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**Rhetorical psychology: Heideggerian reflections on psychology in  
a technological culture**

Sipiora, Michael Paul, Ph.D.

University of Dallas, 1989

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THE BRANNIFF GRADUATE SCHOOL  
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RHETORICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HEIDEGGERIAN REFLECTIONS ON  
PSYCHOLOGY IN A TECHNOLOGICAL CULTURE

by

MICHAEL P. SIPIORA

B.A., SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY, 1976


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
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
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of  
the University of Dallas in partial fulfillment of require-  
ments for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology  
in the Institute of Philosophic Studies.

March 27, 1989

Approved by the Examining Committee:

  
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For Clayton,

(who by his arrival displayed an innate sense of propriety)

in the hope that dwelling  
will be an authentic possibility in his world.

Grateful acknowledgement is made to: my philosophy teachers in San Jose who introduced me to phenomenology, Peter Koestembaum and the late Herman Shapiro; my psychology teachers in Dallas who directed my interests to imagination and culture, Robert Sardello, James Hillman, and especially Robert Romanyshyn who directed the dissertation; and to the other members of my committee, Robert Kugelmann and Dennis Sepper. I would be happy if the values which inform this work are a tribute to my parents, Joyce and Edmond. That the work exists as a completed dissertation must be credited to Teda. My appreciation to her is exceeded only by my appreciation of her.

RHETORICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HEIDEGGERIAN REFLECTIONS ON PSYCHOLOGY  
IN A TECHNOLOGICAL CULTURE  
Michael P. Sipiora, Ph.D.  
University of Dallas, 1989  
Robert D. Romanyshyn, Ph.D.

#### ABSTRACT

A growing number of people seek professional help for psychological difficulties which are less the result of the inherent vicissitudes of individual character than the mark of lives led in a world enframed by technology. Calculative, means-end rationality has replaced the common sense of things which once oriented everyday life and in so doing has occasioned the disorientation, dissatisfactions, and meaninglessness to which a rhetorical psychology is designed to respond. Unlike psychotherapy which engages the individual directly, rhetorical psychology addresses the world, the referential context of meanings, in and through which individual psychological life is experienced.

Rhetorical psychology issues from a synthesis of Heidegger's later thought and the classical rhetorical tradition, particularly its sophistic strand. Heidegger's rendering of Sein as the presencing of world in things' gathering of the fourfold (earth, sky, mortals, and divinities) is appropriated as a metapsychology. This metapsychology, which offers a vision of poetic dwelling as an alternative to the technological mode of world disclosure, converges

with rhetorical understandings of language, truth, and the human condition. Moreover, Heidegger's articulation of meditative thinking, understood as an appropriate response to the enframing of technology and thus a path to poetic dwelling, is seen to have an essential affinity to the theory and practice of epideictic rhetoric, the discourse of praise and blame which displays qualities.

Meditative thinking as "releasement to things" and "openness to the mystery" is integrated with an understanding of epideictic, based in Aristotle and developed through both ancient and contemporary sources, and then interpreted in light of the fundamental ontology of Being and Time. Rhetorical psychology articulates the epideictic performance of meditative thinking within the context of the alienation of the everydayness of being-in-the-world. By way of epideictic's metaphorical amplification of things, a rhetorical psychology endeavors to provoke insight into the presencing of Sein in the technological world and thereby disclose authentic possibilities of mortal dwelling. Given psychology's authoritative social status, feature stories in the popular press are suggested as a possible vehicle for such discourses.

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## EXORDIUM

[P]sychology is not a passing fad on the fringes of society; rather it is deeply entangled in social reality. For this reason any study of psychology must simultaneously study the society and culture of which it is part.

Russell Jacoby, Social Amnesia<sup>1</sup>

### I.

Among the many articles on psychology in the popular press is to be found the story of how today "patients commonly bring in what therapists call 'life situation' problems--chronic dissatisfactions and vague feelings of 'emptiness' in their lives."<sup>2</sup> These 'life situation' problems are in decided contrast to the hysteria, phobias and assorted disturbed states which previous generations of clients had brought into the consulting room. The article in question, "Psychotherapy in the '80s," quotes psychologists as referring to the current maladies as "narcissistic disorders,"<sup>3</sup> disorders which are a breakdown of the self in its relations with others and the world.

Certainly there is truth in psychologist Jerome Frank's assertion, quoted in the article, that ours is a "psychological society" in which individuals turn to therapy for help in coping with "things that are part of the human con-

dition." There exists, according to Frank, "an unwillingness to tolerate distress." We want and have been led to believe that we deserve trouble free, care free, ready made happiness. All too often we do not have such happiness and so we demand that the psychologist--who after all is the expert in emotional matters--fix things up.

There may, however, be more truth in the possibility that it is the condition of the world, rather than the human condition, which is the root of our distress. A virtual Pandora's box of disorientation, alienation, anxiety, stress and depression seems to have been loosened upon us with the dawning of the modern world. While not wishing to overlook or in any way undervalue the psychological specificity of any of these sufferings, it does appear that many of the afflictions which are commonly brought to therapy can be understood, at least in part, as the average experience of living in a world gone mad. Psychologist Robert Sardello has even gone so far as to suggest that

during the twentieth [century], the patient suffering breakdown is the world itself. Medicine, education, money, food, energy, media, technology, religion, law literature, transportation, leadership, business, drama --all of those activities which bring a people together are suffering a massive breakdown. The new symptoms are fragmentation, specialization, expertise, depression, inflation, loss of energy, jargoneze, and violence.<sup>5</sup>

Over two centuries ago, Giambattista Vico, seeing many of the aforementioned symptoms in his world--which in a profound way is our world still--deemed it beset by a "bar-



barism of reflection." (This barbarism is different in kind from the other form of barbarism postulated by Vico in his theory of history: the "barbarism of sense" out of whose shroud of "thick darkness" human society first emerged.) The barbarism of reflection or intellect comes at the close of a social order as the "ultimate civil disease" in which people

have fallen into the custom of each man thinking only of his own private interest....[and live] in a deep solitude of spirit and will, scarcely any two being able to agree since each follows his own pleasure or caprice....In this way, through long centuries of barbarism, rust will consume the misbegotten subtleties of malicious ingenuities that have turned them into beasts made more inhuman by the barbarism of reflection than the first men had been made by the barbarism of sense ....[for] the former, with a vile savagery, under soft words and embraces, plots against the life and fortune of friends and intimates. Hence peoples who have reached this point of premeditated malice...are stunned and brutalized.<sup>6</sup>

The barbarism of reflection overtakes a people when they lose touch with their orignative, communal understanding of the world. In Donald Phillip Verene's commentary:

The common perspective, the sensus communis, which constitutes the basis of human society and which is spontaneously attained through the powers of language and custom, is replaced by determininations of the intellect and reflectively devised means of social organization.<sup>7</sup>

The intellectual determinations which Vico saw as usurping the place of the sensus communis, and in opposition to which he pitted the full force of his imaginative intellect, were those which issue from Cartesian philosophy. Calculative, rational thought--modeled on geometry, fixated on quantity, and obsessed with certainties--comes to be the predominate

mode of reflection.

The technological orientation of contemporary culture is heir to Descartes' world view and Verene specifically identifies this orientation as the current form of Vico's barbarism of reflection. Contemporary thinkers, ranging from Jacques Ellul to Martin Heidegger to Herbert Marcuse, have stressed that technology is neither a mere tool at our disposal nor a neutral phenomenon. Rather, it is "the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity" (Ellul);<sup>8</sup> or the "Enframing" which reveals the whole of beings as "standing reserve" (Heidegger);<sup>9</sup> or a "specific historical project" "for the ever-more-efficient domination of man and nature, for the ever-more-effective utilization of its resources"<sup>10</sup> (Marcuse). The technological ordering of the world supersedes the authority, even supplants the validity of common sense. Means-end rationality (Marcuse)/ calculative thought (Heidegger)/ efficient ordering (Ellul) replaces the sensus communis as the foundation of society.

We experience the barbarism of technology everywhere in today's world: in the culture industry interceding to forge even the most intimate moments of everyday life; in the strictures of information processing laying seige to language and thought; and in the dictate of profit, the machinations of production and the seductions of consumption

conditioning the whole of social relations. In an age in which the malicious ingenuity of technological calculations verge on turning people into beasts (reducing them, as Marx asserts, to only being at home--if at all--in their animal functions<sup>11</sup>), is it so strange to entertain the possibility that many people are turning to psychotherapy in response to their inhuman conditions rather than the perennial sufferings of the human condition?

## II.

Vico claims the primordality of the sensus communis as the basis of the human world and in so doing disputes the rationalist position, specifically that of Descartes, which berates common sense as the uncultivated reason of the masses. "Common sense," as Vico writes in his New Science, "is judgement without reflection, universally felt by an entire group, an entire people, a whole nation or the whole of the human race."<sup>12</sup> Further, its concern is with human needs and utilities and it determines human choices insofar as it makes these choices visible. Common sense is the disclosure of things as capable of particular significance within a specific world, and the revelation of our possibilities within the circumstances of that world. It manifests itself in a grasp of the immediate, concrete situation. "I may add," says Vico in On The Study Methods of

Our Time, "that common sense, besides being the criterion of practical judgment [prudential], is also the guiding standard of eloquence."<sup>13</sup>

A recent essay, by anthropologist Clifford Geertz,<sup>14</sup> offers an illuminating approach to common sense. There it is suggested that, in contrast to the usual anthropological concern with ascertaining its elementary but universal content, common sense be viewed as a cultural system which serves to create a familiar world. Geertz's conception of culture, as he writes in an earlier essay, is "essentially a semiotic one."

Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be these webs.<sup>15</sup>

Common sense claims the world as the source of its authority. It conceives of itself as issuing directly from experience--an immediate knowledge. Geertz's approach disputes this experiential assumption with the counterassertion that each version of common sense is in fact a culturally specific form of considered beliefs. As he clearly notes, the result is not an undermining of common sense's authority, but a relocation of that authority from the world to culture:

If common sense is as much an interpretation of the immediacies of experience, a gloss on them, as are myth, painting, epistemology, or whatever, then it is like them, historically constructed and, like them, subjected to historically defined standards of judgement....It is, in short a cultural system.<sup>16</sup>

The question left by Geertz's analysis leads us to the heart of Vico's conception of common sense: If common sense is part of the human world's web of significations, how is it woven? For Vico, who holds that the true is the made, the sensus communis is neither an arbitrary viewing nor an unmediated perception. When he asserts that common sense is judgement without reflection, he does not deny that the sensus communis is produced. What he asserts is that it is not derived from or deduced by the calculations of rational thought. Ernesto Grassi cautions that "in order to understand Vico's idea, it is above all important to clarify the deeper structure of common sense." <sup>17</sup> Exploration of this deep structure reveals the inherent relationship between ingenuity (ingenium) and imagination (fantasia).

Vico's notion of the sensus communis (in Grassi's interpretation) is the knowledge which originates in ingenuity--the capacity to see the similar in the dissimilar. Ingenuity intuits a commonality between the world's appearances and human needs; it apprehends the appropriateness of the things of the world to the fulfillment of human desires. The signification ingeniously disclosed is then conferred upon the world through the movement of imagination. Imagination grants meaning to things, thereby allowing them to be seen as significant. Together ingenuity and imagination transform nature into culture, and along with this, form common sense. Previously unapprehended significa-

tions are brought together within a nexus of relationships which render them as context and circumstance for human concern and action. The fusion of ingenuity and imagination in the sensus communis generates the common sense of things, which orients a people or a nation within the specific world of their historical existence.

### III.

In virtue of its endowing things with human meanings, the sensus communis is intimately connected to psychological experience for it is in these meanings that the world takes on its psychological materiality. Psychological life, as the phenomenological psychologist Robert Romanyshyn has written, is "a reality of reflection"<sup>18</sup> lived in and through the world. This reality is not a cognitive much less rational construction, although it can be brought to conceptual articulation. It is the pre-thematic, lived understanding of ourselves, our actualities and possibilities, which we discover in the particular configurations of our experience. Romanyshyn likens our encounters with phenomena to seeing ourselves in a mirror--we envision ourselves as we are figured by what we see. The common sense of things is the basic "stuff" or substance out of which psychological reflections are fashioned. Our individual psychological life resides in the meaningful experiencing of self, others, and

things, which is reflected through the common human world.

The barbarism of reflection, as we have said, now appears as the technological ordering of all that exists. The world has been reconstituted as a network of interactive and self-perpetuating procedures, instruments, and resources. This ordering shatters the common perspective that relates the self to others and the world thereby exiling the self--our selves--to the deep solitude of spirit and will which Vico so eloquently laments. Barbarism reigns in the tyranny of calculating the meaning of all our involvements within an input/output, production/consumption, means/end frame of reference--an enframing of life which is the technological world itself. Lacking the bonds of a vital sensus communis, humanity is without a reflection in the world. Devoid of the significations conferred by common sense, human behaviors are nothing but quantifiable events, responses conditioned by contingencies of reinforcement. The reality of psychological reflection passes into oblivion.

The disruption and alienation, even denial of sophisticated psychological life which comes of the barbarism of reflection, takes its toll in the particular symptoms of modern neurosis with which we are all becoming more and more familiar. In one case it brutally disfigures the self, leaving it to wander, lost in the rush of technological progress. In another, it stuns the self into the numb com-

placency of routine functioning. The atrocities suffered by the self at the hands of technological barbarism are a matter of the therapist's daily record.

Immersed as it is in the contemporary world, psychology is not itself immune to the rationality of technology. The effects of this rationality can be seen in psychological practice when therapy becomes a business whose societal function is to produce well adjusted individuals who conform to the status quo. One sees it as well in the reductive and mechanistic theories of the modern science of psychology--a discipline which, as Romanyshyn notes, takes its place alongside two other Cartesian sciences: "a physics of nature and a physiology of the body."<sup>19</sup> Both the business and science of modern psychology participate in the repression of the genuine reality of psychological life.

One of the characteristics of a psychological society is that, beyond just the practice of individual psychotherapy, psychology plays an integral role in society as a whole. Nowhere is this role more pronounced nor the impact of the barbarism of technology clearer than in the relationship between psychology and advertising.

Since its modern appearance early in this century, advertising has done technology's bidding by systematically and intentionally obliterating what vestiges remain of a sensus communis not permeated by technological rationality. In Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social



Roots of Consumer Culture, Stuart Ewen argues that:

the basic impulse in advertising was one of... actively channeling social impulses toward a support of corporate capitalism and its productive and distributive priorities....to succeed, indigenous popular attitudes had to be supplanted.<sup>20</sup>

Advertising supplies the missing link in the cycles of mass production and mass consumption by forging a reflection between human needs and desires, and the goods and services of the marketplace.

For help in manufacturing its imitation of psychological reality, advertising was quick to employ the services of psychology. One of the first to heed the call was the "Father of American Behaviorism," John B. Watson. After being forced out of his academic post in the early 1920's (the result of sensationalized divorce proceedings brought about by quantitative research on sexuality), Watson entered the business world and worked his way up to an office on Madison Avenue. The ranks of psychologists active in advertising began to swell during the decades which followed and by 1955 it was reported that "Agencies that do not have resident head-shrinkers are hastening to employ independent firms, run by psychologists."<sup>21</sup> In the 1980s, not only are advertising psychologists legion, the advertising executive who has not had some training in psychology is a rare exception.

As was already recognized in 1941 by Dr. Ernest Dichter ("Mr. Mass Motivations Himself" as he was known), the cross

breeding of advertising and psychology transforms the ad agency into "one of the most advanced laboratories in psychology."<sup>22</sup> Psychology's expertise melds well with the business of advertising. The techniques of psychological testing are invaluable tools for market research. Theories of personality and identity formation are a mine of motivation strategies. An understanding of perception, cognition and memory are essential to the presentation of product image. Exploration of the depths of unconsciousness paves the way for the manipulation of desires. With only slight exaggeration it can be said that what psychology places in the hands of advertising is no less than the keys to the kingdom--access to the lived meanings which structure the human world. Incorporation of psychological dynamics into the mechanics of mass media advertising confers the power to shape and reshape these meanings as deemed fit.

Vance Packard, in his seminal 1957 work The Hidden Persuaders, expressed grave concern about the "anti-humanistic implications" of the "depth boys'" (a trade term for advertisers who use a psychological approach) handiwork. However, from Packard's perspective, such implications were seen to arise from the abuse rather than the use of psychological power. On the whole, advertising

not only plays a vital role in promoting our economic growth but is a colorful, diverting aspect of American life; and many of the creations of ad men are tasteful, honest works of artistry.<sup>23</sup>

Writing in the 1970s, Ewen acknowledges the importance of Packard's work but criticizes the failure to recognize the inherent nature of modern advertising: "It was born and continues in contestation for control over daily life."<sup>24</sup> The alpha and omega of advertising is the creation of a consumer culture which sustains corporate capitalism. (Within the context of the present inquiry, the nature and origin of corporate capitalism is to be identified with technology in its broad sense as a world order. Consumer culture, as depicted by Ewen, essentially corresponds to the state of affairs given above as the age of barbarism.) Promotion of economic growth is carried out through "the imperialization of the psyche."<sup>25</sup> Advertising diverts attention from indigenous relationships between self and world so that psychological reality can be colonized as a market for selling products and life-styles. In the psychological violence they perpetrate upon our communal sensibilities, the designs of advertising are today's "misbegotten subtleties of malicious ingenuities." How can the individual help but develop "life situation" problems when the "soft words and embraces" which call to him or her from every highway billboard, magazine advertisement, and television commercial cloak a "vile savagery"?

The hand-in-glove workings of psychology and advertising reveal as much about modern psychology as they do about advertising. The "theoretical goal" of psychology, according

to Watson, "is the prediction and control of behavior."<sup>26</sup> Advertising, as Watson's career suggests, is applied psychology. While he does not champion commercial advertising, B.F. Skinner, the most influential proponent of Behaviorism, does endorse his predecessor's goal. In his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Skinner explicitly calls for a "technology of behavior." Based upon the scientific discovery of the objective natural laws which govern "the interaction between organism and environment,"<sup>27</sup> such a technology would modify or eliminate designated behaviors through the use of operant reinforcement. Operant conditioning, which is the pivot upon which Skinnerian Behaviorism turns, is the control of behavior through the manipulation of environmental factors. Skinner proposes this technology of behavior as "possibly the only way to solve our problems ... they cannot be solved by physical and biological technology alone." At the same time he supposes that this technology "will continue to be rejected" until the issues of "Who will use a technology and to what ends?"<sup>28</sup> are resolved.

Skinner is undoubtedly correct in identifying a form of engineering specific to the human as the next logical step after, and the necessary complement to those of organic and inorganic matter. The logic and necessity, however, are those of technology---not psychological life. Skinner's project, whose means and ends are those of control, is the

quintessential embodiment of both technological rationality and the illusion of technology as a tool under human direction. The question by whom and to what end a technology of behavior will be put to use is, in the final analysis, academic. A technology of behavior, precisely in its technological status, has within it its own ends which transform both the premises and the protagonist of its use.

In the straightforward assertion of control as its goal, Behaviorism is the clearest statement of the implicit character of the whole of modern scientific psychology. Whether it takes the form of advertising or that of behavioral engineering, the praxis no less than the theory of scientific psychology is joined to the essence of technology itself: the efficient ordering of the world.

#### IV.

In the course of its arrival in the twentieth century, the perennial querelle des anciens et modernes, in which Vico took his stand against the Cartesians, has become a battle royal for control of everyday psychological life. Judging from the advance of technological rationality into every corner of our lives, the alliance of psychology and advertising has given common sense a sound thrashing. Yet, (and here we return to the place from which our reflections took their initial direction) the appearance of prosperous

life-styles notwithstanding, the reports which issue from the consulting room indicate that disorders are spreading deep within the occupied territory.

There can be no doubt but that psychology is called to help, as best it can and with all the resources at its disposal, those individuals who seek its aid. Such help can and does take the form of many kinds of therapy. (What psychotherapy cannot do, if it is to be an honest and humane vocation, is sacrifice the psychological life of the individual to the order of technology.) What is more, the place of psychology in contemporary culture extends, as has been seen, beyond the walls of the clinic. What exactly might be psychology's calling in the world at large? Does it not have an obligation--thrust upon it by the barbarism of the age--to work toward the recovery of a genuine reality of psychological reflection? Or, could psychology possibly lend its services to the generation of alternatives to, or offer even just a modest refuge from the calculative manipulations of, the technological order? And if so, how?

Concealed in the praxis which issues from modern scientific psychology is the project of a radically different kind of psychology. Upon consideration we can see there are indeed similarities between advertising/behaviorial engineering, on the one hand, and the implications which follow from looking to the world as the origin of specific forms of psychological distress. Foremost among these is a

recognition of the world/environment's role in shaping experience/behavior. Next is an acknowledgment of the inherent relationship between the communal sense of things and psychological reality. And following upon that, an appreciation of the power of imagination and ingenuity to confer significations.

The theoretical shift from a scientific (quantifiable behavior) to a phenomenological (reality of reflection) conception of psychological experience releases psychology from the technological goal of control and thereby allows these elements of praxis to be seen in a new light: instead of psychology employed as a tool of advertising, persuasion can serve in the cultivation of genuine psychological life. In a psychology of cultivation, the Skinnerian conception of the self as a manipulable "repertoire of behavior" which responds to the environment as a "given set of contingencies" reappears in the phenomenological description of human beings as being-in-the-world in which the self, as a relationship to actualities and possibilities, is engaged in a meaningful context of concern. Or, in the more specifically psychological terms advanced by Romanynshyn, the self appears as a figure in the stories woven in the world's fabric of reflections.<sup>29</sup>

With the shift to a phenomenological perspective, the services of rhetoric, "the once and future queen of the human sciences"<sup>30</sup> and Vico's avowed mistress, can be seen as

recommending themselves to the recovery of psychological life. Ingenuity and imagination, for their part, are solicited in revitalizing rather than replacing common sense and thus in the restoration, not distortion, of psychological reflection. Rooted in a evaluative engagement with the world antithetical to Cartesian rationalism, the precepts and art of rhetorical persuasion offer psychology a mode of discourse appropriate to its communal obligations. Classical rhetoric, which has always featured the sensus communis among its perennial concerns, is a phenomenological psychology's natural ally in composing a response to the barbarism of technological reflection.

V.

Although having introduced the present work in terms of the Vichian notions of the barbarism of reflection and the sensus communis, the chapters which follow will be presented in the spirit, but not necessarily the letter, of Vico's philosophy. Vico, however, remains throughout as a pivotal figure. He celebrates the classical tradition of rhetoric and defends it against the fatal onslaughts of Cartesian modernity. His thought, especially in its interpretation by Ernesto Grassi, provides a bridge between Humanist rhetoric, and the dissertation's other major influence--Heidegger's philosophy of Being.<sup>31</sup>



The work begins with a consideration of Heidegger's later thought because it is here that an ingenious and imaginative conception of the world is delineated. Following upon Heidegger's discussion of Being's presencing as the world--in the form of the gathering of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities--a metapsychology (~~Sein~~-analysis) is proposed. The value of this metapsychology is threefold. First, it facilitates an understanding of human beings within and in terms of the world as a psychological reality. Second, it offers an image of experience which amplifies and illuminates human meanings. And third, it leads to what Heidegger calls "meditative thinking" as a paradigm for the recovery of psychological life in an age of technology.

Following the proposal that the craft of meditative thinking is a rhetorical activity, the second chapter outlines the history of classical rhetoric. The rhetorical tradition provides a historical and cultural, as well as theoretical context, out of which psychology can address the concerns which it faces in the contemporary world.

The third chapter explores the theory and practice of epideictic as the specific genre of classical rhetoric whose historical use in cultural/political/social affairs, and whose function in demonstrating qualities, suit it to the needs of psychology.

The fourth chapter articulates the convergence of the sophistic strand of classical rhetoric with ~~Sein~~-analysis

in a humanism appropriate to developing a psychological rhetoric.

The promise of the introduction--a psychology of cultivation as an alternative to a technology of behavior--is the topic of the remainder of the work. In the fifth chapter theoretical consideration is given to the art of combining psychology and rhetoric in the form of a psychological epideictic: a discourse which follows the directive of meditative thinking to open the possibility of a new sensus communis and with it, an integral psychological life in an age of technology. The sixth chapter offers a brief reflection on the mass media "feature story" as a current mode of epideictic which lends itself to the practice of a sophisticated and humane psychological rhetoric.

## CHAPTER ONE

### SEIN-ANALYSIS

#### Metapsychology

In his famous "Case of Ellen West," Ludwig Binswanger tells us that Daseinsanalyse is

a phenomenological analysis of actual human existence ...[which] relies throughout on that structure of existence as being-in-the-world which was first worked out by the analytic of existence. Both with respect to its scientific structure and its method, it therefore makes use in all seriousness of the "new impulses" which arise on the ontological level.<sup>1</sup>

By the term "analytic of existence" Binswanger is of course referring to Martin Heidegger's master work, Being and Time. While Binswanger's interpretation of Heidegger can be seen to differ significantly from that of the other major practitioner of Dasein-analysis,<sup>2</sup> Medard Boss, both rely upon Heidegger's conception of being-in-the-world for the root metaphor of their psychologies. (It should be noted that for neither Binswanger nor Boss is the conception of being-in-the-world merely a metaphor. Rather, being-in-the-world is taken as a phenomenological description of "actual human existence.")

There has not yet been set forth a psychology which "makes use in all seriousness of the `new impulses` which arise" from Heidegger's thought after the so called "turn" (Kehre). In oversimplified terms, the turn in Heidegger's

thought is from a thinking of Being from out of the openness of being-in-the-world to a thinking of the openness of being-in-the-world from out of the clearing of Being. The "turn" is a shift in the direction of thought from Dasein to Sein. As Heidegger himself writes in the "Letter on Humanism":

This turning is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced. <sup>3</sup>

Dasein is the dimension out of which the analytic of existence is experienced; Sein is the location of that dimension.

Sein (Being) in Heidegger's thought is not the Being of metaphysics. Heidegger continually uses alternative spellings of Sein ( Seyn), alternative expressions for Being (the Clearing [Lichtung]), and even goes so far as to cross out the word (~~Sein~~) in order to stress that he is attempting to reach what has remained unthought in the metaphysical tradition. Heidegger's crossing out of Sein is more than a negation of a metaphysical concept. "It further indicates," writes Heidegger, "the four directions of the fourfold [Geviert]<sup>4</sup> and their assemblage at the place of crossing." The fourfold is comprised of earth, heavens, mortals, and divinities. Their assemblage, as we shall see, happens in things and the place of their crossing is the world. In short, ~~Sein~~ means world as the presence of the fourfold as it is gathered by things.

Just as a psychology which follows from the Heidegger of Being and Time is rightly called Dasein-analysis, ~~Sein-~~analysis would be a psychology which issues from Heidegger's thought after the "turn." It would be a phenomenological analysis of the world as the interplay of the fourfold which comes to presence in things. Both with respect to its structure and method it would make serious use of the later Heidegger's notion of "meditative thinking."

Granted, to describe a psychology as an analysis of the world, phenomenological or otherwise, is highly unusual. Psychology, as any introductory text will tell you, is the study of human behavior. Raymond McCall, in his introduction to phenomenological psychology, accepts that designation while noting that not all behavior can be characterized as psychological.

When behavior expresses desire or intention or any other appetitive condition or when it is guided by perception or understanding or any other form of cognition, it is psychological. The secretions of the pancreas and the peristaltic contractions of the gastrointestinal muscles are behavioral, but unless linked in some way with cognition or appetite, such behavior is not psychological.<sup>5</sup>

Cognition and appetite, or simply, thinking and desire are the behaviors studied by psychology. They are the two basic modes in which human beings experience meaning. It must be clear here that meaning is not exclusively or even primarily a cognitive phenomenon but rather a lived sense of being within an orientational context. Physiological events,

in and of themselves, are not experienced as having that sense to them. Jungian psychologist James Hillman suggests that psychology's concern is that of the deepening of events into experiences--the procreation of meaning.<sup>6</sup> Thus instead of simply the study of behavior, psychology might be more appropriately characterized as the study of the meanings of behaviors.

In Dasein-analysis, the meaning of human behaviors is interpreted in light of the existential structure of being-in-the-world. Sein-analysis does not negate this interpretative orientation any more than Heidegger's later works deny the analysis of Dasein presented in Being and Time. Instead, Sein-analysis ventures that the concrete experience (what Heidegger terms the existentiell or ontic understanding) of the existential (that is, ontological) structure of being-in-the-world can be illuminated in terms of the four-fold. It is the world--the gathered presence of earth, sky, mortals and divinities--which in each instance of being-in-the-world specifies the particular existentiell manifestation of existential structures.

Meaning, as defined in Being and Time,

is that wherein the understandability [Verstehbarkeit] of something maintains itself--even that of something which does not come into view explicitly and thematically. "Meaning" signifies the "upon-which" [das Woraufhin] of a primary projection in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as that which it is.<sup>7</sup>

From the perspective of Heidegger's analytic of existence,

meaning is the presence of Being "upon-which" the disclosedness of being-in-the-world is projected or thrown. It is that upon which "something becomes intelligible as something."<sup>8</sup> Dasein appropriates this meaning as the ground of its own being by discovering itself and other entities in terms of the "upon-which" to which they have been delivered over in existing. Within the disclosedness of each individual Dasein, entities can be experienced as "mattering" (or not "mattering"). The way in which something matters within the circumspective concern of being-in-the-world is the existentiell meaning it has for human beings. This second sense of meaning is the "as which" of entities within the world--something "as that which matters".

The transformation of events into experience, which is the essence of psychological life, is a concrete fusion of both of the aforementioned senses of meaning. While what something is and how it matters can be separated when viewed from the perspective of fundamental ontology, no such distinction is made in our experience. Heidegger recognizes this when he characterizes the world as a "referential context of concern." Entities are what they are in their being located within the "whole of significance" which is the world. Behavior is meaningful in that it participates in the disclosedness of being-in-the-world.

Heidegger's turn to Sein is a turn to the presence of the world as that "upon-which" being-in-the-world attains

its intelligibility. Sein-analysis turns to the world as the presencing which grants meaning to behavior in that the world discloses us to ourselves. Sein-analysis takes up the gathering of the fourfold as a way of imagining the disclosive presencing of the world, a way of imagining the deepening of events into experiences.

Sein-analysis is best seen as a metapsychology. Metapsychologies encompass speculation about the origins, structure and function of psychological life. Such speculations are meta-psychological in that they go beyond the givenness, the visibility of psychological life to what remains concealed within the perspective of a psychology itself. Heidegger writes that this other side of a discipline, a side which the discipline "as such can never reach" is "the essential nature and origin of the manner of knowing which it cultivates."<sup>9</sup>

Metapsychology, in its concern with the foundation of psychological knowledge, risks confusion with philosophical enterprises that attempt to ground psychology in a metaphysical perspective. Such grounding fails to reach the essential nature of the phenomena insofar as the psychological falls prey to interpretation by either materialist or idealist metaphysics. Traditional interpretations are precisely what is avoided by following Heidegger's reflections on Sein. In order to illuminate fundamental concepts, Sein-analysis speculates about and amplifies its own terms



rather than reducing them to metaphysical constructs.

Speculation allows something to be seen; it presents a spectacle or image. Metapsychology, or for that matter all meta-level reflection, requires a particular kind of imagination. In discussing primordial history, Heidegger asserts that "beginnings," which are always the "strangest and mightiest" dimension of any phenomena (if they are authentic beginning and not mere derivations), are "inexplicable...not because of any deficiency in our knowledge" but because knowledge of origins is, "if it is anything at all, mythology."<sup>10</sup> Following Heidegger's lead, it may be ventured that Sein-analysis, which speculates about the origin and essence of psychological life, requires a mythical imagination.

Metapsychological speculations may be understood as stories or myths which tell of the primordial nature of psychological life. Like Freud's myth of the primal horde or his notion of the instincts--"mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness"<sup>11</sup>--or the numerous archetypal myths told by Plato, metapsychology provides images of the essential features of psychological life. Metapsychology is very much like the account of the world soul which Plato presents in the Timaeus. "But here," as A. H. Armstrong cautions literal minded interpreters,

we must remember that the Timaeus is a myth, describing the eternally co-existing elements which are necessary to account for the visible universe by means of an imaginary account of its making.<sup>12</sup>

Like the Timaeus's myth, the fundamental images recounted by a metapsychology go beyond the givens of psychological life to illuminate its nature and origin. Such images are their own ground (Grund). They are the ground cultivated by a psychological manner of knowing.

"Myth," according to Heidegger,

means the telling word. For the Greeks to tell is to lay bare and to make appear--both the appearance and that which is present in the coming to appearance, in the epiphany. Mythos is that which becomes present in its telling, namely, that which appears in the unconcealedness of its claim. For all human beings mythos makes the claim which is in advance of all others and which is most fundamental. It is the claim which permits thought about that which appears, that which becomes present. <sup>13</sup>

As mythic, metapsychology permits thought about psychological reality. Seeing through the spectacles of a metapsychology, one is able to recognize the presence of psychological phenomena. The images of a metapsychology guide reflection in such manner that the essential nature of the phenomena are allowed to come to presence in the appearances of psychological life.

Heidegger's notion of Sein is itself mythic in that it is a telling word which makes a fundamental claim. Sein claims the world as the presencing of mortals, gods, earth and sky. This claim brings the world into unconcealedness; it marks the epiphany of the world as world, as what it is in its essence. Sein as the polyvalent presencing of the fourfold is an image, not an explanation of the fundamental

nature of the world. Heidegger warns us that "As soon as human cognition here calls for an explanation, it fails to transcend the world's nature, and falls short of it."<sup>14</sup>

Myth, by virtue of its presentation rather than explanation of that which appears, can reach to the heart of the world's presencing and bring that presence to disclosure in an image.

In a discussion of Parmenides' Moirai fragment, Heidegger remarks that "Thought has scarcely touched upon the essence of the mythical, especially with regard to the fact that mythos is the saying, ...the calling bringing-into-presence."<sup>15</sup> Sein, in its extreme interpretation as a leap out of the metaphysical tradition, is a mythos, a calling bringing-into-presence of the world as the assemblage of the four-fold. The four moments of this gathering--earth, heaven, mortals, and divinities--are given as figures to be seen through, spectacles or images, not as concepts with which to manipulate thought. Classical mythologist Walter Otto says of "genuine myth" that it "deals with living images of reality as it present[s] itself to mortals who had not yet willfully severed their connections with the world and set themselves up in opposition to it."<sup>16</sup>

What Heidegger calls the Event (Ereignis) of Appropriation is Sein coming forth into unconcealment as the four-fold. Earth and sky, mortals and divinities come to appearance in their own integral presence, simultaneous with their being mutually appropriated each to the other. The Event is

itself mythic; it is the coming to presence of the world in the gathering of the fourfold.

Sein-analysis takes the happening of the fourfold as its informing mythology. David Farrell Krell has noted that the "motivation for Heidegger's crossing of Being...springs from an active resistance to the customary way of posing the question of the `relationship` of Being and Man." Krell suggests that Heidegger is instead showing us human beings as "the presencing relation to Being as Being."<sup>17</sup> Sein serves as an image of psychological life as originating in the disclosive appropriation of earth and sky, mortals and divinities. The Event, the worlding of the world, gives us a fundamental mode in which to imagine what it is to be in the world as humans. The myth of the Event tells of psychological life as a reality of reflection lived in and through the world-- "through the things of the world," to quote<sup>18</sup> Romanyshyn. The meaning of behavior, which as we have said is the subject of psychological study, resides in the reflective mirroring of gods, mortals, earth and sky. Sein-analysis, if it is to follow the path marked out by Heidegger's later thought, is led to the mythic configuration of the fourfold as a showing forth of the essentials of psychological life.

## The Fourfold As Psychological Configuration

A major difficulty arises when we come to interpreting the fourfold itself. Heidegger's frustratingly few references to the term are sketchy, at best. In the text in which he makes clear that Sein can "not merely be a negative symbol of crossing out," that it as well points to fourfold, Heidegger refers his readers to the essays collected in Vorträge und Aufsätze. These writings have been translated into English as "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," "The Thing," and "...Poetically Man Dwells...." The fourfold as such appears only in the first two essays with the third being a reflection on the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin, an ostensive source for Heidegger's mythological formulations. Not surprisingly, earlier mention of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities are to be found in Heidegger's discussions of poetry and or art in general, and to a lesser extent in a small number of poetic reflections, like "The Pathway." Most of these discussions show the direct influence of poets such as Hölderlin, Rainer Maria Rilke, Stefan George and Georg Trakl.

Friedrich Hölderlin, universally recognized as one of Germany's greatest writers, is, according to Heidegger, the poet's poet--that is, he writes about the essence of poetry. Three interwoven motifs can be seen as both the source and issue of Hölderlin's poetry: the disclosure of the divine,

mythology as world history, and the role of the poet. History, in Hölderlin's poetry, is the movement of alternating periods of divine presence and absence. Within the context of this mythology, which expresses itself as history, Hölderlin images archetypal modes of contact with the divine. The essential nature of poetry, and hence the role of the poet, is to take the measure for the dwelling of mortals upon the earth, beneath the sky and in the presence of the gods who have now withdrawn.

The notion of the withdrawal of the gods is central to Hölderlin's vision as a poet and is definitive for Heidegger's dialogue with him. One of the yields of this Hölderlinian-Heideggerian dialogue is the notion of the fourfold. The fourfold can be described as mythological provided that it is distinguished from the the world of Greco-Roman myths out of which Hölderlin's poetry itself speaks. In vain, Hölderlin looks to Greece for the presence of the gods. Then, from within the context provided by the mythology of ancient Greece, he recognizes that

we have come too late. Though the gods are living,  
Over our heads they live, up in a different world.<sup>19</sup>

Hölderlin's particular understanding of our situation, his knowledge of the identity of the gods, and his prophetic vision are all re-petitions of the Greece of Homer, Pindar, and Sophocles. The fourfold, on the other hand, is an attempt by Heidegger to re-cognize that of which classical

myths speak and which still lays claim to us in the present epoch. This is not a recovery of the Greek (or for that matter, any particular) tales of heroes, Titans, and demi-gods. In speaking of earth, heaven, mortals and divinities, Heidegger does not follow the prophet and poet in naming the gods. Only a few scattered references to specific deities appear in Heidegger's works. Instead we are given an image of the world in which particular configurations of the four--which is to say, myths--take form.

In addition to its mythical nature, what must also be taken into consideration in any attempt to interpret the fourfold is that it is a poetically inspired image. In the essay "...Poetically Man Dwells...", Heidegger remarks that "poetic images are imaginings in a distinctive sense: not mere fancies and illusions but imaginings that are visible inclusions of the alien in the sight of the familiar." Earlier in the same passage Heidegger tells us that the image lets "the invisible be seen." The fourfold makes visible that which is most alien, awesome, uncanny---Being. The fourfold lets invisible Being be seen in the polyvalent presencing of Sein. This kind of imagining, as Heidegger says of poetic images, is a taking of the "mysterious measure" <sup>20</sup> of man's dwelling. The four regions of Sein are the measure of the world, they bring the world to presence as the world.

Joseph Kockelmans reminds us,

The term fourfold as well as the four terms heaven, earth, gods, and mortals, must be understood as being ontological in character; thus all semblance not withstanding, they do not refer to ontic things, nor do they divide the totality of all ontic things into four basic sets of things.<sup>21</sup>

The fourfold, as an image, is not a representation of anything but rather a way of seeing every-thing such that the world comes to presence in it. The psychologist sees through the image of the fourfold to envision the invisible dynamic which is the Event of the world. This invisible dynamic which the fourfold brings before our eyes is what Heidegger calls the worlding of the world. Far from being a static picture, the fourfold is a vision of the active co-constituting of earth, heaven, mortals, and divinities which is embodied in historically varying constellations.

Yet another caution needs be made concerning the status of the fourfold both in itself and of the four themselves. The temptation to view the fourfold as a set determination of Sein, or as a categorical accounting of the whole of Being must be resisted. Each of Heidegger's formulations of the fourfold, both of the four together and of each separately, is a new attempt to "say" the meaning of Being. Like the poets who inspired his thought, Heidegger continually re-says, reforms, reimagines the figures of sky and gods, earth and mortals. The fourfold as well is not without variation in Heidegger's writings, appearing sometimes as two, other times as three moments. Recognition of the fourfold as a



poetic image, unique in each of its appearances, guards against the temptation of a reductive, literal, or systematic interpretation.

The aforementioned cautions are of paramount importance. Heeding them is crucial lest Sein-analysis become yet another species of metaphysics. Explication of Sein-analysis in terms of myth and poetic images is meant to guard against precisely this danger. Yet the danger remains if myth is misconstrued as a mode of representational thought, or if the fourfold is mistaken as a projection of imagining subjectivity. Representationalism and subjectivism, as Heidegger argues in "The Age of the World Picture," are categories of modern metaphysics which are one with the Enframing of technology.

Sein-analysis takes up the fourfold as a form of what Greek sophism understood as fantasia. (We will return to sophism and fantasia in other chapters, particularly in our discussion of humanism.) According to Heidegger:

In unconcealment fantasia comes to pass: the coming-into-appearance, as a particular something, of that which presences--for man, who himself presences toward what appears.<sup>22</sup>

Imagination (in the sense of fantasia) and myth are representations which originate in the belonging together of the disclosedness of Being and the revealing of being-in-the-world, rather than the metaphysical project of objective certainty. Heidegger writes of this kind of representing

that it is

the apprehending of that which presences, within whose  
unconcealment apprehending itself belongs, belongs  
indeed as a unique kind of presencing toward that which  
presences that is unconcealed.<sup>23</sup>

Sein-analysis, as a metapsychology which follows the "turn"  
in Heidegger's thought, attempts to provide the foundation  
for a non-metaphysical psychology by attending to the four-  
fold presencing of earth, sky, mortals and divinities as a  
"self-unconcealing"<sup>24</sup> of psychological life.

Given its poetic nature, amplification--as opposed to  
analysis--provides the appropriate approach to the fourfold  
as image. The amplification of poetic images preserves the  
integrity of the whole even as it enhances one's perception  
of the parts. Earth, heaven, mortals, and divinities cannot  
be taken as separate components of a composite whole suscep-  
tible to individual dissection (as would an analytical ap-  
proach) because, as Heidegger notes, whenever we name one  
of the four, "we are already thinking of the other three  
along with it by way of the simple oneness of the four."<sup>25</sup>  
The various modes of rhetorical and literary amplification,  
on the other hand, all aim at endowing the image with in-  
creased presence. Amplification of the fourfold as an image,  
whether by intensification, extension, division, repetition,  
or other techniques, discloses the presencing of the world  
in the simple oneness of earth, sky, mortals and immortals.  
The fourfold is gathered in the amplified image in such a

way that a vision of the world is allowed to unfold before our eyes. In beholding that vision, we bear witnesses to a spectacular Event, the worlding of the world.

The impetus for proceeding in this fashion is to be found in one of Heidegger's numerous inquiries into the nature of thingness, "The Origin of the Work of Art." There the thingness of a work of art is seen to reside in the event or happening of truth or aletheia, what Heidegger has translated from the Greek as "unconcealment". The happening of truth in a work of art is the opening of a world. The well worn example from the essay is Van Gogh's painting of the peasant shoes. The painting discloses the shoes as gathering the referential context which is the peasant's world. Van Gogh opens this world for us by setting it forth in his painting.

Truth does not happen in a work of art without those who view it or preserve its openness. Heidegger explains that "Preserving the work means: standing within the openness of beings that happens in the work." This is a knowing of the work not in the sense of any "aestheticizing connoisseurship" but rather "a sober standing-within the extraordinary awesomeness of the truth that is happening in the work."<sup>26</sup> Viewers preserve a work of art by standing-within, probing, exploring, and becoming engaged with the world which it makes visible.

Amplification of the image of the fourfold preserves

the openness of the world of human dwelling in a manner analogous to the audience's preserving of a work of art. Through the image of the fourfold we are granted insight into the specific world gathered by its presencing. A world is opened up for our perusal. In attending to the mutual mirroring of earth, sky, mortals and divinities, we envision a whole realm of existence.

Still, if the conception of the fourfold is so enigmatic, how can it illuminate psychological life? The answer to this question is to be found by following Heidegger's reflections in the essay, "The Thing." This essay provides a way of seeing through the image of the fourfold to present the thingness of a jug. The fourfold allows for the articulation of an earthen jug as the thing which it is. The vital presence of the thing is brought forth thus enabling the recognition of the jug as gathering a world. Heidegger shows us both that the essence of a thing is revealed in its bringing earth and heaven, mortals and divinities together, and that the disclosure of the fourfold comes to pass in what he terms the "thinging of the thing."<sup>27</sup>

The jug, made from the clay of the earth, holds the wine yielded from the grapes which in turn have been grown from the soil and nurtured by the sun and rain from the heavens. The wine provides enjoyment for the mortals who partake of it. The gods are honored in the libation poured in their names. The jug, in its thingness, evokes the pre-

sence of each of the four. As the matrix of interilluminating presences, the jug constellates a world.

Only within a world, a referential context of concerns, can the jug be seen as a specific thing. Envisioning the jug through the image of the fourfold gives us the Event of the world as happening in the physical event of an earthen vessel. An event in the world becomes the meaningful experience of a world. The image of the fourfold allows us to re-cognize the jug as conditioning, "bethinging" us. "This" as Heidegger explains "now means things, each in its own time, literally visit mortals with a world."<sup>28</sup> The particular world which Heidegger's jug draws near is one of harmony in which earth and sky bestow their favors on the labor of mortals and the gods are well disposed to human offerings. (If only all things would visit us with such idyllic tidings!)

In its presentation of a specific constellation of the fourfold, a thing calls us into the nearness of a world. Mortals, being-in-the-world, always find themselves within such nearness. Nearness, in this sense, is the invisible weave of familiarity that is the very fabric of the world. As the presence of the world, nearness comes before proximity in extended space. Only that which is within this primordial nearness can be close by or far away, intimate or distant, friendly or threatening.

In order to grasp how things bring a world into being,

we must amplify the presence of the fourfold's regions. Attention to each of the four brings the world into a clearer focus thus allowing us to explore its nearness.

Earth is the hiddenness from which things arise and it is as well the concealment which accompanies all unconcealment. All attempts at peering within the earth, whether the unlocking of the secrets of geological activity or the splitting of hydrogen atoms, are "successful" only insofar as they bring these phenomena into the daylight of rational, empirical inspection. The earth itself, the blanket of concealment, as Heidegger writes, "spreading out in rock and water"<sup>29</sup> remains poised within itself, unexposed to inspection and calculation. "Rising up into plant and animal," the earth makes its appearance in the "blossoming and fruiting"<sup>30</sup> which preserve its impenetrability while in the same moment bringing forth the inexhaustible wonders of its preserve. Earth is the unseen depth, the primordial origin from which things come and to which they are called to return. Earth is the flow of that which gushes out into unconcealment. Earth is as well the elemental presence and persistence of things which keeps them rooted in an unfathomable darkness yet simultaneously exerts the vitality of self-generation and perpetuation. Heidegger refers to earth as the "serving bearer" and the "building bearer" which "tends" and "nourishes."<sup>31</sup> While not to be simplistically identified as a principle of growth, earth is what drives things to

burst forth and unfold themselves in the face of the sky. Earth is too like gravity, a pull to origins, an attachment to the solidity of the ground which supports us. Earth is all that which under-stands us in a fundamental, foundational mode--the home ground of mortal being.

Simply put, heaven is that which is above the earth. As Heidegger writes, "`on earth` already means `under the sky.`" "The sun's path, the course of the moon, the glitter of the stars ...the drifting clouds and the blue depth of the ether," these celestial phenomena are what Heidegger means by the sky or heavens. "The year's seasons and their changes, the light and dusk of the day, the gloom and glow of the night, and the clemency and inclemency of the weather"<sup>32</sup> are also to be included.

The heavens, traditionally imagined as the realm of transcendence, are the open region in which that which has come out of concealment can shine forth. The sky is the atmosphere in which the things of earth can reach beyond themselves and run their cycles of growth and decay. Heaven is the inviting warmth of the sun's bright shining as well as the chilling fall of a dark night's rain. The heavens threaten and rebuke, calm and conjoie. Time is given by the movement of the heavens. The sky seems always to speak to us of time and place, early or late, far or near. The paths of sun and moon mete out the passing of the day, the coming of night, and the changing of seasons. Out of the unknowable

heights of the heavens the gods either come or fail to appear. Our upward gaze encounters the sky as a height which reaches down to touch the earth at the same time that it rises up from the earth to the mysterious recesses of deep space.

The descriptions given of earth and sky appear as poetic renderings of physical nature. Heidegger's understanding of nature is based on the Greek notion of physis. According to Heidegger,

The Greeks did not learn what physis is through natural phenomena but the other way around: it was through a fundamental poetic and intellectual experience of being that they discovered what they had to call physis.<sup>33</sup>

Physis is not any particular being, nor is it any specified set of observable phenomena. Rather, physis is the spontaneous coming forth and abiding presence of all and any things. It is the self unfolding which brings things to lie before us in unconcealment. "Physis," writes Heidegger, "means the power that emerges and the enduring realm under its sway."<sup>34</sup> This enduring realm is the distance between heaven and earth, the open region in which mortals dwell.

"The divinities," who either appear or fail to appear from out of the firmament, "are the beckoning messengers of the godhead." The godhead is the Holy, that which is removed "from any comparison with beings that are present."<sup>35</sup> The gods, on the other hand, are part of the world we experience, the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). Thus immanent in the



world, the divinities mediate between transcendent Holiness and mortals on earth. This mediation, which constitutes the essence of the divinities, is the presence of the "wholly other" as we experience it within the horizons of our living.

Heidegger notes three historical manifestations of the presencing "of the divine in the world of the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism, in the preaching of Jesus."<sup>36</sup> This can in no way be taken as an attempt at an exhaustive enumeration of the presence of the divine. Influenced by Hölderlin's perception of the gods' withdrawal, Heidegger directs our attention to the divine presence today as a "no-longer" which is "itself a not-yet of the veiled arrival of [the divine's] inexhaustable nature."<sup>37</sup>

While not identical to the Greek gods, it is nevertheless these gods which most shape the figure of the divinities as they are given in the fourfold. Grecian deities are neither unnatural nor miraculous. Like the mortals in whose lives they intercede, these gods are a presence within the world rather than a violation of it. Or, better described, the Greek gods can be understood as modes of the world's presence. "The visage of each true god," according to mythologist Walter F. Otto, "is a visage of a world."<sup>38</sup> The gods are faces, personalities which can be recognized in the world's appearances. In interacting with the world, the mortals of Greek myth felt the touch of the divine, the hand

of powers greater than their own. In the modern world, the mortals of the fourfold experience the divine as an absence before which they "can neither pray nor sacrifice....can neither fall to [their] knee[s] in awe nor can [they] play music and dance."<sup>39</sup>

Human beings, as part of the fourfold, are called mortals "--not because their earthly life comes to an end, but because they are capable of death as death."<sup>40</sup> The mortality of human being-in-the-world is a central theme in Heidegger's Being and Time. Death stands as an ever-present possibility for human beings. It is the extreme revelation of our being because it is the possibility of not having any more possibilities. Death does not come to us as a realized actuality but always remains with us as the experience of having the Nothing as a possibility.

"Death," we are told in the essay "The Thing,"

is the shrine of Nothing, that is, of that which in every respect is never something that merely exists, but which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being itself.<sup>41</sup>

The death of a mortal is, for that person who dies, never an event occurring within the world. When the person dies, the world is Nothing. Death is the shrine of Nothing because in experiencing death as an unactualizable possibility within the world, mortals acknowledge the world--Being as Sein --as No-thing. The ontological difference between Being and beings is disclosed in this experience. World happens in the

coming to pass, the Event, of the Difference. In their devotion to the shrine of Nothing, which is their potential for dwelling with death as their ownmost possibility, human beings are delivered over to the disposition of Being as Sein. From out of the Event of Sein human beings appear as mortals within the gathering of earth, sky, and divinities.

John Caputo has remarked that "in this enigmatic, perhaps even semi-mythical, account of the `four,` Heidegger has captured something profoundly humane." In describing human beings as mortals "Heidegger has, captured the essence of the `human chronology,` the `arc` which takes its origin from the earth and returns to the earth, while passing through the days and seasons of its years." <sup>42</sup> The arc of human life tells a story of the waxing and waning of the power of mortals on an earth that both sustains and denies them, beneath a heaven both calm and threatening, and in the face of terrifying deities who disappoint and surprise.

The story of mortals told in the fourfold, a story which is integral to the Western religious tradition, is ignored in the modern denial of death. And this denial is not just a denial of the death bed but also old age, and even middle age all in favor of an artificially induced fantasy of youth--a fantasy produced in no small part by advertising. To again image human being as a being mortal is to reconnect with traditional understandings that acknowl-

edge the limitations of human power, pleasure, and suffering and in so doing appreciate the diversity and fullness of our humanity. It is within this context that we can understand the importance Heidegger alots to "the powers of encompassing nature and the echo of historical tradition."<sup>43</sup>

As mortals, we never stand alone. Even in the hollow absence of the awaited divinities, being-in-the-world is always a being-with-others. To be mortal is to be "among mortals."<sup>44</sup> As mortals we share in the humanity of others and experience our own humanness as a joint-venture. Mortals are gifted with families and friends, enemies and rivals, all of whom belong in the world with us. Mortals are as far from being isolated egos trapped in animal bodies as the effluence of a mountain stream is from being a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen.

The quadrants of Sein, the regions of the fourfold, belong together in a simple oneness which is the worlding of the world. Heaven, earth, mortals, and divinities are joined in a mutual mirroring which expropriates each to the other while at the same time appropriating each to its own uniqueness. "Each of the four mirrors in its own way the presence of the others."<sup>45</sup> In that mirroring, earth, mortals, heaven, and divinities are given back to themselves as figures reflected in the presence of the others. For example, the figuring of mortals, in the presence of the other three is a freeing of mortals to themselves. The essence of being human

is lighted-up, made visible to mortal eyes in the reflection of a figure on the earth, beneath the heavens, awaiting the divinities.

At the same moment that the "appropriative mirroring" of the four is a reflection which grants to each its nature it also binds them to one another. The essence of heaven and earth, mortals and immortals is expropriated from each to the simple unity of the four. So, as Heidegger asserts, "Whenever we say mortals, we are then thinking of the other three along with them by way of the simple oneness of the four." The reflection which brings each of the four to themselves also binds them "into the simplicity of their essential being toward one another."<sup>46</sup>

Both bound and freed by their gathering, the four belong together as the presencing of the world. "This expropriative appropriating is the mirror-play of the four-fold."<sup>47</sup> The mirror-play is thus the presencing of the world, what Heidegger calls its "worlding." The worlding of the world is Sein. In it the simple onefold of the world presents itself as polyvalent presencing of the four. This is an originary revelation of Being, the Event of Appropriation.

In addition to naming it as the Event, Heidegger describes the worlding of the world in several ways. He calls it the "round dance of appropriating"<sup>48</sup> in order to draw attention to the fluid, playful, and dynamic nature of the

gathering of the four. He also refers to this gathering as the "ringing." The presence of the mirror-play of the world is a joining which has the qualities of being "nestling, malleable, pliant, compliant, nimble--in Old German these are called ring and gering." <sup>49</sup> In all of his characterizations of the gathering of the fourfold, Heidegger conveys the mythic, elusive character of the world's worlding and its generative as opposed to derivative status.

The worlding of the world is the happening of meaning. The Event of Appropriation renders the world as meaningful, a meaningfulness which is measured out by the quadrants of the world's being. Psychological life, the experiencing of meaning, comes to pass in the mirror-play of earth, sky, mortals and divinities. This mirror-play grants the reality of reflection which is psychological life.

### World and Things

Things lie at the heart of Sein for they turn the four toward each other and draw earth, sky, mortals, and immortals together. In things, the fourfold comes to appearance. The thing's dynamic presentation of the four regions of Sein is the worlding of the world. In Heidegger's words, "The thing stays--gathers and unites--the fourfold....Each thing stays the fourfold into a happening of the simple oneness of the world." <sup>50</sup> As we have already seen with the

example of the jug, things gather heaven and earth, mortals and divinities in such a binding way that they manifest a world. "Things bear world." They give birth to the world in assembling the four. The world, in turn, "grants to things their presence."<sup>51</sup> The world's coming to presence is provoked by things, and things are invoked by the world's appearance. World and things belong together in the round dance of Appropriation. In the ringing of the fourfold, world and thing are "disclosingly appropriated"<sup>52</sup> each to the other such that the presencing of one is simultaneously the appearance of the other.

A thing's coming to be in its "thing-ness," that is, in its gathering of the four, is Sein drawing near to human beings as a particular world. Humans figure in that world as mortals. Mortals preserve the fourfold by dwelling. Dwelling is a primordial mode of being-in-the-world. Again quoting Heidegger, "In saving the earth, in receiving the sky, in awaiting the divinities, in initiating mortals, dwelling<sup>53</sup> occurs as the fourfold preservation of the fourfold."

To save the earth means to free it to its own ecology. While this does mean that the planet Earth--in which the earth of the fourfold is manifested but with which it cannot be identified--is to be shielded from exploitation which seeks to subdue it, the earth is still subject to the needs of mortals. Mortals too, on their part, need heed the claims and calling of earth. It is the same with the heavens.

Lighting a fire--in a hearth or a furnace--to disperse the sharp chill of the night is only human. Human too is the parting of nocturnal darkness. In both these acts, and in others of their kind, mortals acknowledge and pay tribute to the power of the sky even as they shelter themselves from it.

Mortals' awaiting of the gods is a measuring of human hope in the face of divine absence. This hope is steadfast and alert to the signs of the gods' return and at the same time discriminating in not mistaking or denying the poverty of their absence. The thought of mortality directs us onto paths appropriate to the powers and limitations of finite beings. This means having a sense of measure which guides our standing out into the openness of the world and revokes any attempts to unreflectively dominate any and all dimensions of being.

"Dwelling preserves the fourfold by bringing the presencing of the fourfold into things."<sup>54</sup> Mortals dwell by cultivating "what produces growth out of itself" and "by erecting things that cannot come into being and subsist by growing."<sup>55</sup> Cultivating and erecting in this way are what Heidegger terms "building." Building is a bringing forth of things as a gathering of the fourfold. Not any and all building discloses the fourfold nor is all building a literal cultivation or erection of actual things. Rather, building--in the Heideggerian sense--is that responsive



relationship to things which receives its directive from the onefold in which earth and heaven join with mortals and divinities. The relationship is one in which things are brought into a world which their presence helps constellate. Building is how mortals dwell in the world such that their being-there preserves the ringing mirroring of heaven and earth, divine and mortal presences. Building is a response stimulated by the presencing of the fourfold; it is the result of being conditioned by things. In building, mortals make visible that particular world granted by specific things.

The modes of presence in which the fourfold, the Event of the world, gives itself to be revealed is what founds history. History, for Heidegger, is the mittence (Geschick), the destining of revealing. Destining is the determination of building ordained by the presence of the fourfold. Historical epochs have their source in the coming to presence of things as gatherings of the fourfold and are to be understood in terms of the multiple ways in which the fourfold prevails.

Different ages are marked by varying constellations of heaven, earth, mortals and divinities. The co-ordination of the four regions, the ascendancy of one or the decline of another manifests itself in differing worlds. The mirroring of the four is expressed in world-historical configurations. The world changes with the changing modes in which the four

reflect and in turn are figured by one another. The changing nature of man, to quote the title of J.H. van den Berg's seminal work in historical psychology,<sup>56</sup> must be understood in terms of the epoch making turns of the round dance of Appropriation.

We recognize the different constellations of the four in terms of alterations in the world's familiarity, its weave of nearness, the ways in which things come forth into unconcealment. Walter Biemel observes:

That unconcealment prevailed in a different way in Greek times from the way it does at present is something that we cannot speculatively deduce or construct but can only gather from the Greeks' way of dealing with and understanding that which is and from their own self-understanding.<sup>57</sup>

Things, that which gathers and unites the fourfold, appeared differently and so were brought forth differently in ancient Greece than in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, or today. What makes the difference visible is the worlds that were built of these things. And what the things of these different historical worlds give us to see are the configurations of Sein--the destinying of Being.

Our time, a time whose name changes even more quickly than the span of a generation--atomic age, nuclear age, space age, computer age, etc.--presents a unique constellation<sup>58</sup> of the fourfold. The gods have most certainly withdrawn and so long ago that even our memory of them begins to fade. The heavens and the earth have both been forsaken. The

dimension in which mortals have their stay is no longer marked out by the open distance between the "deep blue of the ether" and the sheltering of earth. Instead that dimension is surrounded by exploitable resources of liquid, solid and vaporous constitutions. The outward expanse of the firmament has been replaced by the calculable, quantifiable, conquerable reaches of outer space. Even the paths of sun and moon, the cycles of rain and heat, night and day are but factors in calculations which transform their very premises. Earth is treated like dirt, as energy source and garbage dump, pretty garden or nasty mess of long-dead animal matter. Even before the jungle perimeter falls to the gnawing approach of tractor and bulldozer, the earth has been forced to yield up for consumption the jungle's thingly character--its ability to gather and stay the presencing of a world. And what of mortals? They too have disappeared like the earth they stood upon. Human resources, consumers and workers, and video viewers have replaced those who once figured as mortal men and women.

This constellation of the four is held by what Heidegger terms the Enframing (Gestell). The Enframing is the name for the predominance of the technological perspective. "Technology" is not meant in this usage to refer to merely any or even all technological devices and their accompanying uses. Rather, technology is to be understood as a presence of Being in which everything is revealed as

"standing-reserve." Everything is disclosed as a resource to be used at will, to be stockpiled or exploited as dictated by the needs of further technological development. Technology is an ordering of the world, a way in which the world is present to us and revealed by us, before it is ever expressed in any mechanical devices.

The Enframing, the technological disclosure of that which is, is the obliteration of the fourfold, and therefore, as Heidegger asserts, "the denial of world, in the form of the injurious neglect [Verwahrlosung] of the thing."<sup>59</sup> This neglect is no mere passing over, or disregard which ignores things. Quite to the contrary, it is a determination of everything as a resource, a regarding of things as means to an end which in turn become another end in a never ending chain of activity which lies beyond human control. The neglect of things is injurious in its denial of a thing in its gathering and staying world. It is injurious in its disallowance of things' essential nature as the bringing forth and binding of heaven and earth, mortals and divinities. The usefulness of things in the pursuit of the continually unfolding designs of technology obscures their thingness. The world which the thing draws near in gathering the four is passed over, ignored, denied in the rule of the Enframing.

The injurious neglect of the thing gives rise to the "unworld" of technology. Keep in mind that the Enframing

includes all the areas of being which equip the whole of beings: objectified nature, the business of culture, manufactured politics, and the gloss of ideals overlying everything. <sup>60</sup>

Not surprisingly, advertising plays a role in each of these areas. Under the sway of the Enframing, the worlding of the world has given way to coordinated areas of consumption in which man, in the form of the conditioned desires of women and men, appears to be the measure of all things. Technology projects an image of humanity freed from the taint of mortality. Having fallen under the spells cast by the high priests of advertising, men and women are raised up to be the gods and goddesses of consummate lifestyles. Yet the truth is that people are no more the binding, gathering element in this unworld than are things. People, too, are but standing reserve. "Man is the `most important raw material` because he remains the subject of all consumption." <sup>61</sup> Human beings have yielded their wills to the patterns of mass culture dictated by the rule of the Enframing and packaged on Madison Avenue. Heidegger goes even further in describing the "circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption [as] the sole procedure which distinctively characterizes the history of a world which has become an unworld." <sup>62</sup>

In such an unworld the fourfold is vanquished, the worlding of the world denied, and things are relegated to the status of resources. Today we are not conditioned by

things in the positive, constructive sense of being given over to our possibilities in relationship to a world in which the four are joined in nearness. Instead we, like the things of the unworld, become resources at the beck and call of the expanding technological domination of all that exists.

### Attending to Things

As we have seen, it is in the conditioning of things that mortals are visited with a world. Without those worlds there is no returning from the disfiguring cycles of endless consumption. A nontechnological attention to things would seem a possible antidote to the injurious neglect resultant from the rule of the Enframing. Yet, in this unworld of technology, is there any-thing left that we might attend to? Is every-thing now merely a resource?

Things, in any epoch, are rare. Genuine things, things which gather and stay the four are, Heidegger tells us "modest in number, compared with the countless objects ev-  
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erywhere of equal value." A thing "things" when through it a world shines forth. The jug along with

the bench, the footbridge and the plow...tree and pond, too, brook and hill are things, each in its own way.... Things each thinging from time to time in its own way are heron and roe, deer, horse and bull. Things, each thinging and each staying in its own way, are mirror and clasp, book and picture, crown and cross.<sup>64</sup>

The animals and plants of the earth, the birds of the sky, the tools of human making and the accomplishments thereof, are all things which can gather a world. The affairs of state and those of God, ornaments, documents, and works of art are each things which in diverse ways visit mortals with a meaningful context of action and concern. By the same token, all of the above can be standing-reserve for the manipulations of technological advancement. And when they are standing-reserve, these things claim us no more. Just as they cease to draw us into a world, they themselves are sucked into the frenzied cycle of production/consumption.

George Steiner notes that Heidegger "is no Luddite innocent or pastoral dropout."<sup>65</sup> In following the path marked out by Heidegger's reflections on Sein one is incited neither to turn back the clock to before the Industrial Revolution (or the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century) nor to retreat to the high mountain wilderness and the ways of provincial life and culture. Even if one were so inclined, neither is a viable option. To even imagine technology as an evil against which the human spirit must struggle, is to fundamentally misinterpret Heidegger's notion of technology as the Enframing.

In his "Memorial Address," Heidegger discusses an alternative to technological rationality or what he terms<sup>66</sup> "calculative thinking." At the same time that calculative thinking and its manipulation of resources inflicts an

injurious neglect of things, it also provides the essential (and non-essential) goods and services which go far in determining the quality of contemporary life. What Heidegger proposes is not that we refuse the things of the modern world, but rather that

we let technological devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside, that is let them alone, as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent on something higher.<sup>67</sup>

Heidegger goes on to name "this comportment toward technology which expresses `yes` and at the same time `no`" with a phrase taken from the medieval Christian mystic Meister Eckhart, "releasement toward things" (Die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen).<sup>68</sup> In an article on the fourfold, James M. Demske observes that Gelassenheit's "root-verb lassen connotes the basic idea of `letting things be` in Heidegger's full sense of allowing them their authentic reality."<sup>66</sup> Releasement toward things reopens the possibility of dwelling in the world.

Releasement toward things is, on the one hand, an affirmation of the indispensability of modern technology, a recognition of our dependence on its yield. However, concurrent with that affirmation is a renunciation of technology's calculative determination of the whole of beings. The meaning of things is not equated with their latest technological transformation. Our relationship to things is not exclusively calculative. Thus while we live with "the unavoidable



use of technological devices," we nevertheless "deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature."<sup>70</sup>

Die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen, as Caputo has noted,<sup>71</sup> is actually a twofold process. The first moment is a releasement from domination of the calculative disclosure of beings as resources or standing reserve. Gelassenheit in this sense is the detachment which enables mortals to use things in a technological manner and yet leaves the users free in their dwelling. Such detachment preserves the integrity of being-in-the-world as engaged in the daily involvements which typify modern life but not determined by them. The second moment is a releasement to the presencing of Sein in things. In this sense Gelassenheit is an attending to things as the open region in which a hitherto unrecognized presentation of Sein might appear in the midst of the technological world.

Along with "releasement to things," belongs what Heidegger calls "openness to the mystery." This is an appreciation of technology as a presencing of Being, a presencing, as has been discussed, in which the meaning of technology is concealed. The hidden meaning which "touches us everywhere in the world of technology,"<sup>72</sup> is the mystery of Being as the Enframing. Renunciation of the exclusivity of calculative thinking, which is integral to a releasement to things, is what allows us to remain open to this mystery.

The thinking which follows the dual directive of releasement toward things and openness to the mystery is referred to as "meditative." Meditative thinking, which "requires greater effort.... demands more practice....[and] delicate care"<sup>73</sup> than any calculations, is in constant danger of being obliterated by the excesses of technological rationality. Heidegger worries that

the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile [us] that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking.<sup>74</sup>

If that were to occur, if human beings were to forfeit their capacity for meditative thinking, the mystery of the Enframing would remain forever hidden. The complete realization of technological progress would have frightening results. Instead of humanity gaining access to immortality, mortals would be denied their humanity. We would be permanently estranged from our essential relatedness to the earth, sky, and divinities.

### Technology, Psychology, and Rhetoric

Romanyshyn has suggested that "today we may be living in a situation in which there is a world without the psychological and the psychological without a world."<sup>75</sup> Technology's injurious neglect of things results in a displacement of the psychological. Psychological life is replaced by

advertised lifestyles in which there is no place for the reflection of earth, sky, or divinities. The Enframing of technology instigates nothing less than a "crisis of the psychological,"<sup>76</sup> a crisis in which the human world itself is endangered.

It is precisely in the initiation and possible resolution of the aforementioned crisis that psychology's role is at issue. Knowledge, as Nietzsche (or for that matter, Marx or Freud) made us painfully aware, is never neutral. The discipline of psychology is certainly no exception. Implicit in every psychology is an evaluative orientation from which issues a theoretical goal and a potential praxis. Both of these are explicit in the approach to behavior advocated by Watson and Skinner. Clearly, their psychology of control and technology of behavior betray an allegiance to the ordering of the Enframing.

Sein-analysis, in contradistinction, is allied to the dwelling of mortals and thus informed by what can be provisionally designated as humanistic values (those values which come from the belonging together of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities). The theoretical goal of Sein-analysis is the cultivation of the meanings of behaviors. It does this by imagining behaviors in terms of the mutual mirroring of the fourfold which is made visible through things. Given the injurious neglect of things perpetrated by the unworld of technology, a psychology of cultivation is enjoined to

nurture meditative thinking by initiating releasement toward things and openness to the mystery. What remains to be seen is the form of praxis appropriate to the theoretical imperatives which Sein-analysis places on psychology.

When reporters from Der Spiegel asked Heidegger how his philosophy might be employed as a basis for change, his reply was not encouraging. "I know," he said, "of no paths to the immediate transformation of the present situation of the world, assuming that such a thing is humanly possible at all."<sup>77</sup> However, later in the same conversation, the question was posed as to whether humanity's fate (Geschick) is sealed; that is, is the "superior power of technology" "irresistible?" Heidegger's answer was "no" with the proviso that we "pit meditative thinking decisively against merely calculat[ing]." He went on to explain that thinking "is not inactivity but is in itself the action which stands in dialogue with the world mission (Weltgeschick)."<sup>78</sup> Meditative thinking holds out the possibility that we might be granted "a new ground and foundation," a renewed common sense of things upon which our dwelling might flourish even in an age of technology.

While there may not be any way to engender swift and radical change in the unworld from which the gods have withdrawn, releasement toward things and openness to the mystery are, nevertheless, vital activities. But, they are not to be conceived as a form of praxis. Heidegger

admonishes

that the distinction, which stems from metaphysics, between theory and praxis, and the representation of some kind of transmission between the two, blocks the way to an insight into what I understand by thinking.<sup>79</sup>

With the above prohibition taken under advisement, the instances in Heidegger's writings where there is an actual attempt at meditative thinking bear examination. Two essays come to mind. Significantly, both pieces were originally delivered as ceremonial speeches addressed not to a convocation of scholars but to the community at large, albeit a specific community: Heidegger's friends and neighbors in his hometown of Messkirch.

Chronologically, the first of the two is the aforementioned "Memorial Address" which was delivered in October of 1955. The other speech, "Messkirch's Seventh Centennial," was given six years later in July, 1961. Both speeches reveal Heidegger's concern with technology as the Enframing, although for the most part they avoid Heidegger's complex philosophical vocabulary and are devoid of any mention of Being. The topic of "Messkirch's Seventh Centennial" is that of "home and homeland," while the "Memorial Address" focuses on "thinking," as has already been noted.

Both the meditation on "home" and that on "thinking" are a giving over of thought to that which, in the particular time and circumstance of each oration, provokes reflection. Neither is a form of praxis which makes a particular

phenomena into a practical example of a preconceived metaphysical theory or ideological doctrine. By the same measure, the meditations refrain from theorizing to generalizations which lead away from the concrete to a sojourn in abstraction. Heidegger directs his listeners to an engagement with specific appearances, an engagement that opens into the essential presencing of the phenomenon. This is activity as craft, learned through an attentiveness and devotion which comes to recognize and take its directive from the signs given by the things with which it works. Praxis separates thought and act; craft melds knowing and doing. While praxis serves the purposes of theory (or vice versa), part of the craft of Heidegger's thinking is that the reflection is offered for the sake of that which it is about, not as a means to some further end.

At the same time that Heidegger's approach is broadly phenomenological--"to let what shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from  
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itself." --the performance of his thinking, as witnessed in the two addresses, is decidedly rhetorical. Beyond the fact of its oral presentation, the craft of meditative thinking corresponds to the ancient art of oratorical persuasion. The ceremonial function of the orations, the style of their language, their approach to the audience and their focus on the present state of affairs, and their concern with the qualities of their topics are all characteristic of

epideictic or demonstrative rhetoric. Further, as epideictic, the speeches participate, and draw their audience into participation, in the very activity they advocate--meditative thinking.

Classical rhetoric can be seen as a tradition out of which ~~Sein~~-analysis might develop its full articulation. The epideictic performance of meditative thinking, in virtue of its response to technology and its attention to things, seems especially well suited to a psychology which cultivates the meanings of behavior. It comes as no surprise that the bonds between psychology and rhetoric have an ancient history which far predates the rise of modern scientific psychology, an event which roughly coincides with the demise of the rhetorical tradition.

In speculating on a psychology inspired by the "new impulses" which come of the later Heidegger's turn to the world we have come again, albeit by a different path, to the conclusion reached in the Exordium: psychology needs re-join itself with classical rhetoric. Just as advertising can be understood as the praxis of a psychology bent on the control of behavior, epideictic rhetoric can be imagined as the craft appropriate to a psychology devoted to the cultivation of meaning. The hidden persuaders of the media have drawn upon the science of psychology to promote commodity consumption--the epitome of technological valuation. In rhetoric, phenomenological psychologists can find the art of

demonstrating the humane value of dwelling on the earth, beneath the sky, and with the memory of the divine. Ad men have been smart enough to study Skinner and Freud; psychologists would do well to learn from Aristotle and Quintilian. The following two chapters are intended to provide exactly such schooling: the first presents an overview of the history of rhetoric, the second offers a detailed account of epideictic.



## CHAPTER TWO

### RHETORIC

#### Origin

George Kennedy, the noted historian of rhetoric, offers a general definition of classical rhetoric:

It is that theory of discourse developed by Greeks and Romans of the classical period, applied both in oratory and in literary genres, and taught in schools in antiquity, in the Greek and western Middle Ages, and throughout the Renaissance and early modern period.

The exact origins of this theory of discourse are debated and have been so since the classical period itself. Homer is traditionally seen as the inventor of rhetorical speech. This assertion reflects the origin of rhetoric as having been engendered by the situations, both public and private, of communal life. The various addresses and oral presentations, and the figures who make them, testify to the wealth of rhetorical persuasions exhibited in the Iliad and the Odyssey. Homeric oratory was esteemed throughout the classical period and was used as a model for numerous occasional addresses. It was not, however, until the fifth century B.C. that rhetoric was given conceptual formulation.

In 467 political turmoil in the Greek city of Syracuse

on the island of Sicily resulted in the establishment of a democracy. This change in government, indeed change in form of government as the former regime had been a dictatorship, necessitated that citizens of the new democracy be adept in the art of public speaking. The reports which we have of that time differ in their specification of what exactly provoked the need. According to some accounts, most notably that of the fourth century B.C. Sicilian historian Timaeus,<sup>2</sup> an art of rhetoric in the form of written handbooks or instruction manuals was developed to facilitate citizens' speaking in the public assembly. On the other hand Cicero, on the supposed authority of Aristotle,<sup>3</sup> informs us that the rhetoric handbook was first pertinent to the law courts where the redistribution of land and the arbitration of conflicting property claims were the single most pressing issues in the wake of political upheaval. Citizens were required to speak for themselves in Greek courts and were not allowed legal counsel. Given both accounts it seems safe to say that the first handbooks were compiled in response to both civic and judicial needs and thus political and legal rhetoric were those forms of rhetorical speech which first received theoretical articulation.

Corax of Syracuse and his student (or perhaps, colleague or even opponent, depending on which source is cited)<sup>4</sup> Tisias are credited as authors of those initial rhetorics. Although the work of Corax has been lost, we do

know from reliable ancient sources that it focused on arguments from probability as the primary mode of persuasion. Corax also divided speeches into three parts--prooemium or introduction, agon or proof, and epilogue. This tripartite scheme, while modified by subsequent theorists, has for the most part been accepted as the prototypical division of rhetorical speeches. Tisias is said to have made the first of these modifications by placing a narrative or diegesis before the proof. This addition is most suited to legal rhetoric where a narration of the relevant facts is required.

Another candidate for the title of originator of the art of rhetoric is again a Sicilian, Empedocles of Agrigentum. While much is known about this famous "pre-Socratic," the sole source for granting him this specific title is Diogenes Laertius. Diogenes quotes a lost work of Aristotle, the Sophist, in which Empedocles is hailed as "the inventor of rhetoric."<sup>5</sup> And in On Poets, again according to Diogenes, Aristotle is to have said that "Empedocles was of Homer's school and powerful in diction, being great in metaphors and in the use of all other poetical devices."<sup>6</sup> Even if Empedocles' influence on early rhetoric is discounted, as is often done, a literary or poetic element must be recognized in early Sicilian rhetoric. While the handbooks of Corax and Tisias were for the most part manuals which instructed ordinary citizens on how they might best present themselves

and their cause before the court or assembly, the Homeric tradition of evocative and thereby persuasive speech was still practiced.

The poetic element is most clearly recognized in the orations of Gorgias of Leontini. A Sicilian, Gorgias is said to have been a pupil of Empedocles and might have known both Corax and Tisias. Gorgias' diplomatic mission to Athens in 427 B.C. (to enlist the aid of the Athenians against Leontini's rival, Syracuse) marks symbolically, if not actually, the introduction of the art of rhetoric to mainland Greece. Sicily's strong cultural, economic and political links to Greece would seem to have guaranteed that the development of rhetoric on one shore would have quickly spread to the other. Tisias according to some sources, is to have himself brought his teacher's art to Greece.

Gorgias, a master rhetor, is reported to have "dazzled the clever, speech-loving Athenians by his distinguished and almost foreign speech." Although historians of philosophy have been of two minds about the seriousness and depth of Gorgias' thought, his place within the rhetorical tradition is well assured. The major innovation which Gorgias brought to rhetoric was the development of artistic prose which took over various figures of speech from the poets. Hence while Gorgias' name has been lent to numerous figures of speech popular in subsequent fifth-century oratory (Gorgianic figures), especially antithesis, none of these was invented

by him as he drew them from the verse of Homer, the poems of his supposed mentor, Empedocles, and from the Athenian dramatists.

Gorgias' orations were in no way merely artistic. His goal was persuasion, and to attain it he employed both logical argument focused on probabilities and the evocation of the audience's emotions. The poetic dimension of his orations was intended to move his listeners. Gorgias "regarded an orator as a psychagogos, like a poet, a leader of souls through a kind of incantation."<sup>8</sup>

Establishing himself in Athens as a teacher of rhetoric, Gorgias' skill and expertise in court speeches was passed on to his student, Alcidas. It fell to another student of the great Sophist to further develop a highly stylized oration.

Isocrates studied rhetoric under Gorgias, and also possibly Tisias. While Gorgias' style may be depicted as "a tintinnabulation of rhyming words and echoing rhythms,"<sup>9</sup> Isocrates is said not to have yielded to the excesses of Gorgianic figures--although he did employ them--but rather to have possessed a smooth, full, flowing style. To Isocrates (and also to Tisias and to Gorgias) is attributed the definition of rhetoric as "the artificer of persuasion."<sup>10</sup>

Isocrates' ninety-eight years spanned three generations; he was a contemporary of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Several years before Plato's Academy, Isocrates founded his own school in Athens. (This was after a career of numerous years as a writer of judicial speeches.) By way of this school, its over fifty years of a well-developed and established curriculum, its numerous and famous graduates, and the notoriety of his teachings, Isocrates installed rhetoric as the foundation of Greco-Roman education. His school was the forerunner of rhetorical schools which spread through the Hellenic world and whose subjects were the ancestors of the trivium--grammar, dialectic and rhetoric-- which dominated education up until the modern period.

With his teacher Gorgias, Isocrates shared the sophistic belief that knowledge was relative, non-absolute and that therefore a discourse which utilized arguments from probability would come closest to the truth of the matter. Unlike the Sophists who used the presupposition of the relativity of truth to, as Plato writes in the Phaedrus (267a6), "make the small seem great, the great small, the new old, and the old new,"<sup>11</sup> Isocrates holds to a sense of the honorable and the just. In so doing, he reveals the Socratic influence on his thought. In a work entitled Against the Sophists in which he seeks to differentiate the teachings of his school from those of other rhetors, Isocrates describes those teachings as "philosophy" which he defined as "a wisdom in practical affairs resulting in high moral consciousness and equated with a mastery of rhetorical

technique." <sup>12</sup> Kennedy comments that for Isocrates, "Rhetoric and philosophy are the practical and theoretical sides of the same culture." <sup>13</sup>

Isocrates drew no sharp division between rhetoric and politics. The good man, and it is only such men that can by the very nature of rhetoric become good orators, must be active in public life. Accordingly, many of Isocrates' own orations had political subjects. And although one may justly mark Isocrates' political opportunism, there can be little doubt about the sincerity of his panhellenic beliefs.

Isocrates' delivery of orations left much to be desired --possibly owing to failures of both voice and nerve--and so he did not make actual public speeches or participate directly in civic affairs. Instead, he carefully wrote out and edited his speeches which were then circulated in what we might now call pamphlet form.

Gorgias and other Sophists were not always well viewed by the Athenians. These traveling teachers of rhetoric were frequently distrusted because they appeared to be selling wisdom to the highest bidders. Often times the Sophists were foreigners, and this too was a source of mistrust. The most far reaching reaction to the sophists and their conception of rhetoric came not from the populace at large but from a philosopher, Socrates, and from his pupil, Plato.

As is often pointed out, Socrates had much in common with the Sophists. Both he and the Sophists were concerned

primarily with the world of human affairs and not the workings of the physical universe. Where the major difference between the two, or at least the one important to the present discussion, arose is in regard to the nature of knowledge.

For the Sophists knowledge is, as we have seen, relative, and so probable argumentation based upon opinion is suited to its approximation. For Socrates, and also Plato, truth is always the same, and it is known through philosophical reasoning. Rhetoric, from the Socratic/Platonic perspective, must be based on this true knowledge rather than on mere changing opinion. In producing beliefs which can be either true or false, the rhetor can be an agent of deception. In order not to deceive, the orator must first know the truth about that which he will speak. Without this knowledge rhetoric becomes sophistry which provides neither a guide to the truth nor a reliable source of knowledge. Without the benefit of philosophy which points it in the direction of the True and the Good, rhetoric becomes the knack of persuasion which can serve prejudices and conceits.

With the inclusion of Socrates and Plato it is now possible to recognize what Kennedy identifies as the "three views of rhetoric" which emerged out of its "conceptualization in fifth-century Greece" and which have remained "continuing strands in the tradition of rhetoric throughout the history of western Europe."<sup>14</sup> These three strands, the tech-



nical, the sophistic, and the philosophical, will be the focus of attention as we continue to examine the weave of the classical rhetorical tradition.

### Technical Rhetoric

Technical rhetoric can be traced back to the origin of rhetoric in Sicily and the handbooks of Corax and Tisias. These handbooks gave instruction on how to present effective arguments in the courtroom or to make persuasive oral presentations to the assembly. During the fourth and fifth centuries B. C. there was a proliferation of such manuals in Athens and they set the standards for public speaking. They offered a prescriptive approach to the art or techne of effective speech which could be referred to when addressing any of the numerous civic and judicial concerns of citizens of the polis. In terms of content, the handbooks were concerned primarily with arguments and their arrangement, and to a lesser extent, with the style of presentation.

In a now-lost work, Synagoge Technon, Aristotle collected and summarized the handbooks existent in his day. That work was a preliminary to his Art of Rhetoric, and one can detect the influence of technical rhetoric on this philosophical work of Aristotle's. The one remaining handbook that we do have from the fourth century B.C. is the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (Rhetoric to Alexander) probably

authored, as Kennedy notes, by Anaximenes of Lampsacus. This handbook gets its name from a spurious letter from Aristotle to Alexander the Great which serves as an introduction to the text. While representative of fourth-century technical rhetoric, the Rhetoric to Alexander had minimal effect on the course of the development of rhetoric in its day.

The next texts in our possession are from the first century before Christ. These are the De Inventione of the young Cicero, and the Rhetorica ad Herennium falsely attributed to Cicero and likely authored by Cornificius (of whom little or nothing is known). Both works figure prominently in technical rhetoric because of their nature as functional guides to the composition of orations and because they influenced following ages as teaching texts.

The two works are prescriptive manuals which attend to the various dimensions and parts of rhetoric. De Inventione was to be the first part of a series of works covering the five accepted parts or canons of rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. Cicero abandoned the project upon recognition of the youthful shortcomings of the first part. The Rhetorica ad Herennium did cover all of the canons. Like their older Greek predecessors, both treatises place more emphasis on judicial speech than on either political or epideictic orations. However, these early Latin texts are more systematic and academically oriented--in the

sense of relating to instruction of students--than the Greek texts. In addition, they neglect the persuasive roles given by Aristotle to ethos and pathos (of which more will be said below). In this last feature the two works are characteristic of technical rhetoric as a whole which focuses attention on the logos of a speech, i.e., what is said as opposed to how or why it is said.

What also marks these Latin works of the first century B.C. is their inclusion of stasis theory which had been developed by Hermagoras, a Greek of the Hellenistic period. The staseis were systematic articulations of the possible questions at issue to which a speech in the law courts must be addressed. In De Inventione, Cicero extended the range of stasis theory to cover political and epideictic rhetoric as well. The Latin authors also followed Hermagoras in differentiating style according to the three types--grand, middle, and plain--first specified by Aristotle's student, Theophrastus.

De Oratore, the work of the mature Cicero, and Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria, the most all-inclusive of the ancient texts on rhetoric, incorporate elements from technical handbooks with more theoretically-oriented considerations. We will return to both of these works in what follows. What is of importance to note here is that Quintilian builds a complete educational program around training in rhetoric. Cicero had written that "eloquence is

nothing else but wisdom delivering copious utterance."<sup>15</sup>  
Quintilian takes from this the ideal to be imitated in the course of educating the young: the noble orator in whom the fusion of eloquence and wisdom is fully personified.

The subsequent course of technical rhetoric is charted primarily by the role of rhetoric in the educational systems of the ancient world, and then later, that of Christian Europe during the Middle Ages and up through the early modern period. In this capacity rhetoric figures as one of the seven liberal arts, belonging with grammar and dialectic in the trivium. Kennedy points out the tendency of technical rhetoric to experience letteraturizzazione which is the "repeated slippage of rhetoric into literary composition."<sup>16</sup> In the modern period, the handbooks of classical technical rhetoric are given over to a limiting use as instruction manuals for correct composition and style.

The Renaissance offers a brief stay from technical rhetoric's downward slide into the mechanics of composition. Numerous factors (of which we will take further stock in the next chapter) contributed to a resurgence of rhetoric's vitality. Among these are to be counted the recovery, from the libraries of both Constantinople and Western monasteries, of important rhetorical treatises of both Greek and Latin origin. Also significant was the emigration of Byzantine rhetors to Italy and their subsequent impact on the intellectual life of the Renaissance. Notable among

these scholars is George Trebizond whose Five Books of Rhetoric is, as described by Kennedy, " a classical rhetoric treatise in the technical tradition":

it is written in good classical Latin; its examples are classical, drawn from Cicero in the earlier books but expanded to include Greek and Latin poetry and historical writing in the last book; its sources are Cicero and Quintilian, into which are melded Hermogenes, Dionysius, and a few other Greek sources.

### Philosophical Rhetoric

The philosophical strand in the tradition of classical rhetoric begins, as we have seen, with Socrates and Plato. Their stance is a reaction against the mechanical and unreflective dimension of technical rhetoric and the unethical potentialities of sophistic rhetoric. In place of these flawed rhetorics, Plato proposed an idealized rhetoric in which the knowledge of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, fostered by philosophy, will provide the basis for engendering justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom in the souls of its hearers. Kennedy cites a concluding passage from the Phaedrus as "a convenient summary of Plato's fully developed" conception of philosophical rhetoric:

Until someone knows the truth of each thing about which he speaks or writes and is able to define everything in its own genus, and having defined it knows how to break the genus down into species and subspecies to the point of invisibility, discerning the nature of the soul in accordance with the same method, while discovering the logical category which fits with each nature, and until in a similar way he composes and adorns

speech, furnishing variegated and complex speech to a variegated soul and simple speech to a simple soul--not until then will it be possible for speech to exist in an artistic form in so far as the nature of speech is capable of such treatment, neither for instruction nor for persuasion, as has been shown by our entire past discussion (277b5-c6).<sup>18</sup>

Aristotle combines the Socratic critique of false rhetoric with a phenomenological understanding of the workings of the actual practice of rhetoric. In addition, Aristotle brings articulated theories of psychology, ethics, politics, and dialectic to bear on rhetorical persuasion. The result is that in Aristotle's hands rhetoric becomes, in Kennedy's words, "a theoretical activity and discovers knowledge."<sup>19</sup> The function of rhetoric is not mere persuasion but rather, in Aristotle's words, to find out (theoresai) in each case the existing means of persuasion.<sup>20</sup>

As a distinct theoretical art, which is to say, a communicable form of knowledge, rhetoric stands in specific relation to other disciplines. Rhetoric, according to Book I, line 1 of Aristotle's treatise on the subject, is "a counterpart of dialectic." In the Nicomachean Ethics, rhetoric is said to "fall under" (1094b4) politics understood as the master art of the good for man.<sup>21</sup> The placement of rhetoric in a definite relation to the other disciplines, and in that way, the whole of knowledge is characteristic of the philosophical strand of the art.

Aristotle's genius for systemization is apparent in the Rhetoric, although it must be kept in mind that the existing

text is that of lecture notes developed over time and never fully edited by Aristotle as a completed work. The text is divided into three books. Book I articulates Aristotle's conception of philosophical rhetoric and contains his classifications of the different genres of rhetorical speech--deliberative, epideictic, and forensic--and the modes of persuasion: ethos, pathos, and logos. Also in this first book is the treatment of logical proof or logos. Book II contains Aristotle's psychology for it deals with the remaining two modes of proof: ethos which involves the character of the speaker, and pathos which refers to the audience's emotions. Style of language and the arrangement of the speech are dealt with in Book III.

In admitting psychological as well as logical means of persuasion, Aristotle accepts the realities of the concrete rhetorical situation. He is, however, at great pains to stress the propriety of logical reasoning, in the form of dialectics, as an antidote to abuses of emotional persuasion by the sophists. Further, in a manner characteristic of philosophical rhetoric in general, the orator himself is nowhere given the glorified stature and powers afforded him by the Sophists. Nonetheless the good character of the speaker is important in eliciting the audience's belief in what will be said in the speech.

W. Rhys Roberts, one of the Rhetoric's respected English translators and commentators, points out that each

of the work's three books has specific instruction to the person "who aspires to oratorical success."

Book I seems to say "Be logical. Think clearly. Reason cogently. Remember that argument is the life and soul of persuasion"; book II, "Study human nature. Observe the characters and emotions of your audience, as well as your own character and emotions"; book III, "Attend to delivery. Use language rightly. Arrange your material well. End crisply."<sup>22</sup>

Seen from this point of view, Aristotle's Rhetoric has many of the prescriptive characteristics of the handbooks popular in his day. This is especially true in regard to Book III whose treatment of style is suggestive of such handbooks. What is perhaps most distinctive about the Rhetoric is its provision of the theoretical knowledge on the basis of which one might construct a technical handbook. Aristotle clearly shows that knowledge of dialectics and of psychology are prerequisite to knowing what to say in a speech and how to say it well.

After its definitive articulation by Aristotle in the fourth century, B.C., philosophical rhetoric was more or less cannibalized by the other branches of the rhetorical tradition, i.e. technical and sophistic rhetoric. As was noted above, both Cicero and Quintilian incorporate philosophical reflection into their technical rhetorics. The controversy between philosophy and rhetoric continued to flare up from time to time, and many elements of Cicero's writings are best understood as attempts to reconcile the two camps. Nonetheless, philosophical rhetoric as a distinct



element within the tradition ceases to offer an alternative to the technical and sophistic approaches, or provide mediation between them and philosophy.

Philosophical rhetoric did play a role during the Medieval period which should be mentioned and we need to trace this role through the Renaissance. We are required as well to take note of Francis Bacon's contribution to rhetorical theory during the English Renaissance, and mark a late seventeenth century French contribution to the philosophical strand of the tradition.

Much of the intellectual activity of the Renaissance involved the reordering of Scholastic knowledge and the reform of its instituted education. As has already been mentioned, rhetoric, along with dialectic and grammar constituted the trivium of the seven liberal arts--the foundation of education during the Middle Ages. The technical strand of the tradition was preserved within the Scholastic teaching of the subject "rhetoric." On the other hand, the philosophical strand of rhetoric, in the form of the art of the topics, was most influential in the study of dialectic. The art of the topics--the "places" (Greek topos) where one finds arguments on any given subject--is that part of dialectic which Aristotle's Rhetoric looks to for illumination in its process of practical reasoning. Just as the fluent art of persuasive speech congealed into the Schoolmen's mechanical exercise in composition, dialectics

suffered the excesses of the what Humanist Lorenzo Valla termed "Scholastic double talk...[with] all its itas words."<sup>23</sup> To the Renaissance Humanists it was precisely Scholasticism's "barbarous language and its powerless syllogism...[which they] found so deadening."<sup>24</sup>

Valla's solution to the maladies of dialectic and rhetoric was to subsume the one under the other. Dialectic, in Valla's Dialecticae Disputationes contra Aristotelicos (1438), is seen as that part of rhetoric concerned with the invention of arguments. The joining of rhetoric and dialectic, while somewhat more one sided than the vague "counterpart" relationship noted by Aristotle, is a thoroughly Latin (following Cicero and Quintilian) attempt to revitalize the disciplines.

Another Renaissance solution, one with a more decided impact on the future of classical rhetoric, was that of the French rhetorician Peter Ramus. The years between 1543 and 1569 saw the publication of several works on dialectic and rhetoric which form the basis of what became known as Ramism. What Ramus did was to further rearrange the Scholastic scheme of knowledge, only he did so in a direction opposite to that of Valla by firmly dividing dialectics and rhetoric and placing the latter in the subservient role. Recognizing that the trivium entailed the study of logic in two different arts--dialectics and rhetoric--Ramus consolidated those studies under the rubric of dialectic by forcing

rhetoric to relinquish two of its five traditional parts: discovery and disposition. With this concession, dialectic, which is made up of invention and discovery (the second encompassing disposition or the arrangement of a speech), comes to rule over all that is rational and theoretical in rhetoric. Rhetoric is restricted to style and delivery, that is, the ornamentation and expression of the now forbidden fruits of dialectic. (Memory, the fifth part of rhetoric is practically forgotten.)

The rhetoric of Francis Bacon, lord chancellor of England, is especially provocative in its complex relation to Ramism--a relationship that has been appraised quite differently by various scholars.<sup>25</sup> What is clear is that Bacon speaks with the authority of a practicing orator (a dynamic, even commanding orator, if we accept the judgement of so famous a witness as Ben Johnson)<sup>26</sup> who used the art of rhetoric to shape the affairs of the body politic.

There is an urgency to Bacon's notion of rhetoric which is absent from the formulations of Ramus. Ramism's concern with the instruction of youths in Latin literacy was well served by the movement's revision ("weakly inquired" in Bacon's estimation)<sup>27</sup> of the arts. This success is testified to by the numerous editions of its texts and their influential place in the educational systems of the seventeenth century. Ramism's very success is built upon the rejection of an essential dimension of the rhetorical tradition.

"Classical rhetoric is" as Kennedy observes, "essentially civic and essentially oral; Ramism is neither;"<sup>28</sup> Bacon's conception of rhetoric, on the other hand, is both.

In his division of knowledge, Bacon follows Ramus in overturning the Scholastic institution of the liberal arts but goes beyond Ramism in a new organization. Bacon's On the Advancement of Learning (1605) and its expanded Latin translation De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623), initiate a tripartite division of learning--history, poetry, and philosophy--with each discipline based on a different mode of knowledge--memory, imagination, and reason, respectively. Rhetoric appears within the division of philosophy in the role of "transmitting" the knowledge arrived at through the use of logic. While the ordering of logic and rhetoric seems plainly Ramistic, the status of the relationship is not. As Kennedy observes, "Rhetoric is given a secure place of its own in the structure of knowledge, equal in importance to logic, because of its practical utility."<sup>29</sup> Rhetoric's practical utility stems from the fact that, in Bacon's words, "Eloquence prevai<sup>30</sup>leth in active life." Persuasive speech is the coin of the realm in the communal world and without it all reasoning might just as well be solipsistic.

The nature of rhetoric within Bacon's system can be gleaned from his famous statement:

Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as Logic

is to the understanding; and the duty and office of Rhetoric, if it be deeply looked into, is no other than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to imagination, in order to excite the appetite and will.<sup>31</sup>

Rhetoric, in this formulation, involves a purposeful relationship between speaker and audience. That purpose is persuasion, here identified as moving the will. In defining rhetoric in terms of its purpose (as opposed to its techniques) Bacon places himself within the philosophical strand of the tradition. And in defining persuasion in terms of the will, he anticipates the psychological concerns of eighteenth-century philosophy (the effect of which will be discussed below). Further, in identifying the rhetorical enterprise with the effect of the speaker's imagination on the audience's will, Bacon acknowledges the nonrational dimension of that enterprise, and in so doing, reinstates the importance of Aristotle's conceptions of ethos and pathos as modes of persuasion. Thus within the tradition of philosophical rhetoric it is Bacon, "a man who has suffered much from his reputation in the history of science,"<sup>32</sup> who places rhetoric intimate with imagination and initiates a bond between it and reason. ("Antecedents," as Kennedy reminds us, "can be found in Plato and are clearly illustrated by Socrates' second speech in the Phaedrus."<sup>33</sup>) Imagination, in the form of the art of rhetoric, is called upon to bring reason into the world of human affairs, that is, the world of appetite and will, so that it might dis-

perse the idols which distort and undermine the understanding. All of this is indeed a far cry from the severely restricted (and, from a Baconian point of view, constricted) rhetoric of Ramism.

While Bacon's rhetoric, despite its valuing of imagination and its disdain for the Aristotelianism of the Schoolmen, is itself loosely Aristotelian, Francois de Salignac de la Mothe Fenelon, to whose work we now turn, was essentially a Platonist. Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambrai in France, composed his Dialogues on Eloquence during the late 1670s, but it was not published until after the his death in 1715.

Borrowing Kennedy's analogy, Fenelon's Dialogues are to the seventeenth-century art of preaching what Plato's Phaedrus was to fifth-century sophistry. Fenelon combines the Platonic articulation of classical rhetoric with the Christian rhetoric of Augustine to develop a model of discourse suited to preaching. This model is proposed as antidote to the sophistic excess of French church oratory, the day's most popular form of rhetorical expression. "Rhetoric as understood by Fenelon is primary rhetoric: it is spoken and persuasive: focus is on function, on the effect<sup>34</sup> on the audience." Style is used toward the goal of persuasion, not however, to the excesses of conceits. Invention is retained as essential to the art but there is little use for the topics.

Although a document belonging to the philosophical

strand of the tradition, the Dialogues appear on the other side of the division between classical and neoclassical rhetoric. Before we venture further across this divide we need first to attend to the remaining branch of classical rhetoric.

### Sophistic Rhetoric

The view of rhetoric which makes up the third strand in the tradition is the sophistic. As its name implies, this view of rhetoric originates with the Sophists of fifth century Greece. The Sophists were, as was noted above, self-proclaimed teachers of those skills required for success in the public life of the Greek city states. Foremost among these skills was the art of public speaking or rhetoric. In its gross forms the method of sophistic instruction in this art was primarily that of memorization and was notably lacking in any conceptualization or understanding of the theoretical dimensions of the undertaking. This view of the Sophists and their instruction, which was propagated by Plato in his Dialogues, is only partially correct.

Isocrates, whom Plato classifies as a Sophist, directs the same sort of charge against those he identified as Sophists.

W.K.C. Guthrie describes the position of the Sophists (and Socrates) as "a revolt of common sense against the remoteness and incomprehensibility of the world as the

physicists [the pre-Socratic philosophers] presented it."<sup>35</sup>  
This revolt of common sense took the form of a turning of attention to the practical affairs of men. In that arena, probability rather than certainty seemed the rule. The Sophists, as has been said, were skeptical in regard to the possibility of obtaining any absolute knowledge. Faced with the impossibility of a purely rational comprehension of truth, the Sophists turned to emotive presentations which solicited belief. Their reasoning was situational, pragmatic, and relative rather than apodictic and or abstract.

What was said earlier of Gorgias, that he utilized arguments from probability as an element of persuasion, is true of sophistic rhetoric in general. In addition, what the Sophists discovered was the power, hitherto confined to poetry and religion, of human speech in the public realm. Jacqueline de Romilly has made much of the magical powers of Gorgias' speech. In Gorgias' rhetoric, de Romilly ventures that "the very meaning of the power of speech has been transformed...He is the theoretician of the magic spell of words."<sup>36</sup> This element of magical speech will reappear periodically throughout the sophistic tradition.

Isocrates continues the line of sophistic rhetoric. Cicero classifies all rhetoric up to his own day as either Isocratean, which is sophistic, or Aristotelian, which is philosophical.<sup>37</sup> Several characteristic elements of the sophistic strand in classical rhetoric can be identified in



Isocrates' works.

First, Isocrates emphasizes ethos--the character of the speaker--as a noble person who has been made wise by the study of rhetoric. Kennedy comments that sophistic tradition is "responsible for pictures of an ideal orator leading society to noble fulfillment of national ideals."<sup>38</sup> This is certainly the image within which Isocrates saw his own eloquent orations on panhellenism.

Second, while much of Isocrates' efforts are undoubtedly directed toward the the political realm, his actual orations are often occasional in nature, cultural in content, and moral in intent. In this capacity Isocrates is cited as one of the first rhetors to fully develop the genre of epideictic rhetoric which is, according to Aristotle's designation, the speech of praise and blame. While it would be a hasty generalization to identify the epideictic genre with the sophistic strand in classical rhetoric, it is nonetheless sophistic orators who work most frequently in the medium. This will later be clear in our discussion of the Second Sophistic.

That Isocrates did not actually deliver his orations but presented them in highly edited, written form for his audience to ponder at their leisure is a further characteristic of sophistic rhetoric. More than either of the other two basic views of rhetoric, the sophistic was most disposed toward the committment of its final product to literary

form. The most obvious reason for this development can be identified with the presence of ornate language. "Sophistic rhetoric," as Kennedy rightly attests, "is a natural spawning ground for amplification, elaborate conceits, and stylistic refinement."<sup>39</sup> The charm of the medium is as important, or certainly as captivating, as the import of the message in such rhetoric. From the point of view of the reader, who might be far separated in space and time from the original oration, the language of sophistic rhetoric may still be a source of gratification even when the urgency of the message has dissipated.

Isocrates made full use of the sophisticated ornamentation which often distinguishes the third strand of classical rhetoric. While we have already noted that Isocrates avoided the excesses of Gorgianic figures, this did not prevent many of his orations from falling prey to empty verbosity produced by extraneous amplifications. This is an inherent danger in all sophistic rhetoric which relies (often mechanically) on the purely decorative use of techniques of amplification. It is also symptomatic of an even greater peril which faces sophistic rhetoric: that of an intoxication with the emotive power of words which obliterates critical self-reflection on the truth of one's speaking. Kennedy balances the negative potential of sophistic rhetoric, with an appraisal of its actual performance:

If sophists have sometimes liked to shock or indulge

conceits, it should be remembered that most sophists have believed that the orator should be a good man, and their most consistent theme has not been how to make the worse seem the better cause, but celebration of enlightened government, the love of the gods, the beauty of classical cities, the values of friendship, the meaning of patriotism, the triumph of reason, and the artistry of speech.<sup>40</sup>

The Hellenistic period saw the flourishing of rhetorical schools of the type pioneered by Isocrates. Sophists, as the instructors in these schools were called, trained their students in sophistic rhetoric. Technical rhetoric, as found in the various handbooks current at the time, was no less a part of the educational process. Integral to the training given was the use of practice exercises on themes specified by the instructor. Such declamations were composed and delivered in the sophistic mode.

The next significant development with respect to sophistic rhetoric is a movement generally referred to as the Second Sophistic. Philostratus, a Greek rhetor active in the late second and early third Christian centuries, provides a history of sophistry in his work, The Lives of the Sophists. He classifies Gorgias and Isocrates as belonging to the "Ancient" period of sophistry with a new or "Second Sophistic" beginning in the fourth century B.C. but not yielding any memorable orators until the second century A.D. The end of the period is usually cited as coinciding with the fall of Rome and the beginning of the Middle Ages in the fifth century.

The Second Sophistic contains, according to

Philostratus, two different kinds of sophists. The first, the "pure" sophist, is merely a non-philosophical teacher of rhetoric not unlike his Hellenistic predecessor. The sophistic philosopher, on the other hand, is more easily likened to the ancient Sophists who, while also often traveling teachers of the rhetorical art, held considered positions on political, ethical, and cultural topics. Among these rhetors are numbered Dio Chrysostum in the first century, Aelius Aristides and Herodes Atticus in the second, and then later in the fourth century Libanius, Themistius, Himerius, and the emperor Julian the Apostate.<sup>41</sup>

The philosophical sophists were often spellbinding orators of great renown. They attained popularity for their public declamations which were attended as forms of popular entertainment. After their original oral presentation many of the orations were, like those of Isocrates, extensively edited and circulated in written form. There is, as pointed out by de Romilly, a reemergence during this period of the magical dimension of rhetoric associated with the ancient Sophist, Gorgias, who is looked to by many of the Second Sophistic as the father of their art.

By virtue of their public stature, the sophistic philosophers were solicited to perform various civic functions ranging from the undertaking of diplomatic missions to the delivery of ceremonial addresses. A great many of the orations of the Second Sophistic belong to the

latter category including speeches at festivals, funerals, and other occasions such as the visit of a dignitary. Two treatises attributed to the third century rhetor, Menander, are sophistic handbooks which describe these highly conventional types of epideictic speeches.

The sophistic philosophers, who were active until the end of pagan antiquity, were an integral, positive element of the society to which they belonged. They were the last ambassadors and the final champions of Hellenic culture. "The sophists," writes Kennedy,

were like fashionable preachers who encouraged belief in inherited values of religion and morality in the most polished and elegant form, and they contributed significantly to the stability of a society whose major goal was preservation of the status quo in the face of barbarian attack and new religious movements.<sup>42</sup>

Despite theological misgivings about and mistrust of the medium, the new religious movement which replaced the pagan world-view, Christianity, found classical rhetoric extremely useful in patterning its discourses. An important reason for this is that, not surprisingly given what we have already seen of the nature of education in late antiquity, many of the early Church Fathers were trained in rhetoric. This included not only Augustine, but also Tertullian, Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius (the former all having been teachers of rhetoric), Ambrose, Hilary, and Jerome--the Latin Fathers--as well as Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and John Chrysostom--the Greek

Fathers.

While the contributions of Augustine and the other Latins are better classified as belonging to the technical strand of classical tradition (acknowledging nonetheless the existence of some sophistic elements), the rhetoric of the Greek Fathers was of a decidedly sophistic nature. Their sophistic oratory was primarily expressed in epideictic forms: funeral orations (epitaphios) and panegyric sermons (technically, panegyrics were a Greek form of epideictic delivered at festivals). The latter sermons, as opposed to the homily which addresses itself to interpretation of Scripture, were occasional orations delivered at special events, such as the consecration of a new church or on holidays marking the liturgical year.

The heyday of sophistic rhetoric in the early Church occurred during the fourth century, after Christianity became the state religion. In the hands of able orators such as Gregory of Nazianzus, sophistic rhetoric was used to achieve "an eloquent synthesis of Hellenic culture and Christian values."<sup>43</sup> Like the other Greek Fathers, Gregory did not think that rhetoric itself was a proper subject for Christian study, yet that did not prevent its utilization in the propagation of the Christian faith.

During the Middle Ages, sophistic rhetoric figured most prominently in the Greek-speaking Byzantine Empire. Forensic rhetoric had held the greatest appeal to the practically

oriented Romans, and it was this attraction along with later socio-economic factors, such as the degeneration of urban life, which set the technical tone of rhetoric in the West during the medieval period. The Eastern Empire, on the other hand, with its Hellenist heritage, long periods of relative stability and prosperity, and cultural and political conservatism was more inclined to sophistic oratory. This was so not only because of sophistry's characteristic ornateness and ceremonial dimension but also because of its potential cultural function in generating adherence to communal ideas and values. As Kennedy observes, "the functions performed by Greek sophists of later antiquity continued to be performed throughout Byzantine history once they had been adapted to Christianity."<sup>44</sup>

The Renaissance, as was noted in our earlier discussion of technical rhetoric, witnesses a reemergence of classical rhetoric in the West. The ever increasing material prosperity of Europe yielded a resurrection of civic life. In the newly prosperous cities a renewed interest in classical learning was coupled with the demand for effective public speech in daily affairs. The joining of theoretical interest and practical need led to a flourishing of the art of rhetoric.

The new practitioners of the art were those scholars, teachers, and writers collectively known as Humanists, in virtue of their devotion to the studia humanitatis. By dint

of their knowledge of classical languages and their physical searches through the ruinous libraries, the Humanists retrieved rhetorical works by Cicero, Quintilian, and various Greek authors from historical oblivion. No less important was the intellectual transfusion received from the Eastern Empire. New and, in many cases, first-time Latin translations of previously unavailable works of Plato were made possible on the basis of Byzantine texts. From the late 1300s to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Byzantine world's active knowledge of rhetoric was, to a great extent, transferred to the West, the city states of Italy in particular.

Victoria Kahn, in her book Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance, draws attention to the fact that "Quattrocento humanism was a civic humanism, which means that rhetoric was in the service of the active <sup>45</sup> life." This view of rhetoric was later to be shared in the English Renaissance by Francis Bacon, as we have already noted. Leading Italian Humanists such as Coluccio Salutati, Leonardo Bruni, Gioviana Pontano, Poggio Bracciolini, and Lorenzo Valla (whose structuring of the relation between rhetoric and dialectic was discussed above) were employed in various capacities by municipal or papal agencies. Kahn explains that

Political conditions in the republics and courts of Italy created the need for the humanists' rhetorical activity, at the same that time the humanists' literary



interest in antiquity led them to recover classical arguments for the superiority of prudence [practical reason based on probabilities] to theoretical reason within the realm of action.<sup>46</sup>

While it was primarily in the newly recovered (or simply retranslated) texts of Aristotle and Cicero that the Humanists found their arguments for prudence (and further, the articulation of its intimate connection with eloquence), their understanding and use of rhetoric is clearly cut from the same cloth as sophistry from Gorgias to the rhetors of Byzantium. In many ways, as Kennedy observes, the Quattrocento Humanists bear a striking resemblance to "the leading figures of the Second Sophistic, who were also teachers of rhetoric, admirers of the classics, orators, and letter writers."<sup>47</sup> In addition to their actual practice of rhetorical speaking, the Humanists exhibited a sophistic concern for written rhetoric distinct from the reduction of rhetoric to rules of literary composition.

The Humanists' hopes for the betterment of humanity via the power of education were all but dashed on the rocks of prejudice during the waves of religious wars which broke over Europe in the wake of the Reformation. One famous casualty of the religious violence was Peter Ramus. A Huguenot, Ramus was among the martyrs of the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre.

For all the tragedy of Ramus' death it nevertheless contributed, along with the (apparent) orderliness and

(superficial) coherence of his work, to the widespread appeal of Ramism in French and English (including American) educational systems. On the other side, the impact of Ramism with respect to the loss of the Renaissance (and classical) rhetorical ideal--the union of eloquence and prudence within the civic realm--was mentioned in our earlier discussion of Ramus and Bacon.

Ramism, Cartesianism and the Demise of the Classical Tradition

At this point in our inquiry, having traced the strands of the tradition up to the beginning of the modern era, we need to take stock of those developments which herald the new age and dictate rhetoric's place in it. One such development which bears closer examination is the implications which follow upon the ascendance of Ramism within the intellectual and educational framework of the West.

Rhetoric's concession of invention and disposition to dialectic, engineered by Ramus' revamping of the trivium, pares down its territory to that of pleasing and ornate expression. James Golden and Edward Corbett aver that

The most significant effect of this reassignment, however, was that the conceptualizing part of the composition process came to be regarded as an activity of private inquiry rather than one of the steps in the preparation for communicating with an audience.<sup>48</sup>

Not only does rhetoric, the artificer of persuasion,

become what we now so disparagingly refer to as "mere rhetoric," but thought itself is sealed off from the world, a first step in its impending encapsulation in the uniquely modern phenomena of subjectivity. Referring to the further historical repercussions of Ramism, Walter Ong writes:

the rhetorical approach to life--the way of Isocrates and Cicero and Quintilian and Erasmus, and of the Old and New Testaments--is sealed off into a cul-de-sac. Speech is no longer a medium in which the human mind and sensibility lives. It is resented, rather, as an accretion to thought, hereupon imagined as ranging noiseless concepts or "ideas" in a silent field of mental space. Here the perfect rhetoric would be no rhetoric at all. Thought becomes a private, or even an anti-social enterprise.<sup>49</sup>

The Ramist revision of logic is made possible not only by the curtailment of the domain of rhetoric but also by the collapsing of disciplines which preserved Aristotle's distinction between two forms of argumentation. When Ramus combined all the logic he found being taught in the trivium, he placed under one roof the division Aristotle sets out in Book I of the Topics between scientific demonstration and probable reasoning. Demonstration or analytical reasoning starts with premises which are "true and primary." This kind of reasoning is concerned with what is certain and its inferences carry the strength of necessity. On the other side, probable reasoning is dialectic as it is recommended in Aristotle's Rhetoric in the form of the enthymeme. The enthymeme, a syllogism with one of the premises left un-

stated, has as its provenance the probable and is appropriate to the realm of opinion. Ong points out that for Aristotle, in contrast to the subsequent Scholastic interpretation of the enthymeme as simply an abbreviated form of an analytical argument, rhetorical syllogisms reach their conclusion on the basis

of something unexpressed, unarticulated: enthymema primarily signifies something within one's soul, mind, heart, feelings, hence something not uttered or `outer-ed` and to this extent not a fully conscious argument...what we today would call a subconscious element.<sup>50</sup>

Analytical proofs, by way of contrast, leave nothing unarticulated nor anything to the thought of the heart and are thus suited to the exacting reasoning of the sciences.

Ramus' logic, coming as it does in the wake of Scholasticism, preserves only the superficial distinction between the two forms of reasoning even as it attempts to develop a form of argumentation which overcomes the practical impotence of its predecessors. The failure of Ramist logic to advance beyond that ineffectual status and provide the basis for the then rapidly expanding field of experimentation is, however, attributable less to its retreat from the world of opinion (by denying the validity of rhetorical inventiveness) than to the limitations of the Medieval logic he had rearranged but not fundamentally altered. It would be left to another Frenchman, Rene Descartes, to articulate a new method for scientific thought. In the meantime, Ramism had succeeded in that which was not its intent--leading

classical rhetoric down the path of modern irrelevance.

We should recall that George Kennedy's description of classical rhetoric, with which we initiated our present survey of the tradition, takes us no further than the early modern period. This is so because it is at the onset of the modern period that the very fabric of the classical rhetorical tradition is rent by an unprecedented transformation of how the world is perceived. Even more significant for the fate of rhetoric than the revival of Greek classicism in Europe during the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, the rise of modern science ushers in a radically new conception of reality which undermines the foundations of the rhetorical tradition.

The distrust of rhetorical method--which had remained a dimension of the tradition since Plato's Socrates first interrogated Gorgias about the teachings of the Sophists--now eclipses that very tradition. Aristotle, moderating between potential deceptions of sophistry and the unrealistic vantage point of Platonism, had positioned his rhetoric in the guiding light of dialectic. The notion of truth which illuminates the rhetorical enterprise is that of the probable which is deduced via enthymeme from generally accepted opinions. Probability is thus recognized as that form of truth appropriate to the flux and flow of human reality--a reality both rife with possibilities and riddled with uncertainties. The new method, which takes issue with

the very concept of probable truth and thereby the rhetorical method itself, is that of the critical philosophy of Rene Descartes.

In his Discourse on Method, published in 1637, Descartes articulates the philosophical basis for the worldview of modern science. Descartes equates the the real with the rational using the clarity and distinctness of ideas as the criteria of truth. Following the model of geometry, Descartes deduces all knowledge from simple, self-evident truths. The Cartesian method subjects to doubt all that is not given as immediately certain. The merely probable is accordingly rejected as false. Descartes' new logic completely rules out rhetoric's dialectical rationality.

Cartesian rationalism, as Ong shows, brings with it a transformation of both thinking and knowledge. Thinking is no longer the shared pursuit of truth shaped by the specificity of historical circumstance and carried out within the communal realm of language. With introduction of systematic doubt and the criteria of clarity and distinctness, thought becomes private inquiry located within the confines of an isolated subject itself clearly and distinctly separated from the world. At the same time, Cartesian subjectivity presupposes a neutral world composed of a plurality of individual, distinct and separate things. The question of means of access to this objective world is answered by the assumption of a natural order of things

whose appearance is identified by Descartes as that of mathematics. Thus Ong can say of Descartes and indeed modern science in general that "Study of such a world is felt not to be a response to the world but an operation upon it."<sup>51</sup> The world is real insofar as it is quantifiable through the mathematical operations of modern physics, the queen of the new sciences. How far removed is this view from that of the old queen of the humanities, rhetoric, can be surmised from remembering the art of the topics as a response to a situation of dialogue by the discovery of places (in the world) where arguments could be found.

The impact of Descartes' philosophy on the whole of modern thought cannot be overestimated. The single work which most testified to that impact and interpreted it in the area of logic and rhetoric was a work coauthored by Antoine Arnauld and first published in 1662: The Art of Thinking, better known as The Port Royal Logic. Arnauld presented his work as including all one needed to know about thinking; rhetoric is explicitly debunked as having "contributed little toward thought, expression, or embellishment."<sup>52</sup> Via the Port Royal work, Cartesian logic and its underlying mathematical conception of the real had a major impact on the subsequent developments of the now demeaned field of rhetoric both on the Continent, and in England and America.

The spirit of the new science with respect to classical

rhetoric is nowhere better exemplified than in the pronouncements of England's Royal Society. Here the watchword is "facts," only the facts and nothing else. Science was to be freed from the obscurations and patiently unnecessary amplifications of the elusive and deceptive ornamentations of rhetorical speech. The Society's 1663 charter of incorporation explicitly banishes "rhetorical flourishes" from the reports of its members.

This utter disdain and distrust of rhetoric--it was quite literally looked upon as a form of obscurantism--was a common feature of both Cartesian Rationalism on the Continent and British Empiricism. Witness the remarks of John Locke, himself a member of the Royal Society, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689):

If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness; all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgement; and so indeed are perfect cheats (3.10.34).<sup>55</sup>

This "more radical departure from the philosophical assumptions of classical rhetoric than anything previously encountered" is "quite properly" viewed, in Kennedy's judgement, "in terms of the impact of the new science."<sup>56</sup> He explains that

Put in an extreme form, the new logic claimed that the only sound method of inquiry is that of geometry, proceeding from self-evident axioms to universally accepted conclusions. The topics of dialectic and rhetoric are useless in discovering the truth or demonstrating



it, and the five traditional parts of rhetoric are a form of deception. The role of the orator seeking to dominate communication is inappropriate, and to stir the emotions of an audience is unacceptable.<sup>57</sup>

A slightly different but nonetheless concordant observation is made by Ong: "With the advent of the age which we from one point of view call the technological age...rhetoric was not wiped out or supplanted, but rather disrupted, displaced, and rearranged."<sup>58</sup> The legacy of this seventeenth-century disruption of the classical rhetorical tradition can be understood, as does Ong, as no less than, "from one point of view, the story of the modern world."<sup>59</sup>

Here, at the threshold of modernity and in distinct opposition to its Cartesian spirit, stands Giambattista Vico, professor of rhetoric at the University of Naples. In "On the Study Methods of Our Time" (De nostri temporis studiorum ratione), a speech given to inaugurate the academic year of 1708, Vico critiques Cartesian rationalism and denounces its influence on education and culture. Elio Gianturco observes that "the characteristic note of Vico's criticism of Descartes..."

[is the] emphasis on man as an integrality (not sheer rationality, not mere instinct, but also fantasy, passion, emotion), and his insistence on the historical and social dimension.<sup>60</sup>

The pursuit of geometric clarity and distinctness is judged clearly inapplicable to moral and civic concerns toward which education must ultimately be directed. With respect to these matters, Vico values synthesis over analysis, probability

over certainty, history over science, and linguistics over mathematics. Vico values eloquence and prudence over ratio and replaces it with them as the focal point of an education which includes, but is not controlled by, modern science.

Vico's championing of rhetoric and its method did little to stem the tide of Cartesianism. "On the other hand," as Maria Goretti has remarked,

he, the eulogizer of eloquence, the estimator of that verisimilitude that makes up the warp and woof of vital human communication, appears to us not only as the bold asserter of human freedom in a world dominated by Descartes, not only as the vindicator of "worldly" reality, but also the master of modern humanism.<sup>61</sup>

### Rhetoric In Modernity

For our present purposes in detailing the rhetorical tradition, we can simply chart several approaches to rhetoric which characterize the modern period (the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) and lead us up to the present. These modern trends include the revival of the technical strand of classical rhetoric, the Neoclassical philosophical approach, the Elocutionary Movement, the fusion of rhetoric with belles lettres, and an epistemological approach arising from British Empiricism.

The mid-eighteenth century, as we shall soon see, was among the most active periods in the history of rhetoric despite its distance of some hundred years from the

pronounced demise of the classical rhetorical tradition. Golden and Corbett, in their introduction to English rhetoric of the period, offer an explanation in terms of a combination of interests:

From its beginning, the eighteenth century [exhibited] ...a pervasive enthusiasm for the newly developing empirical method, a commitment to rationalism, a curiosity to understand human nature and man's relationship to God, a preoccupation with the origin and use of language, and an appreciation of the potentialities of persuasion as a force in a democracy and in a Christian society. <sup>62</sup>

These interests do much to explain both the similarities and dissimilarities which exist between classical rhetoric and rhetoric as it appears in modernity. While the existential situation which provokes thought about language, humanity, and God, and solicits the service of persuasive speech in the civic realm seems to be a bond between classical and modern, their respective understanding of each of these things separates them. To a great extent it is in terms of the empirical viewpoint of science that rhetoric undergoes the displacement and rearrangement which characterize its modern appearances.

The appearance of modern science and the extension of its world view to nearly every area of life did not immediately obliterate all traces of rhetoric's classical tradition. The revival of the technical rhetoric of Cicero, which waxed and waned from the late fifteenth through the nineteenth century, is a case in point. Provoked by the

deficiencies of late medieval Latin, numerous of the Renaissance Humanists upheld the emulation of Cicero's Latin as a doctrinaire remedy for stilted prose and improvised diction. The works of the great Roman rhetor were also appealed to somewhat later at the end of the Renaissance in protest of Ramus' realignment of rhetoric and logic. Accompanying each of these reactionary positions were counter reactions against strict Ciceronianism which were championed by those who favored other models for the rising vernacular languages. The technical dimension of rhetoric which survived in the educational systems of Europe and America was, however, to be influential in the development of the new languages.

Ciceronian rhetoric was taught in the schools, primarily but not exclusively at the elementary and secondary levels, well into the nineteenth century. On the Continent it was Jesuit schools which did the most to preserve a vestige of the classical tradition. In England, John Ward's A System of Oratory, which received widespread if fleeting popularity when it was published in the mid-eighteenth century, was a thorough and accurate, albeit uninspired restatement of the Ciceronian corpus.

One outcome of the technical strand of the classical tradition as it unravels in the modern age is, as we have already commented, its reduction to rules of composition. Enroute to this entombment in the tomes of modern grammar and speech, the flourishes of Ciceronean rhetoric issue forth

once more, only this time in the guise of seventeenth-century baroque eloquence. This phenomena is more properly seen as gaining its impetus from the Counter Reformation's reaffirmation of religion's mysterious side and its accompanying symbolic expression, rather than the Ramist reduction of rhetoric to style. In its extremes, baroque eloquence is divorced from the rationality of philosophical rhetoric, and indulges in empty amplifications and superficial ornamentations. The whole of rhetoric becomes identified with the elements of style thus leaving the tradition open to both attack, such as that of Locke, and general dismissal as "just so much talk."

We may now turn to another approach which too has a close link to the classical tradition--Neoclassical philosophical rhetoric. The new classicism of the late seventeenth and the eighteenth century, modeled as it was upon Greek sources rather than the primarily Latin ones of the Renaissance, brought a renewed interest and understanding of Attic philosophy and culture. An admiration for things Greek translated into a recovery and expression of classical forms in literature, art, and architecture with an eye toward raising the cultural level of the emerging nation states.

Representative of Neoclassical rhetoric is the Dialogues of Fenelon already discussed. Fenelon's understanding of philosophical rhetoric reaches back to Plato while his articulation of this tradition is accomplished

within the context of Christian preaching in the French language. Fenelon's work was translated into English and became well known among British audiences. Chief among the English writers on rhetoric influenced by the new classicism was John Lawson. Lawson, whose Lectures Concerning Oratory appeared in print in 1758, turned to Plato and Aristotle, and to the classically oriented Bacon, in order to reply to the charges leveled at rhetoric by Locke. Lawson's work, as is also true of that of Ward, was dry and without any real vitality and so was quickly outshone by the new psychological-philosophical theories then current.

The middle of the eighteenth century also saw the zenith of the elocutionary movement, the twilight of which would last for over a hundred and fifty years extending, if only in a superficial form, into the twentieth century. The movement combined the sophistic preoccupation with delivery and the prescriptive and classificatory dimensions of technical rhetoric. After the Ramists had deprived rhetoric of invention and disposition (including memory), and the practitioners of the new science had discredited style, delivery was all that was left of the five traditional parts of rhetoric. Ironically (or maybe as the reason for its escape from censure) this part of rhetoric had been virtually ignored in the West since the disappearance of the schools of rhetoric at the end of the Roman period. During the seventeenth century authors concerned with pulpit oratory,

as was Fenelon, had devoted some attention to the art of rhetorical delivery. However, it was not until the following century that the lamentation of the lack of a proper speaking of English, even among the professional classes and clergy, gave rise to a modern theory of delivery.

Foremost among the members of the elocutionary movement in England--which included John Walker and Gilbert Austin--was the Irishman, Thomas Sheridan (father of the famous playwright). As a whole, the movement sought to apply the new empirical method to the study of voice and gesture in order to articulate a science of delivery. This science extended as well to empirical correlations between the speaker's performance and the effect it had on the audience understood in terms of the faculty psychology of the day. Foss, Foss, and Trapp point out that the work of the elocutionists

foreshadowed the use of the scientific method to study all aspects of human communication, and their theories had a tremendous effect on how speech was taught in American classrooms in the nineteenth century.<sup>63</sup>

The elocutionists, particularly Sheridan, gained considerable popularity despite some rather daunting drawbacks of their work. Among these must be included a lack of understanding of the classical rhetorical tradition with the exception of a knowledge of Quintilian's discussions of delivery, excessively mechanical prescriptions for control of voice and gesture, and exceedingly complex classifications of emotions which often bordered on the absurd. Per-

haps worst of all, the whole of rhetoric was mistakenly identified (if not overtly by the elocutionists, then by their audience) with delivery.

While the elocutionary movement concerned itself with primary rhetoric, the belletristic movement of roughly the same time period focused much more on written rhetoric and the joining of rhetoric with other arts. The relationship between belles lettres (beautiful letters) and rhetoric can be traced back to the early seventeenth century and the Continental attempt to revive the studia humanitatis under this new name.<sup>64</sup> A century later the movement would receive its most precise articulation and enjoy its greatest popularity not in France but across the Channel in the hands of Scotsmen.

Adam Smith lectured on the unity of rhetoric and belles lettres at Edinburgh during 1748. Roughly forty years later in 1783, a member of Smith's audience would publish his own Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres likewise delivered at Edinburgh. This was Hugh Blair, whom Kennedy honors as "the British Quintilian."<sup>65</sup> Like Quintilian, Blair integrates rhetoric into an educational system which preserves the components of rhetoric's fusion of wisdom and eloquence in their general preview while acknowledging the declining possibilities for classical orations. Blair lauds the wisdom and achievements of ancient rhetoric at the same time that he pays due heed to the findings of the new science and the



peculiarities of the modern world. The ideal for Blair was less the rhetor than the competent writer and critic who could apply standards of taste to all the fine arts. "Taste, according to Blair, is perfected when a sensory pleasure is coupled with reason--when reason can explain the source of the pleasure."<sup>66</sup>

Blair's work was extremely influential and its numerous editions were widely referred to during the course of the next century both in England and the United States. In terms of the history of rhetoric, Blair made a significant contribution to the letteraturizzazione of rhetoric and the incorporation of its precepts into literary criticism.

The remaining trend in modern rhetoric, the epistemological, is by far the most influential. Tempting though it is, it would be a mistake to imagine this trend as initiating a reconciliation of classical rhetoric and modern psychology-philosophy. Instead what we have is a theory of human communication behavior developed on the basis of the new logic of experimentation and its concomitant understanding of human nature. Although occasional reference is made to one or another of the Ancients, and numerous of the concerns of classical rhetoric--the means of persuasion, the role of the speaker, the audience's reaction, etc.--are addressed by this theory, its view of the world and human reality are unmistakably those of British Empiricism not Platonic or Aristotilean metaphysics. As it turned out, Locke's scathing

critique of rhetorical language was far from the only element of his philosophy relevant to the modern appraisal and understanding of rhetoric.

Representative of the new epistemological approach is George Campbell's The Philosophy of Rhetoric which was first published in 1776. Like so many of the thinkers of the day, Campbell felt that the Ancients were deficient in their understanding of human nature. The starting point for developing a more exact and penetrating theory of rhetoric would have to be a reexamination of human nature itself. Golden and Corbett observe that "in grounding rhetoric in human nature, Campbell accepted the following tenents advanced by Locke, Hume, and Hartley:"

(1) the mind is separated into faculties; (2) the experimental method is superior to syllogistic reasoning; (3) the ideas as held together by the laws of association; and (4) belief and persuasion are dependent upon the liveliness of an idea and the force of emotional appeals. From Hutcheson and Smith, Campbell borrowed the doctrine of sympathy and used it to explain the speaker's relationship with his hearers. Finally, he included Reid's philosophy of "common sense" as one of the three constituent elements of intuitive evidence.<sup>67</sup>

Like the work of Blair (a fellow Scotsman, clergyman, and contemporary), Campbell's rhetoric was influential through out the English speaking world. The Philosophy of Rhetoric was popular as a college text and in that role it freed students from having to labor through the Ancients' theoretical discussions of the nature of rhetoric and rhetorical persuasion by providing an alternative theory

supported by the "superior", empirical knowledge of the new sciences.

The nineteenth century witnessed a continuation, albeit less active, of the modern responses to the tradition of classical rhetoric. Among the century's few high points in respect to the history of rhetoric are John Quincy Adams' classically oriented Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory delivered at Harvard in 1806, and Richard Whately's 1828 work, Elements of Rhetoric, Comprising an Analysis of the Laws of Moral Evidence and of Persuasion, with Rules for Argumentative Composition and Elocution. Whately's rhetoric is often seen as a continuation of that of Campbell with the added emphasis on argumentation its titles implies.

There were also a number of scholarly inquiries into ancient rhetoric undertaken during the nineteenth century. These were largely the work of classical philologists whose interest in the rhetorical tradition was primarily academic. Christian Walz's Rhetores Graeci, Richard Volkman's Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Romer in Systematischer Ubersicht, and E. M. Cope's English studies of Aristotle's Rhetoric are influential examples.

### The Contemporary Status of Rhetoric

The complete triumph of the new science of the seventeenth century in the form of twentieth-century technolog-

ical culture has reinforced the mechanistic, mathematically modeled world view which rent the fabric of classical rhetoric. Information processing, the updated version of the reporting methods of the Royal Society, requires a constant purging of all that is mere rhetoric. On the other hand, advertisers, the new sophists who fulfill the worst of Plato's misgivings, are given license to ply their trade anywhere and everywhere in daily life.

In the academe, by contrast, there appears to be a renewed interest in and appreciation of the importance of the rhetorical tradition. Certainly the teaching of speech and composition at all levels of education is the continued legacy of the rhetorical tradition. Beyond that, however, contemporary work in what can be identified as rhetoric (even if not labeled as such) is often carried out in the form of interdisciplinary research. Participants include but are not limited to communication theorists, philosophers, literary critics, logicians, and classicists. Areas of study include but are not limited to anthropology, linguistics, psychology, philosophy, and semiotics. Frequently this multidisciplinary mix of topics and orientations is found under the title of speech communication or simply, communication theory.

A recent work, Contemporary Perspective on Rhetoric, testifies to the twentieth century's interest in the tradition and to the spectrum of vantage points from which this

interest has been and is being pursued. Chapters in the book are devoted to I.A. Richards, Richard Weaver, Stephen Toulmin, Chaim Perelman, Ernesto Grassi, Kenneth Burke, Michel Foucault, and Jurgen Habermas. The editors assemble this ensemble of perspectives in the following way:

Richards and Burke, for example focus on the study of language as central to rhetoric. For Weaver and Perelman, however, values are a starting point for their examinations of rhetoric. The approach to or perspectives on rhetoric provided by Toulmin, Grassi, Foucault, and Habermas might be best described as epistemological; for them how we know and communicate on that knowledge is of central concern. One also could see Toulmin, Weaver, and Perelman as taking an "argumentative" perspective on rhetoric, since they are concerned with the developments of arguments as a means of persuasion.<sup>68</sup>

It would take us too far afield at the moment to locate each of these thinkers' perspectives within the tradition and identify their specific predecessors. What we do recognize almost immediately is that rhetoric in the contemporary period is again involved with many of the issues and concerns of the classical tradition. Hence Kennedy's optimistic observation that in the work of these contemporaries "the classical tradition seems to have entered a new phase in its long and distinguished history."<sup>69</sup>

Our project of a rhetorical psychology which cultivates the meanings of behavior is fully comprehended only when it is recognized as part of this new phase of the tradition. This recognition is in turn dependent upon an appreciation of the place and development of epideictic within classical

rhetoric and Western cultural history, the subject to which  
we now turn.

## CHAPTER THREE

### EPIDEICTIC

Of the three genres of rhetorical speech, the epideictic most eludes precise theoretical definition while exhibiting the greatest diversity of usage. We will attempt to articulate the unique character of epideictic by: first, charting its early development; second, surveying its treatment at the hands of the major theorists of the classical tradition; third, attending to the periods of its greatest use; and fourth, reviewing current discussions of epideictic including those of thinkers mentioned at the conclusion of the previous chapter such as Chaim Perelman and Kenneth Burke. The understanding of epideictic yielded by these inquiries will provide the basis for evaluating the genre's relationship to psychology.

#### Origin and Ancient Theory

The earliest examples of orations which prefigure the epideictic genre can be found in the Homeric corpus. Various of the speeches delivered in the Iliad, particularly those lamenting the loss of the dead and consoling the living, exhibit the occasional nature which later comes to be connoted by epideictic.

The two types of occasional address which were much in use by the late fifth century B.C. were the funeral oration and speeches given at festivals. During this time the Athenians instituted an annual public address in honor of the recent dead. This public expression of mourning was an addition to the already existing practice of private elegies. Both the epitaphios (funeral speech) and panegyric (festival address) were prose pieces presented by orators who either supplanted or shared the podium with poets. The evolution of rhetorical prose out of the earlier practice of poetic laments or festive odes coincides with the conceptualization of rhetoric as a whole.

In his article, "The Classical Conception of Epideictic," J. Richard Chase makes note of Volkmann's assertion that in the wake of Gorgias' introduction of rhetoric to Athens, oratory was "divided into two classes:"

pragmatikon, the practical oratory of the Athenian citizen who possessed the right to speak in the court or in the assembly of the people, and epideiktikon, the oratory of the non-citizen who was permitted to speak only at festivals or through either the written word or, as logographers, through the Athenian citizen.<sup>1</sup>

The ranks of the Sophists were predominantly filled by foreigners who were allowed to engage in public speaking only at special times such as festivals. The oratory which they did practice on those occasions, or circulated in written form, was that of rhetorical demonstration. This accords with the root meaning of epideiktikon as "display".



The development of epideictic rhetoric in the hands of the Sophists follows upon Gorgias' facility with artistic prose. W. Rhys Roberts regards Gorgias "as the initiator of epideictic oratory, the oratory of display and ceremonial, which took its cue from the public recitations of Homer's poems." <sup>2</sup> A case can also be made for Gorgias' student, Isocrates, as the one most responsible for the development of the genre. Suffice it to say that from its origins, epideictic rhetoric has had a strong bond to the sophistic strand of the classical tradition.

Praise and blame were often the subject of sophistic display. Both festival and funeral orations, possibly because of the ritual/religious nature of their occasions, gave way to formulization (early on for the epitaphios and somewhat later in the case of panagyric). Part of the formula for each type of oration was a measure of praise--for the dead and their deeds, or the gods, or the participants in athletic games, or the city of the festival. The element of praise was expanded by the Sophists into full blown orations which likewise quickly took on a highly structured appearance.

An abiding interest of both sophistic and philosophical rhetoric during this period was the nature, purpose, and basis for the attribution of praise and blame. By way of this concern

fundamental notions of ethics...the division of 'goods'

into those of mind, body, and circumstance,...and the classification of good qualities of character and actions under the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance<sup>3</sup>

become integral to the theory and practice of epideictic.

A prime case in point is the discussion of virtue in Aristotle's Rhetoric undertaken in the context of the topics appropriate to epideictic discourse.

Numerous of the early speeches of praise are on fanciful or mythological subjects. They exhibit the stylistic ornamentation which emerges as a hallmark of epideictic. The Helen of Gorgias, and also that of Isocrates, and Agathon's speech praising Eros in Plato's Symposium are well known examples. It was left to Isocrates to employ this type of oration in praise of contemporary persons outside of the context of funerals or festivals.

During the fifth and early fourth centuries (that is, before Aristotle's Rhetoric), speeches of praise and blame--egkomiastikon (encomium) and psekitikon--were known as separate rhetorical forms. (Encomium, as distinct from mere praise, is often times exaggerated and insincere, even completely fabricated and meant solely to embellish its subject. Aristotle, on the other hand, confines praise to the setting forth of "greatness of virtue," while "encomium deals with achievements" [I.ix.33].) By the same token, epideictic was not synonymous with orations of praise and denunciation. This is reflected in the Rhetorica ad

Alexandrum of Anaximenes which divides all rhetoric into two categories: that of the assembly and that of the court. Epideictic is absent from Anaximenes' scheme while praise and denunciation are included in rhetoric's seven functions. (The other five functions are: exhortation, dissuasion, accusation, defense, and inquiry.) According to Quintilian, "Isocrates held that praise and blame find a place in every kind of oratory."<sup>4</sup>

Aristotle's definition of epideictic is highly influential in all further theoretical articulations of the genre. What marks the Rhetoric's specification of the genres as innovative is their classification according to the role played by their audiences. "The kinds of Rhetoric are three in number, corresponding to the three kinds of hearers" (I.ii.22). The hearers are either judges or spectators. Deliberative rhetoric is addressed to an audience, usually a political assembly, who must judge whether a proposed course of action is well or ill-advised. The jury, who are the hearers to whom forensic discourses are directed, must judge whether or not past events accorded with the rule of law. The hearers of an epideictic are spectators (theoros). They bear witness to the spectacle, the rhetorical display, of an epideictic. No decision is required of the audience of an epideictic, save possibly that of evaluating the speaker's skill. Theodore Burgess, in his classic study "Epideictic Literature," states that "the theoros is so named from the

analogy of the theater,"

where the audience are mere spectators and entertainment is the chief purpose. He looks upon an oration chiefly as a display of intellectual ability, and this attitude of mind on the part of the auditor distinguishes the epideictic branch of oratory from all others.<sup>5</sup>

Aristotle further differentiates the rhetorical genre according to its subject, time, and end. "The epideictic kind," writes Aristotle, "has for its subject praise or blame" (I.iii.3). The end toward which such discourse is directed is the "honorable and disgraceful" (I.iii.5). The Rhetoric speaks "of virtue and vice, of the noble and the disgraceful, since they constitute the aim of one who praises and of one who blames" (I.ix.2). The time period appropriate to an epideixis is the present, "for it is the existing condition of things that all those who praise or blame have in view" (I.iii.4). Aristotle adds that "it is not uncommon, however, for epideictic speakers to avail themselves of other times, of the past by way of recalling it, or of the future by way of anticipating it" (I.iii.4).

According to Chase, Aristotle's formulation of epideictic functions in two ways. First it

designates a class that is dominated by the praising and blaming of things noble and disgraceful. On the other hand the term is also descriptive; retaining its etymological sense, it connotes an oratory of display.<sup>6</sup>

By defining the genre in terms of its hearers, Aristotle was able to unite the various elements adhering in the current practice of epideictic oration. The definition avoids an

exclusive identification of the genre with any of its particular manifestations, from sophistic encomium to highly conventional funeral orations. There is, in the Rhetoric, an implied identification of epideictic with all speeches not specifically deliberative or forensic. The notion of the genre as a catchall for orations which do not neatly fit elsewhere, a notion fueled by the ambiguities inherent in epideictic itself, has plagued rhetorical theorists since Aristotle.

Another earlier aspect of epideictic mentioned by Aristotle is that of the genre's appropriateness to written compositions. Already noted was the meaning of epideiktikon as referring to the orations of foreigners which could only be given at festival, or by way of delivery by Athenian citizens, or as was frequently the case, in written form. Just as the sophistic strand of classical rhetoric was more inclined to the literary presentation of speeches than was either the philosophical or technical strands (the letteraturizzazione undergone by the latter being the absorption of primary rhetoric by composition rather than an expression of rhetoric in written form), Aristotle tells us that epideictic discourses are inherently disposed to being presented for reading. This is so because written compositions require a style which is "most precise" (or in Cope's translation, "nicer accuracy and higher degree of polish and finish") (III.xii.2). Epideictic style, by virtue of its attention to

display, is able to furnish such precision. Quintilian will later echo this position.

Isocrates was among the first to master the art of the literary presentation of speeches. Roberts notes that by the time Aristotle was lecturing on rhetoric, "Epideictic oratory, such as that of Isocrates, was coming more and more to be a pamphlet, not a speech; in theme and occasion it had never been so restricted as the other branches of oratory."<sup>7</sup> The association of epideictic with a literary or written presentation allows it an audience which extends beyond those immediately present. In recognition of this, Roberts goes on to say that "Isocrates was right when he looked beyond Athens and his own age, and thought that an author should appeal to a wide public of intelligent readers."<sup>8</sup>

Isocrates and his school trained both rhetoricians and historians. While the influence of epideictic on history is quite clear with Isocrates, the relationship between rhetoric and history can be traced back to the origins of rhetorical theory. Burgess notes that "Corax, Tisias, and Georgias were founders of the Sicilian school of history as well as oratory."<sup>9</sup> There are two specific areas in which rhetoric and history converge. The first is easily recognized in the speeches often included in ancient Greek histories. The second is that of narration. It is in this second area that epideictic rhetoric is of greatest influence on the work of historians. Both historical narrative and epideictic dis-

course rely upon formal description, and it is on this count that historians are wont to borrow freely from the various devices of epideictic style.

Epideictic rhetoric was largely neglected by the Romans. The closest native Roman form of oratory to an epideixis was a funeral speech which differed in both composition and intent from its Greek counterpart. Classical rhetoric, like the rest of Greek culture, was introduced into Roman society during the Hellenistic period but it was primarily forensic and to a much lesser extent deliberative oratory which attracted the practically oriented Latins. Epideictic rhetoric appears most frequently during the period of the later Empire and then it is often employed as a means of flattery.

The Rhetorica ad Herennium, which is among the earliest Latin tracts, follows Aristotle's delineation of three genres and identifies epideictic with the discourse of "praise or censure of some particular person."<sup>10</sup> In form typical of technical manuals, the ad Herennium instructs its readers on the composition of an epideixis, specifying the appropriate topics of praise and censure.

Cicero refers to epideictic, which he defines in De Oratore<sup>11</sup> as "the extolling or reviling of particular persons," as laudatio or laudatory oratory by virtue of its primary function of attributing praise. Further on in the same text is the remark that "Romans do not much practice

the custom of panegyrics [laudationum]."<sup>12</sup> However, in the earlier De Partitione Oratoria, an essay on technical rhetoric Cicero composed for his son, epideictic is mentioned in a favorable light:

For there is no class of oratory capable of producing more copious rhetoric or of doing more service to the state, nor any in which the speaker is more occupied in recognizing the virtues and vices.<sup>13</sup>

The Orator contains Cicero's most interesting appraisal of the genre. Among the last of his works on rhetoric, it is a defense of Cicero's career as an orator. Epideictic, "a class comprising eulogies, descriptions, histories, and exhortations like the Panegyric of Isocrates, and similar orations by many of the Sophists," is omitted from general discussion because it denotes "speeches unconnected with the battles of public life"<sup>14</sup> --the battles of the courts and Senate which occupied Cicero. This does not mean that epideictic is without merit. Much to the contrary, epideictic is the "nurse" of the orator for it builds vocabulary, allows experimentation in sentence structure and ornamentation, and in general is a training ground for the eloquence of a good orator.

"Epideictic oration," in summary,

has a sweet, fluent and copious style, with bright conceits and sounding phrases. It is the proper field for sophists, as we have said, and is fitter for the parade than for the battle; set apart for the gymnasium and the palæstra, it is spurned and rejected in the forum.<sup>15</sup>

Accordingly, Cicero is sure to distinguish his profession of



oratory from that of sophistry. Orators persuade with reason; sophists delight their audiences: "they frequently wander from the subject, they introduce mythology, they use far-fetched metaphors and arrange them as painters do colour combinations."<sup>16</sup>

The practical value of epideictic to the orator, other than that of providing a training ground, consists in its being an opportunity to speak of values. Cicero observes that the "principles of awarding praise and blame...have a value not only for good oratory but also for right conduct."<sup>17</sup> Here the philosophical dimension of Cicero's rhetoric is clearly evident. The principles of praise and blame are only accessible through a knowledge of the virtues as only virtue merits praise. Contrarily, it is the lack of virtue which calls for denunciation. The virtues which Cicero has in mind are primarily the four cardinal virtues of the classical tradition: justice, temperance, courage and wisdom. Thus in those places where Cicero does focus his attention on epideictic, the majority of the discussion is devoted to the nature and types of virtue, and the sort of praise they merit.

Quintilian, whose Institutio Oratoria we have noted as being the most comprehensive of ancient rhetorical treatises, has more to say about epideictic than does Cicero but essentially he shares his esteemed predecessor's primary concern with legal and political rhetoric. What remarks

Quintilian makes about epideictic are illuminating in their clarification of the nature and scope of the genre.

While questioning the place of orations which "console, pacify, excite, terrify, encourage," if epideictic is confined to the "task of praise and denunciation" (III.iii.3) Quintilian nonetheless holds that Aristotle's tripartite division of rhetorical genres covers all species of oration. What will justify this division in Quintilian's eyes is not the role of the hearers but the existence of three distinct classes of causes. The notion of cause is to be understood "in the sense of the Greek hypothesis or subject" (III.v.18). Each cause has, in turn, "a certain essential basis [statu]" (III.vi.1). For the most part, Quintilian takes his statis (status) theory from Cicero who designates the bases as conjectural, definitive, and qualitative in response to the three general questions: "whether it is, what it is, and of what kind it is" (III.vi.44). "All the topics of demonstrative oratory," according to the Institutio Oratoria, "involve a qualitative basis [statu]" (VII.iv.3).

Quintilian notes that the genre of praise and blame is referred to as "laudatory" by Cicero while the Ad Herennium calls it "demonstrative" rhetoric. "Both names," he goes on to explain "are believed to be derived from the Greek in which the corresponding terms are encomiastic, and epideictic" (III.iv.12). On the basis of the example of panegyrics which

contain elements of both praise and advice and so would not be classified purely as encomium but would certainly qualify as epideictic, the latter is asserted to be the wider and more appropriate term.

Quintilian resists what he feels is the better translation of epideictic as "display" in recognition of the fact that all three oratory genres "devote themselves in part to the matter in hand, and in part to display" (III.iv.14).

This leads him to the conclusion that:

it may be that Romans are not borrowing from Greek when they apply the title demonstrative, but are merely led to do so because praise and blame demonstrate the nature of the object with which they are concerned (III.iv.14).

The nature of that which is praised or blamed is the answer to the question "what kind of thing is it?" In this way epideictic orations demonstrate the quality of that which is lauded or denounced.

The genres of rhetoric, while distinguished by the division of causes and their status, are not unmixed in the sense that "all three kinds rely on the mutual assistance of the other" (III.iv.16). Which is to say that one genre may partake in the classes of cause which typify another. The class of causes concerned with praise and blame is cited as an example. Protesting Aristotle's demarcation of these causes solely for the "delectation of audiences" (the identification of the hearers of an epideictic as

spectators), Quintilian cites the Roman usage of praise and blame in both legal and political orations. By the same token, an epideixis may draw on causes which issue from the bases of conjecture and definition which are associated with the other two genres.

Quintilian is in accord with Aristotle's recognition of the inherent closeness of epideictic and advisory rhetoric. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle observes that

Praise and counsels have a common aspect; for what you might suggest in counselling becomes encomium by a change in phrase....Accordingly, if you desire to praise, look what you would suggest; if you desire to suggest, look what you would praise (I.ix.35-7).

The Institutio contains parallel remarks: "Panegyric is akin to deliberative inasmuch as the same things are usually praised in the former as are advised in the latter" (III.vii.28).

Quintilian is also in agreement with Aristotle on the range of subjects appropriate to an epideixis. As has already been noted, both Cicero and the author of the Ad Herennium had restricted epideictic to applauding the virtue or denouncing the vice of a particular person--that is, an actual human being. Aristotle, on the other hand, had recognized "that men, seriously or not, often praise not only a man or a god but even inanimate things or any ordinary animal" (I.ix.2). Although he says that the orator should be made familiar with the proper grounds for praising the above range of subjects, Aristotle neglects to continue the dis-

cussion. Quintilian reaffirms that epideictic "is directed in the main to the praise of gods and men, but may occasionally be applied to the praise of animals or even of inanimate objects" (III.viii.6). Unlike Aristotle's Rhetoric, the Institutio prescribes the nature of praise appropriate to gods, men, cities, public works, and places. In some cases Quintilian merely spells out the criteria exhibited in actual orations--for example those inherent in Cicero's encomium of Sicily--while in others he generates guidelines based on the virtues of the subject.

"The proper function...of panegyric," according to Quintilian, "is to amplify and embellish its themes" (III.viii.6). In fulfilling this function, "the demonstrative type of oratory requires freer and more expansive rhythms" (IX.iv.130) than either forensic or deliberative oratory. Different forms of ornamentation are appropriate to each of the genres. Because epideictic "aims solely at delighting the audience" it "therefore develops all the resources of eloquence and deploys all its ornament" (VIII.iii.11). In this regard Quintilian describes the sophistic dimension of epideictic in which

the orator, like a hawker who displays his wares, will set forth before his audience for their inspection, nay, almost for their handling, all his most attractive reflections, all the brilliance that language and the charm that figures can supply, together with all the magnificence of metaphor and the elaborate art of composition at his disposal (VIII.iii.12).

While standing in the highest rank of rhetorical

theorists, Quintilian still does not for that have the final say on sophism or epideictic. We have now to turn to subsequent eras in which the actual practice of epideictic flourished.

### The Second Sophistic

Discussion of the Second Sophistic supplies the opportunity to specify the relationship between sophistry and the epideictic genre. Kennedy describes the Sophists of the later Empire as:

sum[ming] up the moral and historical achievement of Hellenism and...project[ing] it in a splendid panorama before the Greco-Roman world...the sophists ...contributed to unifying and expounding the culture of their age in somewhat the same way that the emperor Hadrian unified and amplified the arts of architecture and sculpture. Sophistic oratory at its best is a verbal counterpart of the villa at Tivoli. In the last great period of peaceful, prosperous classicism the sophists, like the emperor, strolled through the world enjoying and expounding its achievements and its glories.<sup>18</sup>

This laudatory image is certainly far removed from that of Sophists as salesmen who solicit the flash and flare of metaphors to hawk their wares, or as demagogues who parade about in the fineries of empty verbiage. While all the rhetors of the Second Sophistic were not so exceptional, some were. The age-old friction between philosophy and rhetoric lessened greatly during late antiquity and representatives from both sides presented sophisticated philosophy in the

elegance of rhetorical prose. Numbered among them were many who approximated Isocrates' goal of the noble person whose voice leads their society to the fulfillment of its ideals; or again, Cicero's ideal image of the orator as a good man speaking wisely. And, it is a member of the Second Sophistic, the emperor Julian, who probably comes closest to Quintilian's dream of an orator-emperor.<sup>19</sup> The prominence given to the speaker in sophistic rhetoric accords with epideictic's practical (if not theoretical) emphasis on ethos and the display of the rhetor's skill as essential to persuasion.

Epideictic was relied upon by the rhetors of the Second Sophistic for the performance of a multiplicity of public and private functions. This was the case in their extemporaneous declamations and in the major orations which were carefully composed for actual delivery and later edited for circulation in written form.

Ceremonial orations were significant public events. As spectators of an epideictic marking the coronation of an emperor or even possibly his visit to the city, the general populace were allowed to participate in events of social and political importance. The same holds for speeches commemorating significant events from the past such as a military victory or the city's founding. In addition, these speeches, like the public declamations given by Sophists on topics suggested by the audience, also provided entertainment for

the masses often taking the place of the performing arts which were then in serious decline.

The Sophists' speeches were informative and educational in a period in which there were few vehicles for the public dissemination of news. Epideictic, by virtue of its occasional nature and status of quality, supplied the medium in which Sophists were able to display the values and philosophies of Hellenic culture in a manner accessible to a broad public. (It must be noted that this public was often not without an appreciable degree of rhetorical sophistication, as is evidenced in reports from Philostratus.)<sup>20</sup> And what it could do for Hellenism in general, sophistic epideictic did as well for the political interest structure. Solidarity with the powers that be, the cultivation of the status quo, was also a function frequently performed by the sophists. Government support for schools of rhetoric and the establishment of chairs of rhetoric testifies to the Sophists' role in maintaining the civil and cultural life of the cities during later antiquity. Menander, a Sophist of the Third Century whom we shall discuss presently, refers to the city appointed rhetor as "the voice of the city."<sup>21</sup>

Kennedy points out that in the hands of a particularly skilled orator, the ironic use of epideictic could serve the purposes of political dissent, however subtle might be the criticism.<sup>22</sup> Feigned or exaggerated praise, as a form of criticism, will remain one of epideictic's functions in



situations where free speech is disallowed.

The sophistic technique of display associated with epideictic (display of both the speaker's skill and the matter under consideration) was used both as mere ornamentation and as a potent force in civic and cultural affairs. Despite this element of display, we need continue to resist the exclusive identification of sophistry with epideictic. The Sophists worked in all three classical genres and display played a role in their legal and political discourses even if it was not always as pronounced as that played in epideictic orations.

The Greek Sophists (and to a much lesser extent, the Latin Panegyrists) of the imperial period did excel in epideictic rhetoric and they generated a host of different species within the genre. What all these species of oration have in common and what marks them as epideictic is their attribution of beauty, honor, utility, or another form of appropriate virtue to the topic of discourse. To be sure, sophistic epideictic is dominated by display and it is occasional rhetoric. Nevertheless, it is praise and blame which, as Chase makes clear, distinguishes epideictic from the Sophists' work in the other two genres.

The great advantage which the Sophists saw in epideictic is its versatility. Even in its narrowest conception, epideictic has a range of usage which far surpasses that of either deliberative or forensic rhetoric. The genius of the

rhetoors of the Second Sophistic lies in no small part in their ingenuity in further adapting and extending epideictic to fulfill diverse functions and to fit the various situations of their day. The dangers inherent in epideictic--that warranted praise degenerates into flattery, that the substance of the topic is lost amidst its embellishments, that the orator becomes intoxicated by the grandeur of his or her proclamations--were also thereby increased. Given their practical relationship to the dominant power structure and their inevitable lapses into demagoguery, the Sophists cannot be called honest brokers for the interests of the common man. Yet for the most part, the Sophists remained responsive to, rather than exploitative of, their milieu.

The practice of epideictic as it existed during the Second Sophistic is formalized in several handbooks written during the latter part of the Third Century. These are prescriptive works, "how to" manuals which confine themselves to specific types of epideictic addresses and so do not cover rhetoric in general. They are exceptional in that most instruction in epideictic was given by example--the chief sophist of a school would present an epideictic speech as a model for the student's imitation. The progymnasmata or preliminary exercises in composition which were performed in the schools did include exercises in praising and blaming, encomium and psogos or invective respectively, but there was little attention given to the practice of the genre as occa-

sional rhetoric such as is presented in the handbooks.

Epidictic, far more than either political or judicial rhetoric, is given to formalization in preset rules upon which the speaker relies in composing his or her oration. This technical side to epidictic rhetoric is in turn dependent upon theoretical knowledge insofar as the generation of these rules requires recognition of the quality appropriate to the subject and occasion.

The existence of handbooks, such as those which will be discussed presently, served as an indispensable guide for those speakers who had little time or inclination to devote themselves to a philosophical reflection on their topics. In an age in which ceremonial speaking was integral to public and private life, the ranks of those who, out of necessity, turned to such handbooks was legion.

On Epidictic Speeches<sup>24</sup>, a work falsely attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus and most probably the work of several hands, details seven different species of epidictic: panegyric--festival oration, gamelion--marriage speech, genethliac--birthday address, epithalamion--bridal chamber speech, prosphonic--address praising a ruler, epitaphios--funeral oration, and protreptic--an exhortation to athletes. The prescriptions given in this handbook are in no way unusual. Each kind of speech is developed out of common notions and presented in some detail for the reader's instruction.

Two treatises survive which are traditionally ascribed to Menander of Laodicea, also known as Menander Rhetor. The first of the treatises begins with the standard division of rhetoric into three genres immediately after which Menander warns his readers not to expect to hear anything more about rhetoric as a whole. What will be covered is the "technique [of epideictic] and how it may be successfully conducted."<sup>25</sup> Contrary to Cicero's view of epideictic as appropriate to the parade ground but unfit for the battle, Menander regards true epideictic (as distinct from mere sophistic displays of knowledge and style)<sup>26</sup> fit for "combat, not exhibition."

Epideictic is specifically identified as encompassing speeches of praise and blame, although Menander only treats of the the former. Nearly thirty species of the genre are discussed in the two texts and they cover a wide range of praise appropriate to gods and men, and things both animate and inanimate. Specific forms dealt with by Menander include the praise of the gods, cities, harbors, bays, citadels, and the emperor (basilikos logos). Like the handbook of Dionysus, they cover numerous occasions such as weddings, funerals, and birthdays. In addition, coronations, arrivals and farewells, laments and expressions of pity on the death of a person or the demise of a city (monodies), the welcoming of a dignitary, and invitations to governors are discussed. Menander spends some pages on lalia or informal talks which are less structured than epideictic but follow the general

form of encomia.

Menander's text displays the significant extension of epideictic beyond public ceremonies to the realm of private life (i.e., private weddings, funerals, etc.) which occurred during the Second Sophistic and continued in subsequent eras. The forms and formula found in Menander are illustrated in the oratory of the following two centuries and can be found later still in Byzantine rhetoric along with specific textual references.

Burgess and Kennedy both note that many of the forms exhibited in the handbooks of Dionysus Halicarnassus and Menander Rhetor existed in verse form from ancient times. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Second Sophistic, according to Philostratus, is the influence of poetry. This comes as no surprise considering that the ornate style of sophistic rhetoric in general, and epideictic in particular, is traceable to the poetic prose of Gorgias who in turn took over numerous elements of style and figures of speech from the poets. According to de Romilly, the Sophist "Nicagoras used to say that tragedy was the mother art of the sophists; and Hippodromus added that Homer, in that case, was the father."<sup>27</sup>

The earliest forms of epideictic rhetoric, festival and funeral orations, had their origin in poetic forms. It is the poets, Homer and the Attic playwrights, who provide the prototypes for occasional addresses and for speeches of

praise and blame. Epideictic orators traditionally looked to the poets for their inspiration both in terms of form and figures of speech. Little wonder that poetic topics and devices are forever found in the orations of epideictic speakers.

According to Aristotle's formulation of epideictic, what differentiates the genre from political and legal rhetoric is what ties it to poetry and theatre--the designation of its hearers as spectators. Epideictic, like the literary arts, delivers a spectacle before the eyes of its audience. Certainly there are things allowed to poets, such as the use of meter and song, which are forbidden epideictic rhetors. Yet, the ancient history of epideictic can be seen in terms of prose orators taking over more and more of the occasional addresses usually delivered in verse by poets. Menander, according to Burgess, establishes "a precedent in antiquity for the use of prose in place of poetry at a wedding celebration."<sup>28</sup> Menander's text also bears witness to the new ground broken by the rhetors of the Second Sophistic in incorporating hymns and prose poems on occasional topics as part of the orator's repertoire.

Even before Philostratus' charting of sophistry, epideictic had come full circle from originating in poetry to being a broad category which subsumed poetic verse itself. This triumph of epideictic's poetic prose over verse is testified to by Hermogenes, a rhetorician of late antiquity

whose influence extended to the Renaissance. In his work, On Forms, Hermogenes specifies poetry as a subdivision of epideictic.

Classical rhetoric, specifically epideictic, also exerted a formative influence on medieval and Renaissance poetics by way of works such as the Poetria of John of Garland. Brian Vickers marks Averroes' role in shaping the Renaissance conception of poetry as a subspecies of epideictic:

Given the wide dissemination of Averroes' paraphrase of Aristotles' Poetics, which begins "Every poem and all poetic discourse is blame or praise," and states that the poet's aim is to impel men to virtuous actions and repel them from vicious ones, it is fully comprehensible that, even after the rediscovery of the authentic text, this conception of poetry should continue to be influential.<sup>29</sup>

### Christian Panegyrics and Byzantine Rhetoric

We may now turn to the creation of Christian panegyrics by the Greek Fathers noted in the previous chapter. Gregory Thaumaturgus' mid-third century farewell address to Origen, who had been his teacher at Caesarea in Palestine, stands as the earliest example of the utilization of classical epideictic in the service of Christian orators. Gregory, as well as those who follow him in the development of this genre, is guided by the forms set forth by the sophist Menander.

Eusebius, the fourth century bishop of Caesarea who was an important participant in the Council of Nicaea and an early historian of the Church, was among the first to cultivate epideictic rhetoric as a form of preaching. His most famous panegyric sermon was delivered on the occasion of the rededication of the church at Tyre. The sermon contains an ekphrasis (a form of vivid description numbered among the progymnasmata or exercises practiced by students of classical rhetoric) of the actual church which serves as a symbol for Christ's Church on earth. Among Eusebius' other sermons is a panegyric of the Emperor Constantine to whom he was, for a time, friend and advisor.

Constantine's acceptance of Christianity and the accompanying cessation of Church persecution resulting from the Edict of Milan enabled churchmen like Eusebius to address a much wider public than had ever before been possible. While all of the Church Fathers contended that it was the message and not the medium of its expression which was of primary importance, classical rhetoric, in the form of the highly adaptable genre of epideictic, served as an extremely effective method of moving an audience to open their hearts to the message of the Gospels. Accordingly, encomium and invective, bolstered by extensive amplifications and relying on progymnasmatic forms, were both utilized in Christian epideictics.

Ambrose, whose sermons as bishop of Milan had helped



move the rhetor Augustine along the path of conversion, was among the Christians who engaged in Latin panegyrics. As noted earlier, it was however the Greek rather than Latin Fathers whose rhetoric was most decidedly sophistic. Basil the Great, his brother, Gregory of Nyssa, and John Chrysostom all made use of epideictic forms. Among this group it was Gregory of Nazianzus who was the master of the panegyric sermon. (John Chrysostom, "John the Golden-Tongued," excelled in the composition and delivery of homilies.)

The extensive range of Gregory's panegyric sermons includes numerous funeral orations, invectives--most notably those directed against Julian the Apostate--orations celebrating Christian holidays such as Easter, and other occasional addresses. His panegyric of Basil, delivered soon after the latter's death in 379, stands as Gregory's oratorical masterpiece. Gregory and Basil were friends from their school days spent studying Greek philosophy and rhetoric in Athens under the Sophist Himerius. The funeral speech bears witness to Gregory's own preeminence as sophist and theologian even as it eloquently testifies to Basil's brilliance in these same capacities. It has found modern praise as:

a remarkable speech, probably the greatest piece of Greek rhetoric since the death of Demosthenes, vibrant with sincerity despite its artificiality, continually imaginative and inventive in its use of commonplaces, possible only in an age and from an orator who united the passions of sophistry and Christianity, who had gone

through the discipline of the rhetorical schools and found something important to say.<sup>30</sup>

Gregory's synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity, revolves around the employment of classical rhetoric in the service of the Christian order. What he said of Basil can equally be observed in his own orations: "Eloquence was his byword, from which he culled enough to make it an assistance to him in Christian philosophy, since power of this kind is needed to set forth the objects of our contemplation."<sup>31</sup>

Gregory fuses the sophist's love of words, a devotion to the heritage of Hellenism, and the embrace of "religion and hope beyond the visible world."<sup>32</sup> His understanding of the role of priest as preacher, which was itself influential in both the Greek and Latin Churches, shows the influence of the notion of the ideal orator pictured by the rhetorical tradition. Gregory also brings to Christian preaching a rhetor's appreciation of the audiences' part in the communication process.

Basil had made limited use of epideictic, and on occasion both Gregory of Nyssa and John Chrysostum delivered panegyric sermons. None of the Greek Fathers articulated a theoretical synthesis of Christian theology and classical rhetoric. A likely reason for the omission was the already referred to philosophical distrust of rhetoric exhibited by these early Christian preachers. This distrust held a watch on, but did not prevent the practical synthesis of, rhetoric

and Christianity which is exhibited in the panegyrical sermons of the Cappadocian Fathers.

The fusion of Christian learning and rhetoric was integral to Byzantine culture during the succeeding centuries. In his interdisciplinary study, Art and Eloquence in Byzantium, Henry Maguire remarks that "There have been few cultures in which the influence of rhetoric has been as pervasive as in the Byzantine empire during the Middle Ages." <sup>33</sup> From the fourth (the founding of the Eastern Empire) to the fifteenth (the fall of Constantinople to the Turks) centuries, Byzantine education, art, the affairs of Church and State, public life and private reflections all bear rhetorical markings.

The sophistic strand of classical tradition, as was noted in the preceding chapter, dominated the rhetorical concerns of the East. The Byzantines were not unaware of nor unskilled in either deliberative or forensic discourses; it was simply that the multiple forms of epideictic best suited their needs. At least three broad historical reasons for this phenomenon can be identified. First is the heritage of the Second Sophistic, which was much more a development of the Greek-speaking East than the Latin West. Next is the above discussed widespread employment of epideictic by the Greek Fathers. The orations of Gregory of Nazianzus in particular, both the panegyrical sermons and even more his funeral orations, supplied influential and enduring stan-

dards. Third are the socio-political conditions which existed in the Byzantine Empire for the better part of its 1300 year history. With the notable exceptions of the Moslem siege in the early eighth century, the Crusader conquest in the thirteenth, and the final fall of Constantinople in the mid-fifteenth century, the Byzantine world enjoyed relative peace. Within this stable environment, and given its rigidly hierarchical social structure, epideictic was found to be a useful form of discourse for maintaining and bolstering the accepted order. "It is ironic," writes Kennedy,

that Greek rhetoric, which was "invented" in the fifth century B.C. as an instrument of social and political change, became under the Roman and Byzantine empires a powerful instrument for preservation of the status quo.<sup>34</sup>

The wide range of epideictic forms enumerated by Menander were utilized by Byzantine orators. One of the primary functions which epideictic performed was to communicate and elicit support for the dictates of the ruling elite. Encomium of important personages, including the Emperor, served not only to lavish praise on individuals but also as a forum for the laudatory articulation of communal values. Other speeches which marked religious and secular holidays and important events, as well as speeches of welcome and farewell, and funeral orations all fulfilled similar purposes. Many of these orations were, in the manner of the sophistic tradition, edited and published for wide circulation. Specific literary use of epideictic can be

found in the various "lives of the saints" written at the time.

The often referred to Byzantine tendency toward excessive ornamentation and concomitant obscurity is undeniably present in their epideictic oratory and literature. This is not surprising given the sophistic nature of much of Byzantine rhetoric. The acknowledgement of this tendency needs to be balanced by a recognition of the Byzantine devotion to eloquence and classical scholarship (which will always appear obscure to the uneducated).

Byzantine rhetoric is without any significant theoretical contributions to the classical tradition. Praxis, rather than rhetorical theory, preoccupied the Byzantines. They mastered the multiple form of epideictic presented in existent handbooks, such as that of Menander, and in so doing kept spoken as well as written rhetoric alive as a vital civic art essential to the life of a culture. Classical rhetoric is an integral part of the legacy of ancient Greece which the Byzantines transmitted to the West. They enriched the intellectual life of the Italian Renaissance at the very moment that their own culture was fated to perish at the hands of Turkish invaders.

## Renaissance Humanism

Burgess identifies "the early Renaissance in Italy" as among the "notable revivals of epideictic activity" in the West.<sup>35</sup> Renaissance rhetors employed a wide range of occasional orations. Encomium of cities, and of rulers, both religious and secular; speeches of welcome and farewell; funeral, wedding, and holiday panegyric; along with the numerous ceremonial addresses which punctuated the life of the new universities were integral to the culture of the Renaissance.

The social conditions under which oral rhetoric again came to flourish in the West began to take form in the latter part of the Middle Ages. The rise of independent Italian city-states is usually cited as the major factor in rekindling the need for popular oratory. In tracing the heritage of Renaissance rhetoric, Paul Oskar Kristeller comes to the conclusion

that in Italy, in the thirteenth and perhaps even in the twelfth century, all genres of secular speech that were to be cultivated by the Renaissance humanists had come into being out of the legal, political, and social institutions of the later Middle Ages, and that they were composed in the rhetorical style of the time, that of the dictatores, long before the humanists had a chance to apply to them their own different standards of style.<sup>36</sup>

The rules which guided the composition of speeches during this period were borrowed from the techniques of letter writing, the ars dictaminis. Opportunities for public

oration (save those of the sermon) had been all but non-existent in the West during the Middle Ages while the art of correspondence had flourished. In turning to the dictatores for instruction on public orations, the speakers of the Middle Ages reversed the traditional relationship wherein spoken rhetoric preceded and supplied models for its written counterpart.

The eventual resumption of the study of classical rhetoric during the late Middle Ages is a direct result of increased opportunities for oral rhetoric. Cicero's De Inventione, and the Ad Herennium were the subject of study and commentary. An additional development which gave impetus to the renewed interest in rhetoric was the influx of ancient Greek texts from the Byzantine world. A Latin translation of Aristotles' Rhetoric appeared during this period. However, the Rhetoric was more a subject of study for the Scholastic philosophers by virtue of its relevance to politics and ethics, than it it was an influence on rhetors. Classical rhetoric during the Middle Ages remained primarily informed by the writings of Latin (and a limited sampling at that) rather than Greek antiquity.

The standards which the Humanists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries applied to the multiple forms of ocassional address they inherited from the late Middle Ages issued from their recovery of a much wider range of ancient rhetorical tracts than was available at any time since the

fall of the Roman Empire. Some Latin texts, Cicero's De Oratore and the Orator, and the works of Quintilian in particular, only became available in their entirety in the fifteenth century. Many classical Greek text were either re-translated, or more frequently the case, translated into Latin for the first time. The works of Dionysius Halicarnassus, Menander, and Hermogenes, to name but a few, were all made available to Latin speaking audiences during the Renaissance. These texts supplied theories of epideictic which, while well known to the Byzantines, had been neglected during the Latin Middle Ages. The Byzantines, as has already been noted, played an important role in this transmission of classical Greek texts. In addition, the Byzantine rhetorical tradition itself, including the panegyric sermons of the Eastern Church Fathers, was introduced to the West. Although, as Kristeller contends, it is difficult to determine the specific impact of these writings on the West, there does not appear to have been any significant interest in them on the part of Western scholars.<sup>37</sup>

Arturo Fallico and Herman Shapiro, in the introduction to their translation of Italian Renaissance philosophy, offer the usual explanation that the Humanists'

selection of the name studia humanitatis ('the humanities') for their subjects, is significant for it reveals the characteristic emphasis upon the centrality and worth of man which defines the entire scope of their philosophical concern.<sup>38</sup>



The studia humanitatis--which included grammar, poetry, history, moral philosophy, and rhetoric--laid the foundation for the Humanists' devotion to the Ciceronian ideal of combining eloquence and wisdom. The recovery of the classical rhetorical tradition, both in terms of scholarly texts and opportunities for public discourse, made it possible for the art of rhetoric to be again understood in its totality as combining ethical, psychological, philosophical, literary, and civic concerns. In this connection, Vickers observes that "the role of rhetoric in civil society was enthusiastically propagated, and from Bruni's Florence to Francis Bacon's London the orator as culture-hero was celebrated anew."<sup>39</sup>

Although humanism was the primary current in Renaissance thought engaged with classical rhetoric, it was not alone in this encounter. Renaissance (Neo-) Platonists (Marsilio Ficino, Pico Della Mirandola), Aristotelians, and the Philosophers of Nature (Tommaso Campanella, Giordano Bruno) were all influenced by the reemergence of the rhetorical tradition. While Kristeller cautions against identifying all of Renaissance Humanism with the social concerns of many of its leading figures, it is nonetheless civic humanism, as discussed in the previous chapter, which made fullest use of rhetoric.

The social, economic, and political conditions which necessitated the revival of spoken rhetoric in the Italian

city-states were, to a limited extent, conducive to all three classical genres. However, neither the deliberative speech addressed to city councils or assemblies, nor the forensic oration delivered before legal tribunals were utilized with anywhere near the frequency of that of the multiple forms of epideictic. As the Renaissance developed during the late fourteenth and all the way through the fifteenth century, epideictic became increasingly useful in fulfilling the civic need for public addresses.

Nancy S. Struever identifies the Humanists' relation to the polis with that of the ancient Sophists:

[J]ust as the Sophists functioned as "maestri di cultura" in instructing the newly enlarged citizenry of Athens in the techniques of their public duties, so the Humanists self-consciously assumed the role of pedagogues to the mobile classes...The goal of Humanist education is the achievement of a impalcatura, a scaffolding which will order and sustain a public character as well as a private virtue, for Bruni specifically makes the point that the studia humanitatis which Florence has restored to all of Italy are "privatim et publice ad vitam necessaria".<sup>40</sup>

The Humanists were devoted to the practical value of rhetoric within the civic sphere in terms of forming concrete judgements, building social consensus, maintaining values and developing realistic alternatives to existing practices. Like the ancient Sophists, and then again those of the Second Sophistic, the Humanist rhetors favored the epideictic genre in fulfilling these various functions.

Struever and others have noted further areas in which the Renaissance Humanists "repeat some of the basic move-

ments of Sophistic thought."<sup>41</sup> In their theories of language, for example, the Humanists held to the sophistic view of language's primacy in mediating reality. All human understandings of reality are ordered and made known by way of language. Language is recognized as the foundation and fabric of the human world.

The sophistic conception of language bears witness to the perennial dispute between philosophy and rhetoric over the nature of truth. "Here," according to Struever,

there is a clear antinomy between rhetoric and the dominant strand of classical philosophy: philosophy aims to find the truth beyond events, to discover the occult relations between the visible happening and an invisible purpose, while rhetoric deals only with the truth of events, the manifest (phenomena).<sup>42</sup>

Renaissance Humanism's characteristic concern for practical judgements and the presented state of existing affairs, as well as its reticence toward abstract certainties places it squarely on the side of rhetoric. Charles Trinkaus supports this characterization in his examination of the notion of truth adhered to by various of the Humanists. Petrarch, Valla, and Pontano, each of whose views can be said to be influenced by different classical sources--Cicero, Quintilian, and Aristotle respectively--all expound the question of truth

in a self-consciously grasped nexus of relationships among God, man, nature, history, and society, which nexus seemed more crucial to the humanists for the discovery and implementation of truth than the institutional isolation and methodological purity of the scholastic philosophers of their day. These broader,

more experiential and anthropological modes of conceptualization can in great part be understood as a consequence of Renaissance humanist study of ancient ethics and rhetoric.<sup>43</sup>

Classical epideictic holds an important place within the relationship between ethics and rhetoric in that a knowledge of vice and virtue is, as the philosophical strand of the tradition makes clear, prerequisite to the attribution of praise and blame. The discussions of virtue in Aristotle's Rhetoric provide for the Medieval and Renaissance study of that text as a treatise in moral philosophy. In more general terms, the nexus of relationships grasped by the Humanists is the realm in which rhetoric and ethics are both active in the discovery and implementation of truth. This is the realm of the probable; the realm, as Aristotle tells us in his Rhetoric, "of things about which we can deliberate, but for which we have no systematic rules" (I.ii.12). This too is the realm of prudence or practical wisdom for, according to Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, "it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient...what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general."<sup>44</sup> If rhetorical and prudential deliberations are to discover truth, they need issue from an awareness of what is appropriate (prepon) to the particular nexus of actual relationships encountered. Cicero surpasses Aristotle's assertion of an analogous rela-

tionship between the orator and the person of practical wisdom by identifying the two. The ideal orator must necessarily be a good person if her or his eloquence is to ring true, and vice versa, persuasiveness is required of those possessing prudence so that their knowledge may be spoken wisely. "Cicero's point," as Kahn makes it,

is not simply that the orator has the rhetorical skills of persuasion that will enable the prudent man to achieve a particular end, but that the latter is prudent precisely by being an orator.<sup>45</sup>

In her or his rhetorical deliberations, the eloquent orator acknowledges and adheres to decorum and in so doing exhibits practical knowledge appropriate to the web of relationships which is human society.

Kahn argues that the aforementioned conceptions of language and truth, along with the interpretation of rhetoric and practical wisdom just outlined provided Trecento and Quattrocento Humanists, such as Salutati, Pontano, and Valla, with the framework for a practical conception of the writing and reading of an epideixis as themselves forms of practical knowledge.

Renaissance rhetoric's Medieval heritage of having emerged out of the ars dictaminis was transcended in the arena of public orations but was continued and refined in its own, that is, written form. After all, the Humanists were literary men--classical scholars, philologists, secretaries and chancellors--as much as, if not more than, they

were actual orators. They cultivated a range of literary forms from the treatise to the dialogue, and they carried on extensive correspondences. Many were active poets as well.

Commitment of epideictic to written form is, as we have seen, a characteristic tendency of the sophistic strand of the classical tradition. Orations are edited and polished, their aesthetic effects perfected, and then they are ready for publication often without having ever been publicly delivered. In addition, rendering a discourse in print allows it a potentially much larger audience and range of dissemination. All of these considerations would have recommended the written form of epideictic to Renaissance Humanists. The close relationship between epideictic rhetoric and poetics would have done nothing but strengthen that recommendation.

A general decline of oral rhetoric was experienced during the latter part of the Renaissance. Kahn notes two factors which help explain this decline and the occasioning of the Humanists' distinctive conception of written epideictic. The first of these is the perception of a lack of possibilities for authentic political change accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the opportunities for other than purely ceremonial public orations. The second factor is

the early Italian humanists' experience of the political force of their own literary activity, as when Giangaleazzo Visconti is reported to have said that he feared *Salutati's* letters more than a thousand horsemen.<sup>46</sup>

The result of these developments is the confinement of rhetorical activity to the genre of epideictic. Epideictic, in its demonstrations of quality, is called upon to incorporate the deliberative functions of political and legal rhetoric. At the same time that these rhetorical functions are reduced to a single genre, that genre itself undergoes metamorphosis into a literary form. This compacted version of epideictic, which alternately or concurrently advises, judges, and displays--and does so by means of the attribution of praise and blame--is transformed into a written composition which is to be read rather than heard by an audience. Kahn ventures that while the sphere of classical rhetoric is undeniably reduced by this development, the realm of literature is expanded in dynamic fashion.

The literary composition of epideictic opens up the possibility of the reader's active engagement in a process of deliberation. "Pontano," writes Kahn,

suggests that writing transforms the auditor's aesthetic appreciation of epideictic into the reader's active participation in a process of deliberation, deliberation that is itself analogous and conducive to action.<sup>47</sup>

Kahn explains that from this point of view the text cannot be considered a product. On the contrary, it must be conceived as a process which the reader, in turn, imitates in their own process of attempting to understand the text.

Hans-Georg Gadamer offers a similar conclusion in reflecting on the transformation of oral rhetoric into

written composition. The arousal of emotive understanding, which is the orator's primary intent, is carried out via the interplay of speaking and listening. As Gadamer remarks,<sup>48</sup> "the orator carries his listeners away with him."

On the other hand, the reading and interpretation of what is written is so distanced and detached from its author--from his mood, intentions, and unexpressed tendencies--that the grasping of the meaning of the text takes on something of the character of an independent productive act, one that resembles more the art of the orator than the process of mere listening.<sup>49</sup>

This relationship between the art of the orator and the interpretation of written texts is reflected in the close relationship between hermeneutics and classical rhetoric.

The reading and writing of an epideixis both figure as acts of practical wisdom. The composed work embodies practical judgements which, like the prudence which is appropriate to knowing the good in the polis, relies on decorum to inform its response to the particular circumstance. The attribution of praise and blame in an epideictic is thereby to be understood as a process of deliberation which, by means of the appropriate response, displays the vice and/or the virtue, the honorable and/or the dishonorable, the ugly and/or the beautiful which is found in the situation. It is in respect of this very process of discrimination that the ideal rhetor is deemed prudent.

Because interpretation requires similar--if not the same--deliberations as those involved in composition, the reader is, in the very act of reading, actively engaged in



that specific process of practical knowledge which is the text. Thus it is not through example alone that the activity of reading educates its participants, although the display of virtue is indeed beneficial to the readers. Nor again is it in the example of the prudent orator by itself that the reader is instructed. Rather it is as well in reading as a form of prudence, reading as participation in the text's series of discriminations of decorum, reading as itself a form of praxis that the reader is educated in prudential deliberations appropriate to the human world.

The highly sophisticated rhetoric of the Renaissance is not without its shortcomings. Struever makes a harsh but valid observation:

Sophistication as the constituent of rhetorical identity can be a negative capacity, an incomplete mental reaction. The exaggerated motility of the rhetorical cast of mind is not necessarily creative; Humanist modesty is often cynical, their critical function merely destructive, their wit truly mordant. 50

On the other hand, many of the writings of Renaissance Humanists deliver a rhetoric which cultivates practical wisdom as an inherently pleasurable and aesthetically pleasing experience.

When the Renaissance arrived in England it brought with it its renewed interest in classical rhetoric. The previous chapter has already discussed the contributions of Francis Bacon in this regard. The widespread use of ceremonial rhetoric at the courts of the Tudor monarchs also bears

mention. Effervescent praise flowed freely and frequently during the English Renaissance. Epideictic rhetors lauded the power and glory of country and monarchy. Entertainment overruled substantive deliberation in the genre during this period as serious civil concerns were presented in other mediums.

### Modernity

Ramism and Cartesian rationalism took their toll on epideictic rhetoric in the period which preceded that genre's luminary development in the adept hands of Renaissance Humanists. "When mathematical certainty is taken as the standard of reason in politics as well as science," writes Kahn, "the aesthetic realm of prudential deliberation" which the Humanists had claimed for epideictic, must, "be re-<sup>51</sup> defined in terms of mere subjective experience." Torn from its mooring in ethical notions of decorum and deprived of the vitality of communal engagement, epideictic all too often degenerates into its shadow side of empty or even false rhetoric.

The current practice of epideictic appears in much the same wide range of forms which have characterized it throughout its long history. "For example," as Burgess writes,

the commemoration of great events; addresses on the in-

stallation of great enterprises, on inaugural memorial, and holiday occasions; expository addresses interpreting the topics of the hour; lectures on literary or social questions; commencement and after-dinner speeches; eulogies upon those in public or private life, or over the dead; and topics like these.<sup>52</sup>

Within the American political experience, Abraham Lincoln's "Gettysberg Address" and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have A Dream" speech immediately come to mind as epideictic orations of great power and significance.

One of the specific influences of epideictic on spoken rhetoric after the Renaissance has been on pulpit oratory. By the seventeenth century, preaching had become the most important form of oratory in France. (Fenelon's response to the sophistic practices of this oratory having already been discussed.) In nineteenth-century Britain, preaching replaced epideictic as belonging with political and legal oratory as the accepted rhetorical genres. Contemporary television evangelism in the United States has been extremely successful in utilizing epideictic to transcend the cool, impersonal medium in which it operates.

Kenneth Burke has suggested that the mass media feature or "human interest" story is "perhaps the sturdiest modern variant of epideictic rhetoric."<sup>53</sup> In the manner of epideictic, such stories combine information and commentary in a narration crafted to elicit an evaluative response from the audience. Along these same lines, Walter Beale (whose theory of epideictic will be examined in the fol-

lowing section) notes that "the typical home of the literary epideictic is the special-interest journal" and it is in this medium that the "communal and participatory aspects" of the modern use of the genre are clearly evident.<sup>54</sup> Articles in such journals--which range from sports and fashion magazines to the latest high-tech quarterly--cultivate the interests and values shared by the particular audience community. In addition, such articles bring their topics alive for the reader. Epideictic discourse can create a world and bring "the reader into an imaginative participation in that world."<sup>55</sup> A common ground between rhetoric and poetics is located here in that epideictic shares this capability with the literary imagination in general.

One of the most conspicuous contemporary uses of epideictic techniques is advertising. The rhetorical sophistication of advertising is witnessed in its attribution of praise, demonstration of quality, ornate language, appeal to emotion, focus on the present and broad range of subjects--all characteristic of epideictic. If advertising is the negative sophistry of the twentieth century, its hidden persuasions are the epitome of epideictic's most dangerous potentials.

## Current Theories of Epideictic

Now, having identified the origin, contemplated the antique theoretical articulation, and charted the historical development and usage of epideictic rhetoric, we are in a position to review contemporary discussions of the genre.

Chaim Perelman, more than any other contemporary theoretician, has drawn attention to the significant and vital role of epideictic in the rhetorical project of persuasion.

In the introduction to his magnum opus (co-written with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca), The New Rhetoric, A Treatise on Argumentation, Perelman observes:

The publication of a treatise devoted to argumentation and this subject's connection with the ancient tradition of Greek rhetoric and dialectic constitutes a break with a concept of reason and reasoning due to Descartes which has set its mark on Western philosophy for the last three centuries.<sup>56</sup>

The Cartesian assertion of self-evidence as the definitive characteristic of valid reasoning excludes reason from participation in the realm of probable deliberations. Perelman recognizes that this exclusion not only runs counter to Aristotle's articulation of dialectical proofs, it also leaves us without a discursive technique for analyzing arguments whose domain is "the credible, the plausible, the probable, to the degree that the latter eludes the certainty of calculations."<sup>57</sup>

The goal of the New Rhetoric is the recovery of a

theory of discourse which is based on rational argumentation appropriate to the probable. Perelman chooses to identify this project with classical rhetoric rather than ancient dialectic because while dialectic does deal with probable proofs it does not contain rhetoric's attention to inducing the audience's adherence to the conclusion of that proof. (In addition, the modern association of all dialectics with the Hegelian, and by extension Marxist, use of the term runs counter to the intent of Perelman's concerns.) Although not attending to the rhetorical faculties of memory and delivery, the new rhetoric is nonetheless

related to the concerns of the Renaissance and, beyond that, to those of certain Greek and Latin authors, who studied the art of persuading and of convincing, the technique of deliberation and of discussion.<sup>58</sup>

Recognition of the role of epideictic in the process of argumentation begins with the revision of classical conceptions of the genre. Aristotle, as we have seen, differentiated each of the three kinds of rhetorical speech according to the variety of listeners. The audience of an epideixis was portrayed as spectators. Once having witnessed the oration, the only decision required of the audience is as to the merits of the speaker's performance. This view is, according to Perelman, not only mistaken in practice but theoretically confused.

If Aristotle's view were correct, "the speech delivered before the grave of a lost friend, which is the very epitome

of epideictic discourse,...would have no further object but to prove the speaker's talent!"<sup>59</sup> The same would hold for the panegyric sermon--that its goal is the exhibition of the preacher's rhetorical skill. Nothing is more obvious to Perelman but that these are not the case. Aristotle does say that the end toward which an epideixis is directed is the attribution of praise and/or blame which in turn means that its subject is the beautiful and/or the ugly. The problem, Perelman tells us, is that

the theoreticians of speech, from Aristotle on, readily confused the concept of the beautiful, as the object of the speech (which was, besides, equivalent to the concept of "good") with the aesthetic value of the speech itself.<sup>60</sup>

The beauty of the speech, which solicits the audience's favorable appraisal of the speaker's skill, is not the goal but rather a by-product of the speaker's primary intent to reveal values, i.e. the good which adheres in the topic for discussion.

Unlike the situations which face legal and political orators in which there are clearly issues (although these issues themselves are frequently unclear) upon which the audience must render judgement, the epideictic speaker is not confronted by controversy. The noncontroversial nature of epideictic topics does not, however, mean that argumentation is not involved. Central to Perelman's New Rhetoric is the view that all argumentation aims at gaining a specific intensity of the audience's adherence to the arguments pre-

sented. In epideictic, where the display of values is the argument presented, the speaker is arguing for an increased adherence to values which are already held in common with the audience.

In terms of the above view of argumentation, the distinction between the genres can be seen in that the arguments presented in forensic and deliberative rhetoric are inducements to action: the making of a judgement either in the form of handing down a verdict or deciding on a policy. Adherence to the value judgements of an epideictic do not carry the same type of inducement. Rather, epideictic rhetoric "seeks to create a feeling or disposition to act at the appropriate moment, rather than to act immediately." As conceived by the new rhetoric, epideictic discourse's "goal is always to strengthen a consensus around certain values which one wants to see prevail and which should orient action in the future."<sup>61</sup>

By way of its cultivation of common values, epideictic provides the foundation for the other two genres of rhetoric. Legal and political decisions, and the arguments which are given for them, are made on the grounds of a consensus of values. Without the affirmation and intensified adherence to specific values solicited by epideictic there would be no definite basis of shared opinions from which deliberation could proceed. Perelman's assertion of the significance of epideictic extends even further. "[A]ll practical phil-



osophy," is seen to "arise from the epideictic genre"<sup>62</sup>  
insofar as epideictic discourse functions to inform value  
oriented dispositions to action.

The aesthetic sophistication of classical epideictic is  
upheld by the new rhetoric with the recognition that in the  
demonstration of values, the epideictic speaker "uses the  
whole range of means available to the rhetorician for pur-  
poses of amplification and enhancement...every device of  
literary art is appropriate."<sup>63</sup> The inherent dangers in this  
propensity to ornamentation are also heeded in the awareness  
of epideictic's tendency to be absorbed by literature, on  
the one hand, or become trivialized into mere rhetoric, on  
the other. Either development negates epideictic's integral  
function as a form of argumentation.

Perelman, noting the conservative nature of epideictic  
oratory when it is conceived as engendering adherence to  
communal values (a dimension of the genre which we have  
seen as having been given historical embodiment by the  
rhetors of the Roman and Byzantine Empires), writes:

The very concept of this kind of oratory...results in  
its being practiced by those who, in a society, defend  
the traditional and accepted values, those which are  
the objects of education, not the new and revolution-  
ary values which stir up controversy and polemics.<sup>64</sup>

When epideictic is appropriated to the introduction and pro-  
pagation of new values upon which consensus has not yet been  
reached, the speech is tainted by impropriety and the audi-  
ence has the definite impression that the genre and occasion

have been misused. As an example, Perelman cites the insertion of controversy at a funeral ceremony.

Epidictic can serve a culture as a powerful tool of education. Perelman deems it "the rhetorical genre 'par excellence'" by virtue of its "enabling us to create and to reinforce a communion concerning values."<sup>65</sup> Examples abound:

Patriotic ceremonies aim at reinforcing in us love of our fatherland and the virtues of the good citizen. Private ceremonies exalt the virtues of the good father, of the exemplary son, of the devoted mother and the faithful friend, thus fashioning the model of the man one should be in various circumstances of life. Political discourse reveals the evils from which the city suffers and call forth remedies, or presents the image of an ideal city which men should strive to bring into being.<sup>66</sup>

The epidictic oratory educates the audience in their own values, even when those values are inherently acceptable but as yet unformulated. Adherence to such communal values is what "make of man a cultural being."<sup>67</sup>

Perelman's approach to epidictic originates in a dissatisfaction with the usual understanding of Aristotle's characterization of the genre as being directed to an audience of spectators who are not required to pass judgement on the arguments offered. Christine Oravec, in her article "'Observation' in Aristotle's Theory of Epidictic,"<sup>68</sup> argues for an interpretation of the audience's role which addresses precisely that aspect of classical theory which Perelman finds objectionable.

Oravec begins by critiquing two current interpretations

of epideictic which issue from the identification of its audience as mere observers. The first of these underestimates the genre by viewing it as only idle entertainment--a flashy show of the orator's skill. The second interpretation overestimates epideictic's power to surreptitiously constellate adherence to values under the cover of entertainment. Neither interpretation, according to Oravec, issues from an accurate understanding of Aristotle's view of epideictic.

Oravec's thesis is that Aristotle uses the term theoria or "observation" to refer to a complex function which is not limited to an aesthetic response as it includes elements of judgement and comprehension as well. And, it is in terms of this complexity that epideictic involves a reciprocal relationship between the speaker and audience, recognition of which reinstates the genre to its proper status alongside deliberative and forensic rhetoric as "a powerful persuasive tool."<sup>69</sup>

The word theoria has the same Greek root as that for "theater." Burgess, as we have seen, extends this etymological connection to the assertion of an analogous relation between the observers of an epideixis and the viewers of a theatrical performance who are there merely as spectators in search of entertainment. Oravec points out that Aristotle never limits theoria to "mere" observation. What is more, "the word theoroi means one who looks at, views, beholds, contemplates, speculates, or theorizes," and thereby indi-

cates "a kind of insight or power of generalization, as well  
as passive viewing."<sup>70</sup>

The observer's aesthetic response to the epideictic oration, the response which has preoccupied most of epideictic's analysts, is a sensual appreciation of the ornate language in which the orator displays his or her topic. In terms of this pleasurable experience, the observers of an epideictic can well be likened to the members of a theater audience who savor the magic spells of language and are enthralled by the spectacle of imaginative amplifications of persons and things. The aesthetic aspect of observing an epideixis is the witnessing of a re-presentation of the object's appearances.

Aristotle explicitly assigns a judging function to epideictic's listeners in that they decide on the stylistic merits of the orator's performance. The judgements thus rendered are fundamentally different however from those required by political and legal rhetoric. In the latter cases, the listeners have as their distinguishing characteristic the necessity of make decisions concerning the topics under consideration, not the mode of presentation.

In an effort to amplify the element of judgement in observation, Oravec turns to "a comparison between the functions of the audience and the psychological functions of the practical mind"<sup>71</sup> as described by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. The identity of the faculties of delib-

eration and judgement in the Rhetoric and the Ethics invite comparison of each art's remaining faculty: ethical understanding with rhetorical observation. Observation, like understanding, can be seen as a critical function which gauges the soundness of someone else's opinion. The standard for this judgement is given in the ability to discriminate between the beautiful and the ugly, the honorable and the dishonorable, the virtuous and the vicious, etc. as they appear in the realm of practical knowledge.

The specific judgements undertaken in theoria exceed concern about the virtues of the speaker's style. The further focus is on evaluation of the verisimilitude with which the object is displayed, and the soundness of speaker's attribution of praise or censure to that object. Epideictic can be seen as a rhetorical process in which the rhetor employs the vehicles of figurative language to display the object of discourse in terms which simultaneously reveal both it and the perceptions of the audience. Thus, observation necessarily extends beyond just deciding upon the orator's skill in persuasively demonstrating the object's inherent qualities. Part of the role of observation is to pass judgement on the orator's comprehension of the commonly held values that form the basis upon which qualities are predicated.

"There are indications in the Rhetoric," Oravec notes, "that the audience is educated by the experience of compre-

hending the speaker as he presents praiseworthy or blame-  
worthy objects." <sup>72</sup> Apprehension of the principles or stan-  
dards which the speaker applies to the object, and an under-  
standing of the accuracy of that application constitute the  
function of comprehension within rhetorical observation. The  
element of comprehension within theoria is the basis upon  
which epideictic can be said to have an educational dimen-  
sion. In observing an epideixis, the audience is instructed  
by the rhetor's laudatory display of virtue in the re-  
presentation of a familiar experience. Further, in the com-  
prehension of that display, the presentation of virtue is  
re-cognized by the audience as revelatory of their own  
values. Oravec claims that "The listeners learn the signif-  
icance of their experience by witnessing the application of  
common values to familiar objects." <sup>73</sup>

Epideictic's facilitation of the comprehension of par-  
ticulars drawn from ordinary experience as embodying commu-  
nal value structures can provide standards for practical  
action. The rhetor's skillful use of figurative language in  
setting the object's essential qualities before the eyes of  
the audience provides the vistas through which these stand-  
ards are observed (that is, perceived, judged, and compre-  
hended).

The complex psychological phenomena of theoria,  
composed as it is of a fusion of aesthetic and cognitive  
functions, makes possible epideictic rhetoric's issuance of

insight into the essential character of the object praised or censured. This insight, delivered in the emotive language of amplifications, is generated by epideictic's dynamic encounter between the skill, judgement, and style of the orator and the perceptions and existing valuations of the audience. Observation in epideictic rhetoric emerges as part of a reflective process, and thus a far cry from the passivity of mere spectators. In Oravec's description:

the rhetor receives common values and experiences from his audience and, by reshaping them in artistic language, returns these experiences heightened and renewed....The quality of insight derived from heightened awareness of essential character supplies a kind of "proof"....insofar as it "proves" the significance of the praiseworthy object and insofar as it "confirms" the judgements of the orator. <sup>74</sup>

Recovery of the "contemplative and judgemental, as well as perceptual aspects" <sup>75</sup> of Aristotle's conception of epideictic rhetoric provides the basis for reasserting the genre's persuasive force, psychological complexity, and cultural significance. Oravec's analysis shows that even in the Aristotelian understanding of observation there exists elements of the process of deliberation which Renaissance Humanists attributed to the reading of an epideixis.

Oravec's clarification of observation sheds light on Aristotle's assignment of the present as "the special time appropriate" to epideictic. Noted contemporary rhetorical theorists such as Kenneth Burke and Donald C. Bryant have dismissed this classification as an artificial distinction

made by Aristotle in order to fit epideictic neatly into his system. In Burke's words:

Aristotle probably assigned this third kind [epideictic] to the present because, having defined the other with reference to the future (the deliberative concern with expedients) and the past (the forensic concern with the justice or injustice of things already done), by elimination he needed a kind aiming at the present.<sup>76</sup>

Burke does go on to see some merit in the time specification for epideictic based on this type of rhetoric as entertainment occurring in the present tense. On the other hand, when starting from Oravec's fully articulated version of Aristotle's view of theoria, it becomes clear that the reciprocal relationship between orator and audience, essential to epideictic's articulation of values, requires that praise and blame be directed toward "the existing condition of things." The realm of current communal values and perception is the only arena in which the epideictic rhetor can fashion the reflexive display of an object's qualities which provokes the audiences' comprehension of the significance of their experience. As Oravec remarks, "the epideictic orator, then, faces a most difficult test, because the value of his discourse depends...upon the audience's... common and present experience of the praiseworthy object's distinctive quality."<sup>77</sup>

Oravec's recovery of the Aristotelian conception of theoria and Perelman's new rhetoric share in reasserting epideictic's significance, vitality and utility. Walter H.



Beale's essay, "Rhetorical Performative Discourse: A New Theory of Epideictic," focuses on the perennial question of the genre's definitive characteristics. This discussion approaches the genre from a perspective we have yet to consider--contemporary philosophy of language.

Beale's stated interest is in the classifications of discourse. As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, epideictic is difficult to define not least of all because of the great variation in its forms. Accordingly, Beale's judgement comes as no surprise:

All of the traditional definers of epideictic elucidate important characteristics of the genus, and yet, for one reason or another, none of them provides a defining principle of sufficient generality to cover the entire range of epideictic or fully to exclude other classes of rhetoric.<sup>78</sup>

In place of those traditional definers of the epideictic genre--speaker, audience, subject, time, end, context, occasion, function, language, etc.--Beale takes an altogether different approach. The concept of the "rhetorical performative" act is offered as a "primary definer" which denotes the manner in which the various significant characteristics of epideictic, identified in the course of its long history, are constellated and coordinated within a given framework of discourse.

Provisional definition of the concept of "rhetorical performative" is given as follows:

the composed and more or less unified act of rhetorical discourse which does not merely say, argue, or

allege something about the world of social action, but which constitutes (in some special way defined by the conventions or customs of a community) a significant social action in itself.<sup>79</sup>

Beale goes on to explain that the "rhetorical performative" act participates in the reality or in specific actions to which it refers. By virtue of this participation, judgements usually reserved to actions or behaviors, such as "appropriateness," rather than those directed at argumentation or reasoning, such as "correctness," can be made of epideictic discourse.

The concept of "performance" as a linguistic classification is grounded in J.L. Austin's work, How To Do Things With Words. Austin's proposal of a distinction between "performative" and "constative" speech acts provides the basis for Beale's new theory of epideictic. In brief, "performative" speech acts are those which are part of the actions to which they refer. Beale quotes Austin's comment that "performative" speech acts "would not normally be described as, or as 'just' saying something."<sup>80</sup> "Constative" speech acts, on the other hand, are divorced from any actions to which they might refer; they are utterances which do just say or tell about something.

No sooner does Austin propose this theory than he retracts it. He finds himself at a loss to identify the exclusive primary definers which could in practice serve to differentiate one category of speech act from the other. In its

place he offers a trifold division of speech acts:

The locutionary act--"performance of an act of saying something"--the illocutionary act--"performance of an act in saying something"--and the perlocutionary act--"performance of an act through saying something"--are complementary dimensions of every speech act and essential components of its meaning.<sup>81</sup>

Rather than follow Austin in abandoning the distinction between "performative" and "constative" utterances, Beale suggests that regardless of the distinction's viability with respect to individual speech acts, it is nonetheless useful in terms of "rhetorical compositions considered as unities within specific social contexts."<sup>82</sup> By considering speech acts as a unity, that is by attending to the speech rather than the particular utterance, the force or intent of the discourse is more clearly recognizable. The social contexts in which speech acts attain their unity are both the set of arrangements from which that unity issues and the particular extralinguistic zone or situation in which it can be identified. Therefore it is according to the contextual manifestation of a speech's intent that performative rhetorical acts can be differentiated from non-performative ones.

Another way of explaining this is that performative versus non-performative rhetorical acts can be distinguished according to how the audience is addressed. Non-performative rhetorical acts direct the audience's attention to the contents of the discourse, that is, its subject matter. The audience is asked to see what is being asserted; primacy is

given to the locutionary dimension of the rhetorical act. In performative rhetorical acts, on the other hand, attention is called to the speech's significance in asserting whatever it is that is asserted. The illocutionary dimension of the rhetorical act comes to the fore. The particular social context in which the discourse transpires gives rise to the audience's perceiving the speech as itself doing something beyond just presenting facts, opinions, or any other content.

Beale incorporates the distinction between speech and rhetorical acts in a formal delineation of the concept of "rhetorical performative" acts:

Those discourses which involve a nucleus of performative speech acts and which are delivered in and sustain rhetorical situations in which the audience's attentions are directed principally toward illocutions of the discourse, as opposed to its arguments or the "facts of the matter," are rhetorical performatives: these are the kind of discourses that have been traditionally classified as epideictic. <sup>83</sup>

Austin's notion of the performative speech act is retained not as an absolute category but as a construct useful in identifying those utterances which reveal the function of the speech as a whole. Such utterances, which may or may not find explicit articulation within the speech, form a nucleus or core which identify what the speech is doing beyond "just" making this or that assertion. This is what the speech "`amounts to` as when we say that a certain speech `amounts to` a defense of something, a condemnation

of something, a celebration of something, and so on."<sup>84</sup>

The essential dynamic of "rhetorical performatives" is the correlation between a core of speech acts and the speech's setting. The situation of discourse is always a "particular set" of social, cultural, or institutional arrangements.<sup>85</sup> This set of arrangements is the frame of reference which, as was noted above, constellates the speech's unity and provides the context in which it is embodied. The correlation between the core of performative speech acts and their context focuses the audience's attention on the illocutionary aspect of the discourse. In this way the speech as a whole is seen to participate in the reality to which it refers. Further, in so far as the speech constitutes a social action, the audience's engagement with the rhetorical act can, in some instances, be itself a mode of participation in that specified reality.

#### Epidictic and Psychology

The preceding discussion of epidictic rhetoric reveals that it is uniquely suited to both a psychology which addresses itself to the problems and issues of its culture, and to a psychology which turns to the world to understand how things condition the meaning of human behavior. The overall extent of this suitability will be demonstrated in the last two chapters. At this point,

several general observations suffice to confirm the judgement.

The wide range of appropriate epideictic topics--from people and places to objects and events--enables the genre to provide the attention to things required by Sein-analysis. Epideictic's demonstration of qualities (the showing of what kind of thing it is that is under consideration), by way of its characteristically ornate style, accommodates the imagistic display of psychological reality. The genre's capacity for cultivating meanings is found in the cognitive and emotive response engendered by its figurative displays. Parallel to meditative thinking's status as an activity is epideictic's active engagement in the reality to which it refers. And last, the requirement that this rhetoric be amenable to discourses which focus on the concerns of the community at large and are directed to a broad public is met when one considers the occasional nature of epideictic and the history of its multiple social, political, and cultural usages.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### HUMANISM

The preceding survey of classical rhetoric and extended discussion of epideictic has yielded an understanding of the tradition appropriate to a psychology devoted to the cultivation of human meanings. Before completely affirming the conflation of epideictic rhetoric and such a psychology, the presuppositions which inform their respective activities bear comparative examination. Accordingly, the following analysis will be directed at disclosing the common ground shared by the sophistic strand of classical rhetoric and Heidegger's philosophy.

Despite our earlier caution that sophistic rhetoric can not be exclusively identified with the use of epideictic, epideictic can be accurately associated with the the sophistic strand of the classical rhetorical tradition. In making this assertion it must also be acknowledged that figures in the philosophical and technical strands of the classical tradition, primarily Aristotle but including Cicero and Quintilian, are also vital contributors to the theory and practice of epideictic.

Sophistic philosophy, like that of Renaissance Humanism which shares much in common with it, is frequently either neglected or subjected to harsh criticism both on general

philosophical and ethical grounds. While not conceding any points of criticism, neither will we engage in a philosophical defense of sophistry. Instead, effort will be confined to articulating those elements of ancient sophistry, Renaissance Humanism, and for that matter any position in the sophistic strand of the rhetorical tradition which converge with Sein-analysis. Heidegger himself points us in the direction of this convergence when he writes:

Sophism is possible only on the foundation of sophia, i.e., on the foundation of the Greek interpretation of Being as presencing and of truth as unconcealment--an unconcealment that itself remains an essential determination of Being, so that what presences is determined from out of unconcealment and presencing is determined from out of unconcealment in its particularity.

Ernesto Grassi, as will be discussed below, argues that it is this same understanding of Being and truth which illuminates the project of Italian Humanism.

### Ancient Sophism

The sophistic use of epideictic is part and parcel of the humanist reaction against abstract scientific and metaphysical speculation focused on ultimate realities, be they nature or God. The Sophists' alternative is to attend to the civic realm and the practical affairs of humanity. Sophistic rhetoric is essentially concerned with the polis. Here we have the polis both in its usual sense of the city and the



deeper sense Heidegger specifies in his interpretation of the first chorus of Sophocles' Antigone:

the historical place, the there in which, out of which, and for which history happens. To this place and scene of history belong the gods, the temples, the priests, the festivals, the games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler, the council of elders, the assembly of the people, the army and the fleet.<sup>2</sup>

The rationale for the variety of subjects appropriate to epideictic is provided by the above understanding of the polis. Everything which belongs to this historical place, everything which happens within the realm of the polis, is open to treatment by epideictic. The range of the genre mirrors the boundaries of the polis; whatever is beyond the one is likewise outside of the other. This is political rhetoric in the novel sense advanced by Sardello: "A language of the res publica, politics in the original sense of the term, concerns what belongs to everyone in common, matters of the world--in short, things."<sup>3</sup> In the previous chapter we noted not only the broad range of topics on which sophistic orators have discoursed but also the vital role which such rhetors placed in articulating and reinforcing communal values. Rhetors, such as those of the Second Sophistic and the medieval Byzantine Empire, used epideictic to reflect on the common elements of life in a style and manner accessible to the polis as a whole.

Also in terms of the polis, the ancient bonds between epideictic and history can be seen as forged at a deeper

level than the historian's use of oration within his or her chronicle. Both share in opening the place of history by way of displaying, to use Sardello's phrase, the "matters of the world." From these matters arises the possibility of deliberation. Leonardo Bruni, who was as much as anyone the figure of the civic humanist as rhetor, acknowledged and fulfilled the historian's "responsibility to communicate public values by presenting the materials for a debate that is by definition a historical continuum." In this way, according to Struever, "Bruni tried to show the place of rhetoric at the core of history, and to illuminate history<sup>4</sup> by exposing its rhetorical form."

A tenet central to the sophistic position is the denial of the possibility of absolute knowledge and hence the impossibility of a purely rational basis for rhetoric (or psychology). This is the rock upon which Plato rents the relationship between the rhetoric of the "wise man" and that of the "lover of wisdom." Plato, as has been shown, claimed a philosophical rhetoric which issues from rational knowledge and results in an apprehension of the true. Sophistic rhetoric, in contrast, trades in the marketplace of opinions and appeals to probability for its persuasive power.

The schism between philosophy and sophistic rhetoric runs deep when it is seen as the outcome of two fundamentally different conceptions of reality. The philosophical position, of which Platonism provides the clearest example, holds

the real to be a realm beyond appearances. The sophistic view, on the other hand, assigns primacy to the ever changing flux of appearances. This assignment is more in the way of a realization insofar as the denial of the possibility of knowledge of (or even the existence of) a transcendent metaphysical reality is at the same time an acknowledgement of the reality of the world of our experience. "The sophists agree in," what Mario Untersteiner describes as:

an anti-idealistic concreteness which does not tread the ways of scepticism but rather those of a realism and phenomenalism which does not confine reality within a dogmatic scheme but allows it to rage in all its contradictions.<sup>5</sup>

Kairos, a complex term with a long history extending as far back as Hesiod, is a key element in sophistic epistemology. Among the term's several meanings are an awareness of circumstance and a sense of right measure, proportion or the opportune. For Gorgias, kairos provides the basis for determining what is appropriate or fitting, prepon, among alternative possibilities both in terms of expression and action. A sense of appropriateness supplies the criteria, in sophistic rhetoric and ethics, for responding to the fluctuating world of appearances. In the same passage in which he cites prudence (sapientia) as the "foundation" of eloquence, Cicero offers "propriety" or "decorum" as a translation of prepon and designates it the "universal rule" in oratory and life.<sup>6</sup> James L. Kinneavy notes that the Greek meanings of kairos and prepon had merged by the time of their use by

Cicero and it is in the combined meaning that kairos "is the dominating concept in both Cicero's ethics and his rhetoric [and]...is at the basis of his entire theory of style."<sup>7</sup>

The Sophists recognized the essential role of language in mediating reality. G. B. Kerferd attributes the development of rhetorical theory in fifth-century Greece to the awakening of rhetorical "self-consciousness":

a growing understanding that what is very often involved [in discourse] is not simply a presentation in words of what is the case, but rather a representation, involving a considerable degree of reorganization in the process.<sup>8</sup>

Sophistic rhetoric accepts that not only can there not be an absolute knowledge of reality but also that all statements about what seems to be the case will necessarily fall short of their goal. Yet given these limits, some statements can still be asserted to be better than others. Some statements are a more fitting (prepon) representation of their subject than others. The art of rhetoric consists in seeing both which arguments are the most fitting and what is the best way to present them. This is an awareness of to kairon, the opportune, which yields an appropriateness of discourse to speaker, topic, and audience.

What marks the sophistic conception of language is the emphasis on the powers of language and speech, not their limitations. The complexity of language is appreciated as a mirror of the complex nature of reality, rather than an imposition upon it. On the basis of this identity of com-

plexities, language is afforded the possibility of revealing insights into that which exists. Rhetoric, which by its very nature is language acutely attuned to the world of appearances (as opposed to essences), is empowered to provide a valuation of the particular within the ongoing flux and flow of experience. By way of such valuations, rhetorical language articulates the meanings and significances of the experience of reality.

For Gorgias, and for others in the sophistic tradition who followed his lead, the logos has magical power to cast a spell upon its hearers. The figures and rhythms of sophistic rhetoric's poetic prose work upon the passions and influences the opinions of the audience. Rhetoric is thereby a psychogogy, an art of guiding souls. The aesthetic dimension of epideictic, the dimension it shares in common with poetry, while created through the skillful use of linguistic ornamentation is not just a stylistic concern. Figurative language aims at producing both a cognitive and emotive affect; it is the working of psychological persuasion.

Renaissance Humanism was heir to the Sophists' conception of knowledge. The Humanists took up this inheritance by way of attending to the particular constellations of experiential relationships between human and divine, history and destiny, nature and culture, social and individual within which probability and improbability are the reigning standards. These relationships are the circumstances in

which both truth and virtue appear. We have seen that these constellated relationships are also--or rather, are because of this--the realm in which rhetoric performs.

"For the Sophists, for Isocrates, for Cicero, for the Italian Humanists," writes Struever,

rhetoric was a coherent body of knowledge of human behavior with a special focus on the relation of discourse to action. For them rhetoric functioned as a psychology...which placed a high value on a sense of opportunitas (kairos), a grasp of the relation of choice to circumstance.

Epidictic composition and observation, as we have seen, are forms of practical knowledge which discriminate appropriate meanings. During the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance, Aristotle's Rhetoric was studied as a treatise on politics, ethics and psychology. Heidegger takes a similar view in a reference made to Book II of the Rhetoric.

Contrary to the traditional orientation, according to which rhetoric is conceived as the kind of thing we "learn in school," this work must be taken as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being with one another.<sup>10</sup>

Inherent in all rhetoric, but especially that of praise and blame, is a psychology which correlates language and the practical knowledge which guides action.

### Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism"

In his "Letter on Humanism" (which Ernesto Grassi was the first to publish), Heidegger expresses his general con-

cern about the labeling and packaging of thought testified to by the contemporary proliferation of "-isms." From this perspective a restoration of philosophical meaning to the term "humanism" appears highly suspect. A renewed humanism might only figure as another new commodity on the "market of public opinion."<sup>11</sup>

Beyond a concern about the superficiality of intellectual packagings, Heidegger is adversely disposed to the notion of humanism on the grounds that all humanisms are essentially metaphysical. Metaphysics, for Heidegger, poses the question of Being as an inquiry concerning beings. In asking about the Being of particular beings, metaphysics passes over the openness, the clearing (Lichtung) in which beings come to presence. The truth of Being, which is the unconcealment in which beings are brought forth, is lost in oblivion. That which is nearest to human beings, the presence of Being as the clearing, is forgotten in metaphysical thought's attachment to beings. Metaphysics, in Heidegger's estimation, fails to recognize the ontological difference between Being and beings, and so "not only does not pose the question concerning the truth of Being but also obstructs the question."<sup>12</sup> Only in light of the question of Being can the essence of human being be understood.

Heidegger acknowledges that

if one understands humanism in general as a concern that man become free for his humanity and find his worth in it, then humanism differs according to one's

conception of the "freedom" and "nature" of man.<sup>13</sup> Accordingly Heidegger traces the humanism of the Renaissance back through its interpretations of ancient thought. While this humanism can be distinguished from that of Christianity, Romanticism, Marxism, or Existentialism (Heidegger's Letter is indirectly occasioned by Sartre's claim that Existentialism is a humanism), it participates with them in being determined by metaphysics. The humanity found in being a child of God, rational animal, a social creature, thinking subject, or the user of language are all dependent on interpretations of God, nature, history, society, thought and language which neglect the truth of Being. All humanisms, and the metaphysics from which they derive, are deficient in their understandings of humanity by virtue of their failure to identify the essence of being human with Being's claim on human being. These humanisms are not, however, to be condemned as false. "Rather," writes Heidegger,

the sole implication is that the highest determinations of the essence of man in humanism still do not realize the proper dignity of man....Humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of man high enough.<sup>14</sup>

The dignity of being human obtains in preserving the clearing of Being. Humans are called to safeguard the truth of Being by existing within the openness in which beings come to presence and from which they pass away. The claim of Being thrusts humans into the region of unconcealment, granting them their essence in the event of appropriation.



The opening pages of Being and Time assert that "The<sup>15</sup>  
'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence." The essence  
of being human is found in ecstatic ek-sistence, in standing  
out into the dimension in which Being presences itself.  
Humans stand-out, ek-sist as the "there" (Da) of Being  
(Sein). "So the point," writes Heidegger, "is that in the  
determination of the humanity of man as ek-sistence what is  
essential is not man but Being--as the dimension of the  
ecstasis of ek-sistence."<sup>16</sup> This dimension is not to be  
taken in a spatial sense because it is the world--the refer-  
ential context of human meanings and concerns--understood as  
the clearing of Being. Human being is always being-in-the-  
world insofar as the essence of its humanity resides in its  
preservation of the open region of Being.

Sein, as was shown in the first chapter, is the  
world as the dimension of Being's laying claim on humans.  
The world, presented in the image of the fourfold, provokes  
a thinking of the essence of humanity from out of the truth  
of Being. The humanity of mortals is called forth in their  
being mutually appropriated by earth, sky, and divinities.  
Mortals preserve the openness of Being by dwelling on the  
earth, beneath the sky, and in the presence/absence of the  
divinities. The ringing mirroring of the fourfold both  
grants and shelters the humanity of mortals. In representing  
this genuinely humane vision of human existence, Sein-  
analysis might truthfully be considered a humanism. "For

this," according to the Letter on Humanism, "is humanism: meditating and caring, that man can be human and not inhumane, `inhuman,` that is, outside his essence."<sup>17</sup>

Identification of language as the essential characteristic of being human is, as was noted above, not false, just inadequate. Here the inadequacy resides in the conception of language as something which humans create and use. Language, in Heidegger's famous and provocative phrase, "is the house of Being in which man ek-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the truth of Being, guarding it."<sup>18</sup> Heidegger obviously means much more by language than simply spoken and written words. Language is one with the clearing of Being and just as it is necessary to understand the humanity of human beings from out of their relation to Being, the essence of language must be thought of in terms of its sameness with Being.

Language, in its most fundamental sense, discloses beings as beings. Beings are brought forth into the clearing of Being by way of the saying of language. Language says things; it speaks beings as the beings which they are. This revealing and bringing into appearance of that which is, is the essence of language. Antecedent to written or oral verbalizations, language prepares beings for such presentation by "commending them to the world out of which they appear."<sup>19</sup> This commendation is an appraisal of the openness of Being which simultaneously entrusts beings to the world

and recommends them to humans. "Language, by naming beings for the first time,....nominates beings to their Being from out of their Being."<sup>20</sup> Only because language is the disclosure of Being can it become actual discourse which occurs within the world.

The poetic word holds priority for Heidegger in revealing the relationship between language and Being. In its broadest sense, all the arts--music and dance, painting, sculpture, and architecture, etc.--are poetry: "the saying of the unconcealedness of what is."<sup>21</sup> The event of beings' coming into presence is the happening of the truth of Being, the setting to work of that truth. The fundamental disclosure of the openness of Being, the openness in which all subsequent bringing forth occurs, is the work of the poetic word. Poetry is the saying of language which exhibits and preserves the correspondence between language and the presencing of Being. Poetic language is the primordial occurrence of the truth of Being as the opening of a world.

The last line of Stefan George's poem, "Words," a line frequently quoted by Heidegger, runs: "Where word breaks off no thing may be."<sup>22</sup> Without language, beings may not be. Only with the word, the saying of language, do things appear and remain in presence. Without the word, that which belongs to the thing--the world gathered by the thing--may not come forth into unconcealment. Only in language does world exist as the dimension which houses the humanity of human beings.

Heidegger ventures that "The word makes the thing into a thing--it `bethings` the thing....[this is the] mystery of the word."<sup>23</sup> In bethinging the thing, the word does not provide reasons for the thing, does not ground the existence of the thing in something else. What it does do is bring the thing to appearance as the thing that it is; it shows forth the world which comes of the thing. In his interpretation of another poem, albeit from a different poet (Georg Trakl's "A Winter Evening"), Heidegger writes: "Things be-thing--i.e., condition--mortals...things, each in its time, literally visit mortals with a world."<sup>24</sup> The correspondence of language and Being, which is the essence of the poetic word, is the granting of a world in which mortals and things are disclosed in the mysterious visitation of Being's clearing.

In the last of three lectures entitled "The Nature of Language," Heidegger pursues the correspondence between language and Being even further.

Language, Saying of the world's fourfold, is no longer only such that we speaking human beings are related to it in the sense of a nexus existing between man and language. Language is, as world-moving Saying, the relation of all relations. It relates, maintains, proffers, and enriches the face-to-face encounter of the world's regions, holds and keeps them, in that it holds itself--Saying--in reserve.<sup>25</sup>

The four moments of the world as gathered by things--earth, divinities, sky, and mortals--are disclosed in historically variable constellations or relations. Being, in its destining, presences itself in the changing relations of the four.

Identification of language as the relation of all relations brings to awareness the sameness of Being and language. This is not the assertion of a reductive identity between the two. Rather in seeing both Being and language as the relation of the fourfold's relations, the essential belonging together of the two is grasped as a primordial joining which grants the world its presence. As the holding and keeping of the fourfold, language/Being preserves the world so that it might endure in unconcealment. The enduring presence of the fourfold is not for that either permanent or static. The relation of relations, the Saying of language, the destining of Being is the dynamic nearness in which earth, sky, mortals, and divinities are open to each other, saving and preserving one another within the rhythms and rhymes of the round dance of Appropriation.

Language speaks in its bringing world and things into unconcealment. The Saying of language appears as this showing of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities to each other. Language is thus the house of Sein which structures and shelters the four in their mutually disclosive relatedness. As the house of Sein, language provides the open place in which human beings can dwell, and in dwelling disclose the presence of the fourfold in things. "Poetically man dwells," proclaims one of Heidegger's favorite lines from Hölderlin. Poetry, as we have seen, is the human disclosure of beings which preserves the correspondence between language and

Being. Humans ek-sist in language by responding to the Saying-showing of language. All mortal language is first a listening which takes its measure from the relations of the fourfold. Mortals are called by language to answer its Saying, to care for and preserve the shelter that Saying has opened. The call of language and the claim of Being are the same in their disclosure of Sein as the open region for the ecstatic dwelling of mortals.

Like Being, which conceals itself in the presence of particular things such that it is the things and not the clearing which is seen, language "holds itself--Saying--in reserve." In the Saying which brings beings into unconcealment as the being that they are, the essence of language, its belonging together with Being, is withheld. Human language, which while always a responding to the Saying of language, is nonetheless but a semblance of that Saying. We are always, in another of Heidegger's well known phrases, "on the way to language." Language speaks in bringing things into unconcealment and thereby gathering a world. Human speaking cannot transcend the relations of that world and thus can recognize only the appearances of beings. The Saying of language, as its essential correspondence to Being, is both revealed and concealed in the responsive but finite relatedness of the mortal word.

Midway through the reflections on ek-sistence, language, and the truth of Being offered in his Letter On

Humanism, Heidegger observes that if there is a humanism determined not by metaphysics but by the question of Being it is:

a humanism that thinks the humanity of man from nearness to Being. But at the same time it is a humanism in which not man but man's historical essence is at stake in its provenance from the truth of Being. But then doesn't the ek-sistence of man also stand or fall in this game of stakes? So it does.<sup>26</sup>

Grassi defines the significance of Renaissance Humanism and the rhetorical tradition in general in terms of both just such a conception of humanism and the primacy of the poetic word in opening the place of human dwelling. As we have seen with Heidegger, and shall see in the case of Renaissance Humanism, these two concerns are really one.

#### Grassi's Advocacy of Renaissance Humanism

Ernesto Grassi studied with Heidegger for approximately ten years during the 1920s and 1930s, and shares with him a vital concern about the oblivion of the question of Being especially as it is manifested in the predominance of calculative thinking. Accordingly, Grassi is well aware of the stakes involved in recovering an authentic dimension for human dwelling. He makes quite clear that his "point[ing] to the parallelism between Heidegger's thought and the Humanist tradition" is not meant to merely interpret either one in terms of the other. On the contrary, "the main object...[is]

to erect a historical framework in which the present-day relevance of the problems of Humanism can become visible to us." <sup>27</sup> (Grassi dismisses Heidegger's negative appraisal of Italian Humanism as a misunderstanding of the tradition.)

Grassi laments the abandonment of the rhetorical worldview which transpired in the wake of Cartesianism. "Modern thought, beginning with Descartes, did everything in its power to obscure the importance of the Humanistic tradition." <sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, Grassi is keen that the humanism of the Italian Renaissance can provide the vision for a new philosophical revelation of basic realities.

For Grassi, it is precisely in terms of its philosophical significance and relevance that Italian Humanism merits the greatest attention. Contrary to popular conceptions of Humanism as primarily a literary concern with man structured by vague and inconsistent metaphysics, this tradition is recognized as developing an understanding of the philosophical role of the poetic word which transcends literary function. The Renaissance preoccupation with language is seen to extend beyond a literary interest in the nature, variety, or standards of composition and interpretation to a philosophical concern with language as the revelation of Being and the foundation of being-in-the-world. "One of the central problems of Humanism," writes Grassi,

...is not man, but the question of the original context, the horizon or "openness" in which man and his world appear. The amazing thing, usually overlooked,



is that these problems are not dealt with in Humanism by means of a logical speculative confrontation with traditional metaphysics, but rather in terms of the analysis and interpretation of language, especially poetic language.<sup>29</sup>

Although unacknowledged by the philosophical tradition as a whole, Renaissance Humanism marks a radical break with traditional metaphysics. Unlike its negative characterization provided by Heidegger, this humanism refuses a metaphysically determined preconception of essence of being human and attends to the truth of Being by considering the openness in which humans first comes to presence. Italian Humanism rejects the apodictic reasoning of traditional metaphysics as relying on fundamental misconceptions of reality. Humanism rejects the a priori determinations of beings that provide the first principles of rationalist metaphysics. Instead poetic language, which embodies the openness of Being, is cultivated as the true ground of philosophical reflection.

The Humanist tradition, according to Grassi, contains a "new ingenious philosophy" which has as its "task" "the discovery of relationships between appearances as the foundation of the revelation of reality."<sup>30</sup> This discovery of relationships is known within the tradition as ingenium. Ingenium is a mode of knowledge; it is the fundamental knowledge in light of which reality becomes intelligible. As an originative insight into the structure of reality, ingenium has ontological primacy as well as epistemological priority.

Leonardo Bruni asserts that "Ingenium reveals something `new` [ingenio...ad res novas proclives], something `unexpected` and `astonishing` by uncovering the `similar in the unsimilar,` i.e., what cannot be deduced rationally."<sup>31</sup> The inventive as opposed to deductive character of this original insight is expressed in its being referred to in rhetorical theory as inventio, the art of invention.

Ingenium is more than a capacity, one among many, possessed by human beings. Rather, human beings stand out into and preserve the openness of Being by way of this original insight. Ingenium is the disclosive engagement with Being which constitutes the humanity of human beings. Vico recognizes this when he observes that "Ingenium and nature meant the same things for the Italians. This is because the human Ingenium is itself the nature of man."<sup>32</sup> A humanism which is independent of traditional metaphysics and an ingenious philosophy are the same in that both take their directive from the Event of Appropriation in which humans and Being are mutually disclosed.

As a metaphorical vision of concrete reality, ingenium reveals the similar in the dissimilar. Insight into the similarity (similitudo) between appearances is a recognition of the relationships in light of which reality is rendered meaningful. By envisioning similarities, the original vision responds to the structuring of Being. Ingenium preserves the Clearing, in which beings come to be the

things that they are, by apprehending both the presencing of Being as the relation or objective structure of all relations and its concealment within that which is related. In its grasp of the ontological difference between Being and beings, human ingenium dwells in the nearness of Being which is inaccessible to metaphysical thinking.

The similitudo which appear within the objective vision of ingenium are embodied by imagination. "Imagination," writes Grassi, "is the original faculty of `letting see` (phainestai), so that Vico calls it `the eye of the ingenium`."<sup>33</sup> Imagination, the subjective human capacity to make visible the invisible presencing of Being, brings the original insight to unconcealment in the open of its world. No less than the vision it serves, imagination's stock and trade are revelations within concrete circumstances, not apodictic demonstrations of a priori abstractions.

In ingenium, human beings are called to ek-sist within Being's clearing. When standing in that open region, mortals must withstand Being's awesome manifestations. As Heidegger observes with respect to the images presented in the chorus of Sophocles' Antigone, mortals remain exposed to the overpowering power of Being as a whole, a power which provokes terror and wonder.<sup>34</sup> Imagination, from the Humanist perspective, is the supreme faculty in forming the human response to this same veiled but uncanny power of Being. Grassi writes that for Vico it is on the basis of imagination that

"the human world arises as an expression of the original attempt to explain the terror of confronting the power of Being which manifests itself in beings." <sup>35</sup> Imagination gives birth to the human world as a referential and thereby negotiable context of meaningful beings. In so doing, imagination creates the possibility of liberation from the immediate dangers, demands, and determinations of inhuman beings.

Imagination, in bringing forth concrete embodiments of the similitudo grasped in original insight, engenders the transfers of meaning on whose basis the achievements of human dwelling can come to pass. In even more directly Heideggerian terms, imagination rescues mortals from the threatening reign of incomprehensible beings by unlocking the door to the house of Being, the home of human beings: language. Language, conceived in its broadest sense, speaks in the commonalities, similarities, and other relationships apprehended by ingenium. From this perspective, imagination is the human voice which answers the saying of language.

Embodiment of ingenious insights, the project of imagination, is accomplished via metaphorical activity. Meanings are carried over from one thing to another on the basis of the similitudo apprehended in the metaphorical vision of ingenium. Language and work figure as the primary metaphorical activities for Italian Humanism. However, the basic metaphorical act is the seeing of the similarities which obtain

between that which is seemingly unrelated. Which is to say that in envisioning relations, ingenium is itself a metaphorical activity. There is no external structure from which such activity can be derived as it is a fully irreducible, originative act. The creation of meaning carried out by metaphorical activity is its own ground and support.

Imagination's transferral (metapherein) and exhibition of meaning is a multidimensional activity. The ferrying of significations across the gulf of apparent dissimilarity allows for the presentation of previously incomprehensible beings as things related to human concerns. Meaning is transferred to sensory phenomena such that they can appear as definite entities within the world. In these metaphorical activities, the intelligibility which arises from out of the human preservation of Being's clearing is carried over to encounterable beings. "Each particular being," as Grassi writes, "is a metaphor of Being."<sup>36</sup> The appearances of the human world are at one and the same time the metaphorical presence of Being.

Because Being is never identical with either any particular being or even beings as a whole, the presence of things is simultaneously the disclosure of Being as the structure of beings' relations, and its concealment by those relations. Humanists, such as Giovanni Bocaccio and Coluccio Salutati, expressed this point--which is fundamental to Heidegger's conception of truth as alethia or unconceal-

ment--as the "veiling" which is inherent in all metaphorical activity. "Hence," explains Grassi, "interpreting beings as a metaphor of Being requires that we regard each being as a velamen, a `veil,` under which Being is `concealed` and at the same time becomes `unconcealed.`"<sup>37</sup>

Imagination's metaphorical activities illuminate previously unapprehended relationships between beings. In rendering these relationships visible, imagination re-presents the invisible structures in light of which reality becomes comprehensible to human beings. The luminous presentation of the invisible in and through the appearances of the visible is what both the Italian tradition and Heidegger would agree upon as the nature of an image. "The genuine image," according to Heidegger, "...as a sight or a spectacle, lets the invisible be seen and so imagines the invisible in something alien to it."<sup>38</sup>

Vico, as has been noted, credits imagination as enabling mortals to respond to the awesome presence of Being in beings. The seeing of similarities and the active transferring of meanings on that basis constellate an image of the human world, and what is the same with it, the spectacle of Being's clearing. "Imagination," writes Vico,

collects from the senses the sensory effects of natural phenomena and combines and magnifies them to the point of exaggeration, turning them into luminous images to suddenly dazzle the mind with their lightning and stir up human passions in the thunder and roar of their wonder.<sup>39</sup>

Heidegger speaks in a similar vein: "The poetic saying of images gathers the brightness and sound of the heavenly appearances into one with the darkness and silence of what is alien. By such sights the god surprises us."<sup>40</sup>

Work and language, as was mentioned above, are the principle metaphorical activities whereby the mutual disclosure of Being and human being in ingenium is given concrete manifestation. Neither the languages nor labors of human beings are arbitrary assertions of mortal will. Like the faculty of imagination whose images they enact, language and work are activities which reveal what mortals have heard in the saying of language/Being. The first moment in each activity is the ingenious grasp of the relatedness in which the saying of language/Being shows itself. And in both cases, the transference of meaning based on that relatedness participates in a transformation of beings within the openness of Being.

Grassi echoes Vico when he writes: "Ingenium is revealed through work, through the alteration of the real with reference to human needs that present themselves in the real historical community."<sup>41</sup> Work, in this Vichian sense of fulfilling human requirements and desires, is a twofold activity. First there arises an ingenious apprehension of a relationship between actual human needs and specific phenomena. This vision of a commonality existing between need and appearance then directs the transfer of human significance

to phenomena that were previously outside that realm of meaning. Beings become intelligible as particular things in light of their relationship to specific wants and needs of human beings. These ingenious and imaginative activities bring things into the light of a referential context of concern--the human world. Once within this context, things and human beings are dedicated to the preservation of Being's clearing in the form of their being mutually predisposed to the affairs of the polis.

"Work alone," observes Grassi,

is capable of proving the objectivity of ingenious and imaginative activities; it makes it evident whether the relationships established have proved subjective, by their failure, or objective, by their success in leading to a result.<sup>42</sup>

Objectivity and subjectivity are, first of all, not absolute designations. They have their meaning only within the specific context created by the similarity of need and appearances. Second, the meaning that does abide in these two terms is a pragmatic gauge of the appropriateness of a particular ingenious imagination in making visible the structure of Being. Success and failure are to understood in terms of whether beings, as metaphors of Being, sustain or deny the interpretations enacted by human beings. Neither the determination of success or failure, nor the proof of objectivity or its refutation, are relative matters. The urgency of the concerns which are manifested in the transfer of meaning make all evaluations specific to the maintenance,



or conversely, the disruption of the original imagined relationship.

Vico takes the mythic figure of Hercules as the image which illuminates the essential aspects of work and its part in creating or preserving the human world. The clearing of the primeval forest, which was necessary to open a place for the polis, was a Herculean task. This labor is the archetype, or in Vico's terms, imaginative universal for all human work. Hercules' labors required both an initial intuition of the natural world as capable of sustaining human interpretations and then action which was directed by that intuition--ingenious and metaphorical activities.

Vico refers to the opening of the polis as "the light (luce) that man realizes in clearing the trees from the forest."<sup>43</sup> Grassi identifies this with Heidegger's use of the term "clearing" (Lichtung) to refer to the open region in which human beings ek-sist. Heidegger himself speaks of Lichtung in terms of a "forest clearing....To open something means:...to make the forest free of trees at one place."<sup>44</sup> Similarly, the Vichian idea of work can be likened to Heidegger's conception of poetic dwelling in the form of building. Like the ingenious and metaphorical activities of work, building brings things into presence within the human world and in so doing makes Being visible as the structure of the world's relationships. Both building and work answer human needs at the same time that they open and preserve the

clearing of Being as the place in which the human world emerges into unconcealment.

Language, that is, actual human language and especially imagistic language is, as we have already noted, a fundamental concern of Italian Humanism. Human language, like work, is understood as a metaphorical activity in which imagination reveals ingenious insights in light of which reality is rendered intelligible. "Humanistic thought," explains Grassi, "begins with the problem of the word... with language in its primary sense as a way to give meaning in a situation and to answer the claims made upon man."<sup>45</sup>

One of the Renaissance Humanists' major scholarly enterprises was the translation of ancient Greek texts. While the products of that activity, the texts themselves, constituted a significant element in their recovery of classical rhetoric, it was the act of translation itself which inspired many of the Humanists' insights into the nature of language. Bruni, who for example undertook a translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, is representative in asserting that a word's meaning can only be understood in terms of the context in which it appears. "All words," writes Bruni, "āre ceremoniously connected [inter se festive coniuncta]<sup>46</sup> like a multicolored floor and mosaic." Change the color of one tile and hue of all those around it will be altered as well. The meaning of a word is never fixed once

and for all as it changes in relation to the context in which it is written or the circumstances under which it is uttered. The work of translating classical texts led the Renaissance Humanists to grasp the mutual reflexivity of word and world, and so to affirm the radically historical nature of language.

Beneath the issues of textual translation and interpretation lies the question of the relationship between res and verba, thing and word, content and form. Cicero, and following him, Quintilian are representative of classical rhetoric in their assertion that there is no subject which is foreign to the orator as there is no thing (res) which is alien to the art of speech (verba). The question of what is to be said in any particular situation cannot be answered apart from consideration of how it is to be said. The whole tradition of Italian Humanism from the Roman rhetors to Vico is as one in asserting the inseparability of word and thing. Only through the word does a thing come to appearance. Without words, things are without meaning and so can have no place within the world. Even more, without words there is no world, no open region in which things can appear. Pontano describes how the thing (res) comes to concrete presence in the wonder evoked by the poetic word. Vico refers to this same wonder in his recognition of poetic language as the origin of the human world.

The assertion of the union of res and verba reflects

the Humanists' belief in the essential relatedness of language to both Being, on the one hand, and the human world, on the other. Or, to again quote Heidegger's line from George, "Where word breaks off no thing may be." The key to understanding this relation is to be found in the metaphorical character of genuine or original speech.

Grassi summarizes Bruni's view that

The source of the "actual" revelation through the word of what is is not ratio, but rather that human capacity which permits words to have adaptability (versutis), acumen, and "instantaneousness," and so allows the corresponding "things" to appear in ingenium.<sup>47</sup>

Things disclosed in ingenium are presented in light of an insight into the relationship between human beings and the claims made upon them within a concrete situation. Words bring things into appearance within the situation by presenting them in terms of that insight. What the thing is, is determined by the circumstance in which it appears. This determination of the being of the thing is made by way of the metaphorical activity of language. Words, as Heidegger says, "bething" the thing. In a manner parallel to the creation of meaning in work, human speech renders things as intelligible in relationship to the human world. Language embodies ingenium by presenting things as figured by the similitudo of human need and the world in which that need is situated and thereby reveals the significance of the circumstance in the configuration of the thing's appearance. This appearance is always historical because without the binding

hold of circumstance, words and things drift apart.

Imagination, not reason, is the human capacity to convey the apprehension of ingenious insights and it does so by way of metaphorical expression. Reason provides justification in terms of grounds. It engages in the process of proof: showing that one thing is the case on the basis of something else. Imagination, too, is a showing, but of a radically different character. As the faculty of "letting see" which permits words to reveal things, imagination shows forth meanings which cannot be deduced or derived from something else. Such meanings are always contextual and so are of a relational and therefore historical nature. Their demonstration cannot be performed via inference because they have no foundation beyond their actual presence in things-- it is their appearance itself which is fundamental. These appearances, the presence of things as meaningful, is what imagination lets be seen. Imagination accomplishes this showing by bringing the thing, as a thing, into presence in words.

Grassi claims that the speaking which displays things in light of ingenium is characterized by adaptability, acumen, and instantaneousness and is thus an imaginative or metaphorical language.

Such speech is immediately a "showing"--and for this reason "figurative" or "imaginative" and thus in the original sense "theoretical [theorein--i.e., to see]. It is metaphorical, i.e., it shows something which has a sense, and this means that to the figure, to that

which is shown, the speech transfers [metapherein] a signification: in this way the speech which realizes the showing "leads before the eyes" [phainesthai] a significance.<sup>48</sup>

The meaning presented in metaphorical speaking is constellated in the form of images. Images are the vision which arises from the metaphorical operations of figurative language.

The original, metaphorical language which issues from and relates to the concrete circumstances of historical human existence is rhetoric. Through the art of the topics, rhetoric focuses imagination on the concerns which engage us in the immediacy of our own being-in-the-world. Rhetoric's ornate expression generates images which embody and display the ingenious insights into the appearances of the human world. As a speaking which responds to the presencing of Being--Sein--rhetoric opens the world and renders it meaningful, thereby enabling us to encounter ourselves, things, and others.

Grassi is forceful in distinguishing rhetoric as an imaginative language from the techniques of external persuasion or mere rhetoric, on the one hand, and rational, logical speech on the other. Rational speech, such as that advocated by the Royal Society, does not attempt to move its listeners and so does not solicit the artifices of image, myth, or metaphor. Quite to the contrary, rational speech--as was shown in a previous chapter--denounces rhetoric as

violating the rules of definition and inference, even condemns rhetorical speaking as nonsense and obscurantism. One of the main arguments which Grassi presents in his book Rhetoric as Philosophy is that in rejecting rhetoric, and therein ingenium as well, rational thought severs itself from its own first principles. Rational thought is constituted by the process of inference, or as said above, justification in term of reasons. According to Grassi, "it is clear that the first archai of any proof and hence of knowledge cannot be proved themselves because they cannot be the object of apodictic, demonstrative, logical speech."<sup>49</sup>

Rhetoric, a speaking which is capable of discovering and showing basic principles which cannot be disclosed deductively, is required in order to provide "the framework within which proof can come into existence." The tables have turned as rhetoric, metaphorical language, is seen as "the basis of rational thought."<sup>50</sup>

Mere rhetoric, sophistry in its usual negative connotation, uses images to move its hearers but those images are bereft of genuine insight. Unlike authentic rhetorical speaking, for which the vision and presentation of significance are essential, false rhetoric takes its orientation from external assumptions and imposes these on a subject and audience in a mockery of true eloquence. Rhetoric, in this deficient and therefore negative sense, merits the thrashing Plato unleashes on the Sophists.

## Rhetoric and ~~Sein~~-analysis

Through the metaphorical transfer of significance to the image which it displays, rhetoric has the power to convey ingenious insights into relations which obtain within our life situations. An essential commonality between classical rhetoric and Sein-analysis becomes clear in light of Grassi's explanation of the nature of these rhetorical insights.

Such primary metaphorical thought and speech is not the discovery of commonality or similarity among things, but rather the commonality between that which draws our attention and concerns us and that to which language refers us by way of addressing the situation. Every interpretation refers us to something which is not the interpreted thing itself, but the way it stands in relationship to us. The things that confront us become a metaphorical language and the world speaks to us.<sup>51</sup>

The ingenium in which rhetorical speech originates is an insight not into things but into how things matter in the human world. In bethinging the thing, language refers us to Sein as the referential context in which things make sense. We, as mortals, are those who are given over to Sein in the Event of the world which comes to pass in things. The vision which lies at the heart of rhetorical speech is none other than an insight into how things bething us.

The assertion of things as a metaphorical language through which the world speaks and conditions our dwelling provides the first principle of a rhetorical psychology. Sein is the presencing of the world which we have identified as



psychological reality--a reality of reflection which we experience through things. A rhetorical psychology takes up the fourfold as a way of imagining things which reveals Sein. The image of the fourfold serves the rhetorical function of empowering us to recognize things as metaphors of Sein. In its use of metaphorical language, a rhetorical psychology discloses the meaning of our experience by showing us the ways things matter psychologically. "Through the things of the world," writes Romanyshyn, "psychological experience is visible." He adds that "The recovery of psychological life in this way is, however, also the recovery of the world as psychological."<sup>52</sup> A rhetorical psychology turns to the things of the world to present the meanings inherent in the world of our experience.

Rhetoric, writes Grassi, is an "indicative or allusive (semeinein) speech."<sup>53</sup> Likewise, Romanyshyn tells us that "the psychologist alludes to what is elusive."<sup>54</sup> Sein, the world which speaks in the metaphorical language of things, can never be known directly. Only through things does Sein presence and in this presencing Sein itself withdraws. Psychological epideictic uses the image of the fourfold to allude to Sein--the elusive world of psychological experience. There is no searching out of philosophical ground or inference from metaphysical principles. Instead, the gathering of the four is displayed as a spectacle which presents the worlding of the world in the visible manifestation of

things.

The agreement between Sein-analysis and rhetoric concerning the metaphorical nature of things has vindicated our digression into the classical tradition as the heritage out of which to develop the craft appropriate to a psychology which follows Heidegger's turn to the world. Romanyshyn's observation that "things as metaphor are initially, or primarily, matters of persuasion, not of proof,"<sup>55</sup> all but says as much. Things as metaphors are the materiality, the embodiment, of Being's persuasive hold on human beings. (The Enframing does not determine human reality in the way that a technology of behavior aspires to control psychological life. Rather technology is for us the most convincing, albeit deceptive, presencing of Being.) The work of a rhetorical psychology is a re-presentation of the unworld of technology that gives voice to the concealed persuasions of Sein. The conflation of Sein-analysis and classical rhetoric can thus be seen to have a twofold character: psychology as rhetoric discerns the speaking of Sein through things; rhetoric as psychology addresses things as they present Sein.

Aristotle, it will be remembered, claims for rhetoric the ability "to discover [theoresai] the means of persuasion in reference to any given subject" (I.ii.1). In reference to the presencing of Sein in things, we can confidently venture that it is the ornate language and attribution of quality

exercised by epideictic that provides the prepon means of persuasion. Consideration of how to compose of a psychological epideixis is the next step in articulating a psychology whose goal is the cultivation of behavior's meanings rather than its control.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### PSYCHOLOGY AS RHETORIC

The craft of a rhetorical psychology consists in the composition of epideictic which address the quality of life in contemporary culture. Such discourses would solicit our ingenuity in recognizing and amplifying the speaking of the world through things. They would cultivate the meaning of behavior through the performance of "releasement toward things" and "openness to the mystery." Psychological epideictic might (to use Heidegger's characterization of meditative thinking) "grant us the possibility of dwelling....in the world of technology without being imperiled by it" by way of offering "a vision of a new autochthony,"<sup>1</sup> or at least opening the path to such a vision.

Granted, there are psychological elements inherent in all rhetoric insofar as there is always an aesthetic response to the speech's style and an emotional dynamic involved in persuasion. The proposed rhetoric would, however, be a psychological form of epideictic because, as distinct from the numerous species of the genre discussed by Menander, its end is the cultivation of meaning through the display of psychological reality.

The Rhetoric of Aristotle, not least because of its

philosophical (as opposed to literary) conception of metaphor, will be taken as our primary guide to the construction of a psychological epideixis. As a theoretical activity which obtains knowledge, rhetoric uncovers the astonishing similarity between world and thing which is then disclosed in an epideixis. Presentation of the insight--which is the thesis of an epideixis--and its proof are, according to Aristotle, the two necessary parts of the rhetorical act. The speech itself is usually divided into four sections with an exordium introducing the topic's statement (narration) and an epilogue following the proof. This traditional disposition of the speech provides a framework for the following discussion of psychological epideictic.

#### Exordium and Narration

The role of the exordium is to introduce the speech's topic in such a way as to make the audience receptive to what follows. Quintilian and, as he notes, "the majority of authors" all "agree that this is best effected in three ways": by capturing the audiences' attention, securing their interest, and soliciting their goodwill (IV.i.5). Rhetorical flourishes are one way to grab an audience's attention as ingenious expressions provoke the audience's wonder and astonishment. Once it has caught their attention, the introduction can hold the audience's interest by displaying the

speech's topic in light of those things which bear upon their own lives and happiness. And finally, attribution of importance and value to the audience and/or their concerns is likely to gain their goodwill.

Aristotle notes that the specific kind of exordium appropriate to epideictic "pave[s] the way for what follows," much like a poem's prologue or the prelude in flute-playing. Following the pattern of the flute-players who "begin by playing whatever they can execute skillfully....the speaker should say at once whatever he likes, give the key-note and then attach the main subject" (III.xiv.1).

There can be wide variation in the introduction to an epideictic. In saying whatever she or he wishes, the rhetor may address topics which "may be either foreign or intimately connected with the speech" (III.xiv.4). In fact, Aristotle believes it "more appropriate" that the speaker "wanders" from the topic "than that the speech be monotonous" (III.xiv.2). What is important is that the speaker exhibit his or her style in the form of amplifications which draw the hearers' attention. Like the flute-player who must play his or her most captivating melodies in order to gain the audience's ear, the epideictic rhetor must offer enticing figures of speech. The speaker needs to inspire the audience through an aesthetically pleasing display in order to make them receptive to the presentation which will fol-

low. The introduction is the occasion for the speaker to perform in the ornate language which will open the audience's imagination to the insights she or he hopes to reveal in the course of the speech.

The initial display of a speaker's rhetorical talent is at one and the same time an example of his or her perspective on the affairs of the polis. The element of judgement which obtains in the audience's role as observers of an epideictic is called into play at this point. As Oravec has explained, the audience's judgement is twofold. There is an evaluation of the speaker's rhetorical skills and a judgement of the validity of the presentation. The speaker's words must not only engender a pleasurable response, they also have to be true to common experience or else the audience will find her or his perspective irrelevant and lose interest.

The audience's positive judgement of the verisimilitude of the speaker's presentation is the first step in establishing trust in his or her character. The character or ethos of the rhetor is traditionally noted as one of the three essential considerations which bear on the efficacy of rhetorical persuasion. (The other two, pathos and logos, will be discussed later.) Ethos, as described by Aristotle, is the confidence the audience has in the speaker based on what is said in the speech itself rather than on any preconceptions concerning her or his character. The truthfulness

and relevance of the speaker's introductory remarks are in this way essential to his or her credibility. Thus, one of the ways in which the exordium "paves the way" for what follows is by building the audience's confidence in the speaker so that they will continue to trust the perspective which his or her words offer. Aristotle goes so far as to claim that ethos "constitutes the most effective means of proof" (I.ii.5).

When the speaker's rhetorical display has struck the right note with respect to the audience's attention, then it is time to introduce the topic of discussion. As mentioned above, the topic is best presented in relation to the shared experiences of the audience. Amplification in light of this relationship allows the audience to perceive the relevance of the topic as it simultaneously validates the worth of their existing concerns. This amplification of the topic in terms of its relational quality prefigures the insight into the topic which is the thesis of the speech. The thesis itself may be stated at this point, or it may be withheld until the proof or conclusion.

A narration follows the introduction and is a full statement of the topic with respect to the information which the audience needs in order to comprehend the thesis offered. Aristotle assigns three goals to the narrative section of an epideictic. The first of these, that of relating the facts about the topic, is "inartificial" insofar as the



speaker is not the author or cause of these facts, simply their narrator. As a rule, epideictic rhetors do not need to establish or even document the facts of their topic. These are generally well known and undisputed--which is the case in a psychological epideixis. The speaker is not presenting anything out of the ordinary but rather the extraordinariness latent in everything (that is, the capacity of things to reveal a world).

The narration is dependent upon the speaker's art in its disclosure of the topic's quality. Quintilian notes that "...all the topics of demonstrative oratory include a qualitative basis. The facts are admitted, and the question turns on their quality" (VIII.iv.3). This question is addressed by way of showing that the topic is, in Aristotle's words, "of a certain kind,...[and] of a certain importance" (III.xvi.2), these being the other two goals of the narration.

### Technological Culture

One way in which the narration of a psychological epideixis discloses the kind and importance of things is by relating the context in which they appear. In a broad yet extremely significant sense, that context is our culture. The word "culture" is undeniably vague. In our common parlance we employ it in reference to "the concepts, habits,

skills, arts, instruments, institutions, etc., of a given people in a given period." <sup>2</sup> The ways people think and feel, how they build their cities and clothe their children, their styles of art and kinds of commerce, the morays and social codes which guide their lives--all of these are included in the make-up of a culture. We often use the phrase "cultural milieu" to denote this all embracing totality which is the color, texture, and substance of a particular era. One is always in the midst of such environs and experiences it in the most direct and concrete way through things. By reflecting on the character of contemporary culture, a psychological epideixis provides an informative context within which the audience can come to see the appearance of ordinary things.

In his essay, "On Psychological Language," James Hillman writes:

We are in an age of psychopathy, an age without reflection and without connection, that is without psyche and without eros, an age which acts out the soul's metaphors in the streets. <sup>3</sup>

Sadly enough, current events bespeak such an age. Meditation and conversation, the hallmarks of a cultured way of life, are frightfully lacking in modern existence. The insanity of random violence and the breakdown of communication (within the community, on the job, and in the capitol) have become ongoing phenomena. The news is always old news...drug trouble in the schools, again...violence in the inner cities,

again...a rash of teen suicides, again...bizzare mass murders, again...political scandals, again. It is as if we are a culture compelled to the repetition of psychopathic behaviors.

To say that we live in an age of psychopathy is not to insinuate that there has been an increase in the ranks of psychopaths. However, what can be seen are the painful effects of a psychopathic era on the individual psyche. Without psychological reflection there is no context for involvements, no worlds in which to find ourselves; we become disoriented in what were once familiar situations. Without psychic connection to life, we can only imitate living. Vacuous lives are filled-up with empty names for missing meanings. This is the idle chatter of mass culture--the masters of which are the breed of modern sophists called "ad men."

Heidegger, as we know, provides another characterization of our age in light (or should we rather say, in the shadow) of technology. Predominance of the technological perspective brings a "darkening of the world" in which humanity's "bonds with the grounds [of its being] are hidden and masked."<sup>4</sup> Rather than taking this as yet another characterization of our age which would thus stand along side that proposed by Hillman, let us imagine Heidegger's conception of technology as clarifying Hillman's diagnosis of cultural psychopathy.

In his speech commemorating Messkirch's seventh-hundred anniversary, Heidegger describes what in the present context can be termed psychological traits of life in an age of psychopathy. "The focus," as the speech's translator and commentator Thomas Sheehan observes, "is on technology, not merely as the outgrowth of progressive changes in science and society but as the mittence (Geschick) of Being."<sup>5</sup> Heidegger employs epideictic rhetoric to compose an occasional oration which brings this focus to bear on the transformation of the ordinary which transpires in the technological age and which affects the way of life in even so small and out of the way a place as the small Swabian town of Messkirch.

Like the oratorical tracts of the Sophists, "Messkirch's Seventh Centennial" is a work of oral rhetoric which was subsequently edited for publication. Although his reasons are not strictly identical with those put forth by Cicero, Heidegger's often noted word plays are well represented in the oration, and conform to the Latin rhetor's prescription for the "method" of epideictic which

is directed to giving the audience pleasure and entertainment,...the style employed must be made of those brilliant touches in particular words which are such an extremely agreeable feature,--that means that we must frequently employ new coinages or archaisms or metaphors--, and in the actual construction of words we must use frequent repetitions of parallels and similes.<sup>6</sup>

As an occasional address, the speech offers a course of reflection appropriate to the evening--"the time and hour of

7  
meditation" --and to the celebration of the town's anniversary. Heidegger considers the "town-celebration" to be a "feast in the authentic sense" in that it occasions reflection.<sup>8</sup> The reflection provoked is on the fate of home-- understood as the openness in which human dwelling can take root and prosper--in a world in which technology holds sway. In appraising his audience of the difficulties inherent in the path this reflection will follow, Heidegger follows the Sophists in employing the rhetorical self-consciousness characteristic of epideictic orations.

The first difficulty encountered is that the topic of "homeland" has been so thoroughly trivialized that it no longer offers the possibility of genuine insight. Too much has as well been said during the celebrations concerning both the past and present of Messkirch. What Heidegger proposes, in the provocative manner befitting the exordium of an epideixis, is that the oration "dare to stay with the question: Messkirch tomorrow? In the future?"<sup>9</sup>

Upon its first hearing, Heidegger's question would seem to both confound its hearers and violate Aristotle's time scheme for an epideictic. Epideictic is supposed to refer to the existing condition of things, that is, the present. Aristotle does expand this designation somewhat when he allows that "it is not uncommon for epideictic speakers to avail themselves of other times, of the past by way of recalling it, or the future by way of anticipating it" (I.

iii.5). Heidegger's query of the future employs full use of this expanded time sense in the service of provoking the audience to a recognition of phenomena which are immediately present in daily affairs.

What Heidegger is up against is the a-historical prejudice of the technological world. This prejudice is the simultaneous denial of the past by deeming it transcended by present achievements and a forgetfulness of the future--a giving it up beforehand as merely an extension of progress occurring in the present. There is a frightening loss of memory, a loss of things past, as the designs of expanding technology unfold a future in which human beings are seduced by the illusion of having power over all things. Obliteration of the horizons of time leaves the present flat and dimensionless. In order to make the audience aware of the urgency of the situation to which the discourse is directed, Heidegger revivifies the present as an enduring embodiment of things past and those yet to come.

Recollection of the past, as advised by Aristotle and practiced by Heidegger, is not merely a calling to mind of what has come before us. It is a turning of the audience to face its past in such a way that the happenings of the past re-call or re-claim it. The past then appears as a dynamic presence whose recollection brings to attention the callings and claims in which the present originates. In Heidegger's terms, the past is present as "what-is-as-having-been."<sup>10</sup>

By the same measure, the epideictic orator's anticipation of the future is not the foretelling of a present which we will someday experience. It is instead the engendering of a recognition of and openness to possibilities that are coming toward the audience from out of the horizon of the future. This is an awareness of the future as appearing now in the ways in which the present is drawn beyond itself. "Tomorrow," as Heidegger tells his neighbors, "is not only the tomorrow that follows immediately upon today; rather it already dominates within the affairs of today."<sup>11</sup>

The transformations of the ordinary wrought by the Messkirch of tomorrow being "entangled in the network of the technological era"<sup>12</sup> are experienced in the Messkirch which celebrates its seventh centennial. These experiences, the futural possibilities which appear in the present, are the topic of Heidegger's oration. They are the common perceptions and experiences which Heidegger's epideixis reflectively displays for his fellow townspeople's edification.

The two experiences which Heidegger's oration brings to notice are prominent features of psychological life in a technological age. They bear witness to the enframing of technology as it intercedes in and determines our daily existences. The first of these is an obsession with the new, the unfamiliar, the fantastic, the alien (das Unheimische). "By the day and the hour," as Heidegger observes, "people are being pulled away into strange, enticing, at times also

entertaining and educational realms."<sup>13</sup> Speaking as he did in the early 1960s, Heidegger saw the myriad of TV antennae, sprouted as if by magic from the roof tops of every civilized abode in the Western world, as a sign of the re-creation of human dwelling in an alien image. His observations are equally suited to the newest consumer delight--personal, portable, home computers. These latest technological wonders, on which you can play electronic games, plan your budget, program your correspondence, learn a foreign language, design a picture, or any one of an ever expanding menu of activities, are advertised as solving the problems of work, play, and learning. Personal computers, like television (and its successor, video cassette recorders), bring spectacular technology into the intimate places of our dwelling and seems to place technological power at our finger tips. Beyond even TV and computers, any number of the crazes that come over the marketplace, or the rages of the fashion world, or the waves of popular cults which break out in our midst could be cited in support of Heidegger's contention.

Flight into the alien, facilitated by the wealth of transportive and transformative activities generated by modern technological culture, breeds the lack of psychological reflection discussed earlier. The chronic dissatisfactions which come of this lack are alleviated, yet then only temporarily, by the arrival of the still latest realm of unfamiliar experience. This in a way explains the psychologi-



cal importance of "seasons" in the various industries which produce culture--entertainment, clothing, recreation, cosmetics and so on.

Boredom, a "deep boredom like an insidious fog which creeps to and fro in the bottomless depths of our existence"<sup>14</sup> is the other experience to which Heidegger directs attention. Could this be the same phenomena as the "vague feelings of emptiness" that are currently brought to psychotherapists? The "ennui" Heidegger speaks of must be differentiated from all passing boredom with particular things. We attempt escape, or at least seek relief from this profound boredom by engaging in whatever round of activities is closest at hand. Nevertheless, we cannot break completely free of it; it returns again and again. Left to ourselves, we are defenseless against its onslaughts; it "penetrates"<sup>15</sup> our existence to the core." When in the grip of this deep boredom, all our connections to the world are loosened. We lose our interests; our concerns, preferences, and desires lessen, weaken and fade. Little wonder that we avoid it like the plague. Like the Black Death which shook Medieval Europe to its foundations, decimating its population and desecrating its belief structures, this profound boredom threatens havoc on the lifestyles of contemporary culture.

Taken together, the observations made by Hillman and Heidegger provide a psychological profile of our culture. They depict a culture which, lacking psychic reflection and

connection, exhibits a deep boredom concurrent with an obsessive fascination with the alien. In the context of a psychological epideixis, the profile is an articulation of the audiences' disposition. The rhetorical term for this disposition is pathos and it is one of the three key elements of persuasion noted earlier. According to Aristotle, "the orator persuades by means of his hearers," (I.ii.5) as their judgement is influenced by their disposition. On account of this, Aristotle considers the study of character and emotion as essential for the rhetor.

#### Amplification

Narration of our culture's disposition, its psychological orientation to its world, sets the stage for the rhetor to develop her or his insight into the topic. This section of the speech is the proof. "Proofs," as Aristotle directs, "should be demonstrative" (III.xvii.1). The Rhetoric specifies different modes of proof as best suited to each of the genres. Examples are appropriate to deliberation about the course of action to be pursued in the future, and enthymemes to forensic rhetoric's concern with facts (V. III.xvii.4). In the case of epideictic, that which is demonstrated is, as was earlier quoted from Quintilian, the quality of whatever is praised or blamed. The mode of proof which is capable of demonstrating qualities is amplification. The Institutes

tell us that "the proper function...of panegyric is to amplify and embellish its themes" (III.viii.6). And Aristotle specifies that "in epideictic speeches, amplification is employed, as a rule, to prove that things are honourable or useful" (III.xvii.3). The character of such proof is indicative as opposed to an apodeictic. Cicero says of epideictic in De Partitione Oratoria that

this kind of discourse consists in narrating and exhibiting...without employing any argument...for it does not establish propositions...but amplifies statements.<sup>16</sup>

Kenneth Burke observes that "of all rhetorical devices, the most throughgoing is amplification (Greek, auxesis)"<sup>17</sup> Virtually all of the major theorists of the rhetorical tradition prescribe numerous methods of amplification. While Theophrastus specifies six commonplaces of amplification, Cicero counts them as ten, the Ad Herennium enumerates fifteen, and Quintilian groups the various kinds of amplification into "four principle" categories: "augmentation, comparison, reasoning and accumulation" (VIII.vi.3). Medieval rhetors such as Geoffrey of Vinsauf, John of Garland, Richard of Thetford and Robert of Basevorn each generated sometimes lengthy lists of amplifications. Richard of Thetford's Art of Amplifying Sermons, for example, offers: exposition rather than naming, dividing, reasoning, appeals to concordant authority, extrapolating from the known, metaphors, exposition via levels of interpreta-

tion, and cause and effect.

In general, rhetorical amplification refers, as Perelman makes note, to "the oratorical development of a theme, irrespective of the exaggeration that people generally associate with it."<sup>19</sup> This development is carried out through the use of figurative language which "make[s] the object of discourse present to the mind."<sup>20</sup> Presence, which is a key term in The New Rhetoric, is "the displaying of certain elements on which the speaker wishes to center attention in order that they may occupy the foreground of the hearer's consciousness."<sup>21</sup> Epideictic's demonstration of its topic's qualities is accomplished by selectively "endowing" the topic with "presence." Oravec describes the results as the audience perceiving the topic "in terms of the language, the very magnification and amplification used by the rhetor in his representation."<sup>22</sup>

As an aside, it should be noted that one of the contemporary appearances of amplification is to be found in the practice of Analytical Psychology. C. G. Jung defines amplification as a "logical principle...of seeking parallels." It "formulates exactly the technique of finding the context." Jung explains that he adopted the principle of amplification from "the philologist" who seeks to discover the meaning of a word by trying to "find parallel applications perhaps, where the word also occurs."<sup>23</sup> Hillman avers that the psychological method of amplification "is rather

like the methods of the humanities and the arts ... [as it] is like a prolonged meditation, or variations on a theme of music, or the patterns of dance or brush-strokes."<sup>24</sup>

Amplification, which is essential to Jungian interpretation of images especially in dreams, places its topic within contexts--personal, environmental, or archetypal--which illuminate their meaning. Far from making images familiar by reducing them to usual settings, amplification makes us familiar with the complexities inherent in its topics by enlarging and magnifying their unfamiliar, provocative presence. "The analyst," according to Hillman, "brings meaning out ... by swelling events into pregnancy through amplification."<sup>25</sup> And Jung writes that "A dream is too slender a hint to be understood until it is enriched by the stuff of association and analogy and thus amplified to the point of intelligibility."<sup>26</sup>

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle stresses that how a thing is said is as important as what is said (--the rhetorical union of res and verba). The former "largely contributes to making the speech appear of a certain character" (III.i.2). Amplification is usually associated with the brilliant and vivid language of the grand style of rhetoric, the style appropriate to epideictic. This style of speaking, as has been shown, was pioneered by Gorgias and developed within the sophistic strand of the classical tradition. The grand or brilliant style is used to rouse the audience by stirring

their emotions and sparking their imagination. It goes beyond simply presenting a clear understanding of something (the goal of the plain kind of style) to, in Cicero's words, make "us feel that we actually see it before our eyes."<sup>27</sup> To that end, the brilliant style employs the ornate arrangement of distinctive words and striking phrases.

Ornamentation of speech is one of the four virtues or qualities of style categorized by Theophrastus. Ornamentia verborum or ornatus encompasses figures and tropes. It is integral to epideictic and the brilliant style for it is by way of the metaphorical use of language that the rhetor is able to set his or her topic before the eyes of the audience. Quintilian remarks that in comparison to the other genres, "how much more eloquence and ornament is allowed the topics of demonstrative oratory" (XI.i.48).

Lest the rhetorical conception of ornatus be confused with the common notion of ornamentation as mere superfluous decoration (a notion correlative to the widespread debasement of sophistry and rhetoric in general), it is well that the origin of the term be kept in mind. The Latin ornatus comes from the Greek word kosmos which has as its "primary meaning," according to Raymond DeLorenzo's discussion in his essay "Ornatus and the Nature of Wisdom,"

an order of parts taken as a whole. The allure of the ensemble is not separable from the organization of its constituent parts.<sup>28</sup>

Ornatus, as a virtue of rhetorical style, is the ordering of

speech which gives it its distinctive, alluring appearance.

Quintilian writes:

The ornate is something that goes beyond what is merely lucid and acceptable. It consists firstly in forming a clear conception of what we wish to say, second in giving this adequate expression, and thirdly in lending it additional brilliance (VIII.iii.61).

The stylistic amplifications which ornament an epideixis are a demonstration of the topic's qualities. This showing forth of appearances is undertaken by way of ornatus' departure from ordinary language, which is to say, it occurs through the use of figurative language. Figurative language (meant here to include both figures and tropes) violates the patterns of everyday speech thus shattering the expectations embedded in mundane discourse.

While ornatus is an arrangement of language which does a violence to familiar usage, it is not experienced as such. Rather than a perturbing breakdown of speech, the use of ornamentation appears as a pleasurable elevation of language. By breaking with the ordinary, figures give language a "foreign" (xenen) air. According to the Rhetoric, people feel the same way about rhetorical style as they do about strangers: "men admire what is remote, and that which excites admiration is pleasant" (III.ii.3). Cicero remarks with respect to "unusual or original or novel expression" that "anything that causes surprise gives pleasure." <sup>29</sup> And Quintilian notes with approval Cicero's remark in a now lost

letter that "Eloquence which evokes no admiration is, in my opinion, unworthy of the name" (VIII.iii.6). "If a speaker manages well," claims Aristotle,

there will be something "foreign" about his speech, while possibly the art may not be detected, and his meaning will be clear. And this, as we have said, is the chief merit of rhetorical language (III.ii.6-7).

Xenen, as it appears in the Rhetoric, is a difficult term to translate. Among the work's English translators, Lane Cooper renders it as "novelty [remoteness];" John Gillies as "new and unusual;" W. Rhys Roberts as "unfamiliar;" and R. C. Jebb as "distinctive."<sup>30</sup> J. E. C. Welldon,<sup>31</sup> E. M. Cope, Thomas Hobbes and J. H. Freese all agree in using "foreign" and provide parenthetical explanations. Cope offers: "an air of novelty, something unusual, above the flatness and monotony of ordinary, vulgar talk."<sup>32</sup> Hobbes writes:

Should the epithet foreign, as applied to a quality of style, not be immediately apprehended, it may be well to recollect that it means the excellence opposed to the fault which we designate homeliness.<sup>33</sup>

In the Loeb Edition, Freese says in effect that xenon is untranslatable: "`Foreign` does not exactly convey the idea, which is rather that of something opposed to `homelike`,<sup>34</sup> -out-of-the-way, as if from `abroad`."

"Not-being-at-home" (das Nicht-zuhause-sein) as distinguished from everyday familiarity is what Heidegger says he means by his use of the term Unheimlich in Being and Time:<sup>35</sup> "not homelike, uncanny." Sigmund Freud cites xenen as the



Greek term for the subject of his inquiry in the 1919 essay, "The Uncanny." Freud describes this inquiry as a psycho-analytical investigation in the field of aesthetics ("understood to mean not merely the theory of beauty, but the theory of feeling"<sup>36</sup>). His analysis of xenon yields a constellation of factors that include: relationship to death, entanglement with religious faith, belief in symbolic or imaginal reality, mirror images and the human potentiality for fantasy. Freud remarks that psychoanalysis itself is uncanny (one might say, has a "foreign air") to many people because of its concern with these elements of human experience. Interestingly, the factors Freud uncovers all but match the "fence-poles" with which Hillman stakes out his theme of the soul in Re-Visioning Psychology. The soul, according to Hillman, is "that unknown component which makes meaning possible, [and] turns events into experiences."<sup>37</sup>

While one might safely infer that the uncanny is intimately related to aesthetics and psychological life, it would assume too much at this point to identify xenon in the Rhetoric with either Freud's Unheimlich or Hillman's notion of soul. However, the remarks on uncanniness presented in Being and Time can be turned to in order to amplify Aristotle's likening of the effects of rhetorical ornamentation to encounters with foreigners.

## Rhetoric and Being and Time

Heidegger, it will be remembered, claims that Book II of the Rhetoric is an analysis of the everydayness of being-in-the-world. We can approach the phenomena of xenon by reading Heidegger through Aristotle in much the same way as the former read the Rhetoric by way of his own formulation of the problematic of Being. What is suggested is that the phenomenology of uncanniness presented in Being and Time can be interpreted in terms of Aristotle's consideration of emotions as an integral part of rhetorical techne. Before commencing with such an interpretation it will be helpful to digress for a moment and elucidate those aspects of Heidegger's analytic of Being which relate to the rhetorical process.

Already noted has been Heidegger's assertion that language is essential to being-in-the-world. In Being and Time, where Heidegger's concern is less the nature of language than its place within Dasein's being, he tells us that "the existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk [die Rede]."<sup>38</sup> Discourse comprises all the ways of speaking and listening, as well as those of keeping silent. Heidegger regards discourse as an existentialia (his term for basic ontological constituents of Dasein), thereby drawing attention to its role in Dasein's disclosedness. Discourse articulates the intelligibility of

being-in-the-world. Meaning, as was noted in Chapter One, is "that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself." In articulating the intelligibility of the "there" of being-in-the-world, discourse discloses meaning--meaning which can then be spoken.

Equiprimordial with discourse as existentialia are state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) and understanding (Verstehen). Literally understood, Befindlichkeit refers to how one finds oneself. Heidegger writes: "What we indicate ontologically by the term "state-of-mind" is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing: our mood, our Being-attuned."<sup>39</sup> McCall suggests that Befindlichkeit be translated as "`self-orienting attitude` or `self-disclosing attitude` and adds its reference to 'the actual situation in which one finds oneself.'<sup>40</sup> A state-of-mind reveals the "there" of Dasein as a being delivered over to a world. More, in having a mood (Stimmung), Dasein is attuned to the significance of that world as a whole such that particular entities within it can "matter" to Dasein. Heidegger uses fear as an example: "Only something that is in the state-of-mind of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that what is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening."<sup>41</sup>

Understanding, as a fundamental mode of Dasein's being, is an appreciation of one's possibilities in the world into which one is thrown. These possibilities include those ways of comporting itself toward entities, being-with others, and

being toward itself which are available to Dasein within its "there." In understanding, Dasein recognizes its potentiality-for-Being. Understanding discloses being-in-the-world such that Dasein can interpret and project itself upon the significances which constitute its world.

Every understanding has its mood or attunement to possibilities. Likewise, to each mood belongs a disclosive understanding of Dasein and its world. Discourse obtains to both state-of-mind and understanding as their articulated disclosure. State-of-mind, understanding and discourse belong together as constitutive of how Dasein is "in" the world. In light of this, it is now clear why Heidegger sees Aristotle's discussion of emotions as a treatment of the moods of everyday being-in-the-world. Emotions, as defined in the Rhetoric, "are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements and are accompanied by pleasure and pain" (II.i.8-9).

For the most part, Dasein is "in" the world as the "they" (das Man)--the everyone who is no one in particular. Averageness is an existential characteristic of the "they." The "they" concerns itself with averageness, maintains itself in averageness, prescribes averageness. The "they" articulate the self of Dasein as well as determines the world of its dwelling. It must be stressed that the "they" is not to be taken as a pejorative depiction but as a neutral description of "who" Dasein is in its average every-

dayness. Heidegger uses the term "publicness" to refer to the "they's" disclosure of Dasein and the world. Publicness is characterized by a "leveling down" of all possibilities to what is usual and expected, a reduction of all that is unusual or exceptional to a common level of familiarity and accessibility. This leveling and reduction facilitates the easy performance of our mundane activities but it distances us from our ownmost (eigentlich) understanding of being-in-the-world and conceals the possibilities which come of such an understanding. Heidegger writes:

The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted...[becomes] decisive even for the possibilities of having a mood--that is, for the basic ways in which Dasein lets the world "matter" to it. The "they" prescribes one's state-of-mind, and determines what and how one `sees.`<sup>42</sup>

In short, publicness determines the referential context of concern in which Dasein finds itself as the "they."

Within Being and Time's discussion of the publicness of the "they" and its moods one finds the aforementioned designation of Book II of Aristotle's Rhetoric as an analysis of Dasein's being-with one another. Heidegger claims that "It is into such a mood and out of such a mood that the orator speaks. He must understand the possibilities of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright."<sup>43</sup>

"Being-with-one-another," according to Heidegger, "takes place in talking with one another and in concern with what is said-in-the-talk."<sup>44</sup> The orator relies on the struc-

ture of being-with as discourse in order to "rouse" and "guide" the moods of the "they." The kind of "care" (Sorge)--Heidegger's fundamental characterization of the essence of Dasein as a being engaged or involved--manifested in being-with others is solicitude (Fursorge). Solicitude has its deficient and indifferent modes in which the Other does not "matter" to Dasein in its Being-with. These include not attending to the Other or relating to the Other as if to equipment "ready-to-hand." Alternately, concerned solicitude discloses the Other in an affirmative manner as another Being-with. Rhetorical persuasion, the orator's attempt to move the "they", is a positive expression of solicitous being-with-others in the form of discourse.

Heidegger specifies two positive modes of solicitude. In the first of these, solicitude is exercised in the form of a "leap in" for the Other which takes over the Other's concern. The Other is relieved of his or her immediate involvement with the matter at hand. Once that involvement has been brought to completion by the Dasein who has leaped in, the Other can again take it up as something accomplished or simply disregard it altogether. This mode of solicitude, in which "the other can become one who is dominated and dependent," is "to a large extent determinative for Being with one another." <sup>45</sup> The other positive mode of solicitude is one in which there occurs a "leap ahead" of the Other which frees her or him for their involvements. Dasein "leaps forth

and liberates" the Other in his or her "ownmost potentiality-for-Being."<sup>46</sup>

The two forms of positive solicitude can be correlated with the negative and positive views of rhetoric: the dominating "leaping in" with the manipulations of "mere" rhetoric, and the liberating "leaping ahead" with the persuasive power of genuine rhetoric. Both rhetorical projects are addressed to the "they" with the intention of directing its moods. The one, mere rhetoric, works upon the "they's" moods to formulate an understanding which, in Heidegger's term, "disburdens" Dasein of the necessity of taking up its possibilities in its own way. Mere rhetoric leaps in only to impose its own orientation on the averageness of being-in-the-world. The other, rhetoric in its genuine sense, seeks to transform the mood of the "they" in a way which discloses Dasein's understanding of its ownmost potentialities. Dasein discovers its potentiality-for-Being through an existentiell modification of the "they-self" which issues from a rhetorical rectification of the "they's" moods.<sup>47</sup>

Rhetoric can change the worlds in which Dasein dwells. By solicitously reforming the moods of the "they," rhetoric has the power to authentically disclose the "there" of being-in-the-world. Based on his or her knowledge of the "possibilities of moods," the rhetor is able to exercise a formative influence on the "they" by engaging in a discourse which "rouses" their state-of-mind and "guides" their

understanding.

### Uncanniness

With the aforegiven understanding of the rhetorical situation in mind, we can now return to Heidegger's phenomenology of uncanniness and Aristotle's treatment of the emotions. According to the Rhetoric, in order for the rhetor to be able to "arouse" an emotion, several things must be known of it: first, the "disposition of mind" which produces it; second, to whom or what it is usually directed; and third, the "occasions" on which it occurs (II.i.9). These are things that the psychologist-rhetor must know of uncanniness if she or he is to give the speech that foreign air which will move the audience.

In Being and Time, Heidegger tells us that uncanniness comes with the disposition or frame of mind of anxiety. While anxiety does not produce the feeling of uncanniness in the sense of causing it to occur, anxiety does attune us to its occurrence. "Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the basic state-of-mind of anxiety." <sup>48</sup> This particular kind of anxiety, existential anxiety or dread, does not issue from nor is it directed to any particular thing or event. In being anxious, Dasein is concerned about its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, that is, anxious about the very relatedness in which it exists in the world.



Central to Heidegger's analytic of Being is the assertion that Dasein's potentiality-for-Being is held in nothingness. On the one hand, Being-in-the-world has a null basis; it is thrown into the world. Forever concealed in the disclosure of Dasein "that-it-is," is the "whence" from which it is thrown. On the other, death--the possibility of the impossibility of being-there--faces Dasein as "that possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped."<sup>49</sup> In the feeling of uncanniness, Dasein is gripped by anxiety as it experiences not-being-at-home in the Nothing which is equiprimordial with presence in its being-in-the-world. Uncanniness, writes Heidegger, is "the basic kind of being-in-the-world, even though in an everyday way it has been covered up."<sup>50</sup>

Dasein responds to anxiety by "falling," that is, by giving itself over to the "they." The public ways of the "they" are the average, everyday way of doing things and being with others. In publicness "everything gets obscured, and thus what has been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone."<sup>51</sup> "Fallen" Dasein allows itself to be determined by the familiar world of the "they." "What is at stake," as Heidegger remarks in a 1925 lecture, is "a cultivation of Dasein itself as being-in-the-world."<sup>52</sup>

The publicness of the "they" functions to absorb and disperse Dasein's anxiety. The individual, non-relational

and ever present possibility of death is reinterpreted as a definite event, inevitable but always in the future-- something which happens to everyone, sometime or another. Death is no longer mysterious and anxiety provoking. Being-in-the-world as mortal is forgotten.

While Dasein flees into the "they" in order to escape the anxious feeling of uncanniness, it is precisely in its lostness in the world of publicness that uncanniness overtakes Dasein. Uncanniness, the collapse or disruption of familiar being-in-the-world, comes upon one as if from nowhere. The usual occasions of uncanniness, to answer Aristotle's second query concerning an emotion, can only be specified as the everydayness of being-there. It "can `befall` us right in the midst of the most familiar environment...We then say: one feels uncanny." <sup>53</sup> The world of our usual involvements recedes, withdraws from our concern. What was once significant is suddenly stripped of its meaningfulness. The familiar context of our being-in-the-world becomes strangely unfamiliar.

Dasein itself, in its potentiality-for-being, is the object of uncanniness. Uncanniness calls Dasein back from out of its immersion in the "they," back to itself, back to its own being-thrown into the world. The call, the feeling of uncanniness, is in the state-of-mind of anxiety as it recalls for Dasein the Nothing which, as it were, frames its being-in-the-world. In forcefully bringing Dasein back to

itself from the world of publicness, uncanniness also calls forth Dasein's potentiality for taking hold of possibilities --including death--in its own way. The "who" which speaks in the call is Dasein in its potentiality-for-being; Dasein calls to its self which is taken over by the "they-self." "The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice."<sup>54</sup> Uncanniness draws Dasein out of the "they" world as it simultaneously opens the possibility of Dasein projecting itself upon its own potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. This is the possibility which is given in the understanding (Verstehen) which comes of uncanniness as a fundamental disclosure of being-in-the-world.

Pausing for a moment, we can compare Heidegger's conception of the unheimlich with that of Freud. From the perspective of psychoanalysis, uncanniness is the quality of morbid anxiety which results from the revivification or confirmation of a psychological reality that has been previously experienced as familiar but is now repressed because it conflicts with objective reality. (Objective reality is determined by the Reality Principle whose rule we can roughly equate with the publicness of the "they.") The "unheimlich," as Freud writes, "is what was once heimisch, home-like, familiar; the prefix "un" is the token of repression."<sup>55</sup>

Freud seems to contradict Heidegger's contention that uncanniness precedes familiarity. Leaving aside the impor-

tant distinction that Heidegger is asserting the ontological priority of uncanniness while Freud's analysis occurs at the experiential level, Freud himself in his New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (written 14 years after "the Uncanny") provides a basis on which to resolve the dispute. There Freud writes that "anxiety makes repression and not, as we used to think, the other way around."<sup>56</sup> This would seem to mean that the anxiety of the uncanny is what is first experienced and it is because it is anxiety producing that the uncanny is repressed. The uncanny is not simply a subspecies of the familiar--something once familiar which has been repressed but resurfaces. The familiar carries the uncanny within it; the uncanny is the secret concealed within the canny (Das Unheimliche ist die Geheimnis des Heimlichen). Such an interpretation is consistent with Freud's description of what we can call the "they's" experience of uncanniness:

The ordinary person sees in the [occurrences of the uncanny] the workings of forces hitherto unsuspected in his fellow-man but which at the same time he is dimly aware of in a remote corner of his being.

Precisely because psychoanalysis is "concerned with laying bare these forces,"<sup>57</sup> it is thought uncanny.

Based upon the above reading of Freud, it can be said that uncanniness is the latency of the familiar. It is the deep secret of the familiar which, because of its inducement of anxiety, has been covered over in the service of the

reality testing of the "they." The experience of the uncanny attunes us to the disclosure of what has remained hitherto latent in the familiar "they" world.

Following Aristotle's scheme for the analysis of emotions we have come to the following characterization of uncanniness. The feeling of the uncanny comes in the state-of-mind of anxiety; it comes upon Dasein in its familiar everydayness; and its object is Dasein in its relation to itself and its world. Uncanniness is not produced, if by "produced" is meant caused by something in the world. Rather, it comes of Dasein itself as a basic form of being-in-the world.

As far as the rhetor is concerned, interested as she or he is with persuasion, it would appear that soliciting a feeling of uncanniness would only make their audience anxious and being anxious, unreceptive to the oration. So while the foregoing analysis has certainly amplified the phenomena of uncanniness as an emotion affect, Aristotle's association of it with pleasure becomes problematic. Either the classical theorists' assumption of a connection between the foreign air of an epideixis, admiration and pleasure is mistaken or our analysis has missed an important element in the make-up of uncanniness. Since the strength of the rhetorical tradition weighs against us, it would seem prudent to return attention to the nature of uncanniness.

We encountered uncanniness earlier in the form of the

powerful hold of the unfamiliar which appeared as a distinguishing characteristic in the profile of contemporary culture taken from Heidegger's Centennial address. What Heidegger describes is the way in which "new" things fascinate us and provoke our curiosity. In our obsession with the "new," we are "captivated and absorbed" by "the power of the alien (Unheimische)."<sup>58</sup> Our captivation by the "strange, enticing, exciting" realms of the alien corresponds to the draw of the unfamiliar which the rhetorical tradition associates with xenon. An unfamiliar turn of phrase solicits our curiosity just as do the appearances of the alien. They are both something strange, something apparently different than the run of the mill and we naturally gravitate to them. We derive pleasure from just seeing them; witnessing their presence is inherently gratifying.

The "craving for the new,"<sup>59</sup> which typifies the way in which we relate to things in the technological world, is discussed in Being and Time as the phenomena of curiosity. Curiosity is the "they's" concern with things in which we just want to see how things "look." To be curious is to wish to encounter something in terms of its novelty. Unfamiliar appearances are "taken in" so as to satisfy our desire to know them. Yet, curiosity never dwells with things long enough to understand them. Things are not comprehended in their possibilities--their world gathering potential--but only as they are actualities in the given world. Knowing

remains on the surface, superficial. The "they's" craving for the new is "so little devoted to the 'thing' it is curious about that when it obtains sight of anything it already looks away from it to what is coming next."<sup>60</sup>

Curiosity nevers stays with anything such that it might dwell with things but is restless and relentlessly on the move to whatever is newest. Curiosity is the way in which the "they's" attraction to the unfamiliar both satisfies the excited desire to "see" whatever is foreign and yet simultaneously relegates the new to the level of average everydayness.

The deep boredom, which was also identified in contemporary culture, is the counterpart to our fascination with the unfamiliar. Heidegger contends that "the fundamental but hardly noticed mood of deep boredom is probably what drives us into the time-killing that the strange, the exciting, the bewitching offers us daily in our alienation (Unheim-<sup>61</sup>ischen)." This boredom or ennui comes upon us in the hold with the alien has on our average everydayness. The "they's" craving for the new is turned to in order to cover over our boredom. And yet, it is the superficial fascination with the new which leaves us bored.

In his Letter on Humanism, Heidegger speaks of the alienation of the technological world as the "homelessness" of man. This is not merely the condition resultant from an ever increasingly mobile society. It is "a homelessness in

which not only man but the essence of man stumbles aimlessly  
about." <sup>62</sup> Homelessness is man's estrangement from the

nearness of Sein which is the Homeland (Heimat) of his dwell-  
ing. "Homelessness is the symptom of oblivion of Being." <sup>63</sup>

Alienation, homelessness, is the conditioning of being-in-  
the-world by the Enframing. Our fascination with the unfamiliar  
and our profound boredom are part and parcel of technology's  
injurious neglect of things. Only things can gather the place  
of human dwelling. "For," as Heidegger observes,

no technological equipment nor any of its achievements  
or aids, neither the powers of invention pushed to  
their limits nor endless activity have the power to  
give us homeland, i.e., that which sustains and deter-  
mines and lets us grow in the core of our existence. <sup>64</sup>

The Centennial address makes reference to two kinds of  
uncanniness. The first, das Unheimische, has been translated  
as the alien and, as we have seen, refers to the technological  
disclosure of the world. Das Unheimische is the uncanny  
hold of technology which provokes our flight into the un-  
familiar realms of the alien and thereby alienates us from  
our potential to dwell with things. The second, das Unheim-  
liche, is the uncanniness of Being itself which presences  
in the technological mode of disclosure. Das Unheimliche or  
the Awesome is the power of Being which is concealed and yet  
active in the Enframing. As Heidegger writes, "it is precisely  
this Awesome that dominates in the alien and that  
through the alien comes toward man, determining his  
future." <sup>65</sup>



In the "Memorial Address," Heidegger says that "Meditative thinking demands of us that we engage ourselves with what at first sight does not go together at all." <sup>66</sup> The Unheimische as alienation and the Unheimliche as the Awesome are two such appearances which do not seem to belong together. To be able to see the one, the presencing of Being, in and through the other, the technological disclosure of things, is the "openness to the mystery" essential to meditative thinking. The mystery, the hidden meaning of the Enframing, is the Awesome disguised in the alien.

The insight which informs Heidegger's meditation in the "Centennial" speech is a concrete instance of openness to the mystery. There Heidegger suggests that "Probably these belong together: the alienation of the technological world and the deep boredom which is the hidden pull of a sought-for-homeland." <sup>67</sup> In the profound boredom which overcomes us in our alienated everydayness, we are detached from that very everydayness, detached from the specific demands of our mundane involvements. In being bored, we are pulled out of the public ways of the "they" and pulled into the midst of beings as a whole. But this "whole" is a world which no longer matters to us. Boredom disrupts the ties that bind us to the unworld of technology and discloses the inability of that unworld to grant a place for our dwelling. Boredom frees us from the ordering of technology--we become indifferent to it--and thereby opens anew the possibility of

being appropriated by the world as the gathered presence of the fourfold.

The pull of home, in the sense of the ringing mirroring of the fourfold, discloses being-in-the-world as mortal. And what is the same, the pull of home reveals the basic uncanniness of Dasein with its anxious attunement to death and finitude. Because boredom carries within it the latent possibility of existential anxiety we are tempted to flee from it by losing ourselves in the latest fascination of the "they." Alternatively, mortals can become fascinated, captivated by their own uncanniness. In standing resolute in the face of anxiety we bear witness to the disclosure of our own potentiality for being and with that the possibility of being called by things into the nearness of the gathered four. This disclosure is the pull of the sought-for-home. The home of dwelling remains, however, only "sought-for" until and unless the Awesome itself "turns," as Heidegger phrases it, and gives itself to be revealed through things.

To summarize, in the boredom of our alienated being-there we are freed from the unworld of technology--which in our time determines the publicness of the "they." We are also opened to the pull of home which is latent in the mystery of the Awesome.

The anxiety of dwelling in the world as mortal can now be seen in its positive dimension. Anxiety of this sort does not provoke confusion even while it collapses the public

ways of the "they." "Much to the contrary," as Heidegger observes, "a peculiar calm pervades it."<sup>68</sup> Just as existential anxiety is not directed at particular things within the world, the calmness which infuses the uncanniness of being-in-the-world as mortal is not related to specific states of affairs. This calm issues from the resolute understanding of one's ownmost potentiality for being. What is more, anxiety "stands...in secret alliance with the cheerfulness and gentleness of creative longing."<sup>69</sup> In anxious Dasein's calm attunement to itself, it is open and at the ready for the authentic possibilities of its being-in-the-world. As Heidegger writes in Being and Time: "Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility."<sup>70</sup>

Calmness, cheerfulness and gentleness are characteristics of meditative thinking. In the "Centennial" speech, Heidegger assures his neighbors that while such meditation is a most difficult and grave undertaking, it "is not melancholy but gladness in which everything is gladdened, everything becomes clear and transparent."<sup>71</sup> The everything which becomes transparent is being-in-the-world itself. Dasein knows itself and it does so not as an independent, Cartesian self isolated from the world but as a mortal mutually appropriated by the earth, the heavens and the divinities. Mortals, and when we say mortals we are

thinking of the other three as well, become transparent to themselves through the reflection of the world. This, in Being and Time, is the "moment of vision" in which the "there" of being-in-the-world is authentically disclosed as engaged in a specific concrete "Situation" within which Dasein can take hold of its own possibilities.

As was discussed in Chapter One, along with meditative thinking's openness to the mystery belongs releasement toward things. Releasement toward things specifies how we might relate to the unworld of technology once we have recognized the disclosure of the Unheimliche. In the "Centennial" address, Heidegger says that we must be "ready and disposed to conserve that from which we originate.... Thus against the noisy and the frantic we bring to bear the quiet and the restrained." <sup>72</sup> Releasement toward things relies on the self knowledge of mortals to restrain us from falling prey to the fascinations of the Unheimische. At the same time, it quietly listens to the speaking of the world through things. This listening readies mortals to be released from the alienation of technology and disposes them to take up their being on the earth, beneath the sky, and with the absent divinities. In dwelling, mortals conserve their origin in the gathering of Sein as the world. As has already been quoted from Heidegger, "Dwelling preserves the fourfold by bringing the presencing of the fourfold into things."

## Metaphor and Persuasion

In probing so deeply into the nature of uncanniness, it would seem that we have strayed far from rhetoric. However, we are now in a position to better understand the workings of psychological epideictic and distinguish it, as authentic rhetoric, from "mere" rhetoric.

"Mere" rhetoric uses the ornaments of style to arouse our obsessive curiosity. In so doing, it delivers us from boredom by leaping in, taking over our potential for anxiety, and disposing of it for us. In place of boredom, mere rhetoric substitutes its own version of the new and newest and thereby conditions the publicness of the "they." In point of fact, it is advertisers, the highly skilled rhetoricians of the mass media, who so artfully conjure the unfamiliar realms of the Unheimliche. This is rhetoric in its base form, sophistry in its negative critique. While it does move the audience, mere rhetoric accomplishes a superficial persuasion which neglects the mystery at the heart of things and therein only serves to maintain the alienation of the unworld of technology.

Genuine persuasion, in sharp contrast, is directed toward making the audience transparent to itself. Just as in "mere" rhetoric, this is persuasion in terms of pathos in which the rhetor appeals to the audience on the basis of their disposition--alienated everydayness. Yet, authentic

rhetoric serves to leap ahead of its audience and reveal to it the Situation of its dwelling. A psychological epideixis delivers a vision of the world in which mortals find their reflection. The vision releases mortals from their alienation and prepares them for authentic possibilities. Psychological rhetoric, when it possess true eloquence, opens the world and fosters the essence of our humanity by disposing us to stand out into that world by cultivating things.

In accordance with the demand of the philosophical strand of the classical tradition, a psychological epideictic is based on knowledge. This knowledge is not the certainty of calculative thinking, not the means-end rationality which informs the manipulations of "mere" rhetoric. The knowledge which guides the eloquence of psychological epideictic is meditative thinking's insight into the appearances of Sein. Like ingenium of the Humanist tradition, meditative thinking is a disclosive engagement with the world which reveals the place of human dwelling. Meditative thinking's openness to the mystery discloses the uncanny presencing of Being in the alienation of our everydayness. Its releasement toward things is an apprehension of Sein in the relatedness of earth, sky, mortals and divinities.

The foreign air with which a psychological epideixis arouses its audience issues from the very character of meditative thinking itself. Remember that Bruni claims that

ingenium reveals something new and astonishing by uncovering the similar in the unsimilar. Meditative thinking's ingenious insights into the appearances of the public ways of the "they" reveal the uncanniness of being-in-the-world which is latent in the familiar. There is an air of unfamiliarity, an intriguing strangeness to meditative thinking (just as there is to psychoanalysis). Face to face with the uncanniness of its being-in-the-world, mortal Dasein is prone to anxiety. A psychological epideixis turns the anxious disruption of everydayness into the calm of authentic being-in-the-world by leaping ahead of its audience to disclose the possibilities of dwelling. The gladsomeness of meditative thinking, which is the same as that of dwelling itself in being appropriated into the play of the fourfold, is the pleasure invoked by the foreign air of a psychological epideixis.

As has already been established, the rhetorical proof of those insights which a psychological epideixis seeks to persuade its audience is undertaken in the form of demonstration through amplification. What is proven or demonstrated is the logos of the speech. The logos is what is asserted by the speaker; it is the significance of what is said in the speech. The logos of psychological epideictic is the insights into contemporary life which are generated by the ingenious activities of meditative thinking. Meditative thinking, the apprehension of Sein in and through the un-

world of technology, requires that a similarity is recognized between that which is apparently dissimilar. The metaphorical character of meditative thinking resides in the discovery of this similarity which is itself the insight which a psychological epideictic seeks to convey. Demonstration of the logos is necessary so that the signs of Being's disclosure may become present to the audience. The audience must be made to see the vision of being-in-the-world which meditative thinking asks that they contemplate. In the midst of the "they's" idle chatter, they must be allowed to hear the call of Sein which speaks through things. They must be presented with possibilities of dwelling which remain latent in the technological disclosure of the world. The epideictic orator employs the stylistically ornate language of the grand style to present these insights. Style is what brings the logos to appearance. As Grassi recognizes, the kind of speaking which has the power to display such insights must necessarily be an imaginative language which relies on metaphor.

"Rhetorical ornamentation," writes Quintilian in expressing a "canon" of the tradition, "requires...the skilful use of metaphor" (VIII.iii.15). Metaphor is "by far the most beautiful of tropes....[it] shines forth with a light that is all its own" (VIII.vi.4). Little wonder that the Rhetoric advises prose writers to devote careful attention to its use.



In the Poetics, Aristotle claims that:

the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor [literally: to be metaphorical, to metaphorikon einai]. It is the one thing which cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius [euphuias], since a good metaphor [literally: to metaphorize well, eu metapherein] implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars. <sup>73</sup>

To metaphorize well is to have an ingenius insight into a relation between appearances. The intuitive perception of similarities, which is the heart of a good metaphor, cannot be rationally deduced. Neither can it be taught for it comes as a "gift" (euphuias), a "natural genius" (III.x.2). Being metaphorical is a sign of the genius of what the Humanists called ingenium--the apprehension of similitudo.

The greatness of metaphor resides in its originative contemplation of similarities which are not readily apparent. According to the Rhetoric, "Metaphors should be drawn from objects closely related [apo oikeion] but not obvious to every one at first sight" (III.xi.5). <sup>74</sup> Metaphorizing well requires a grasp of resemblances which escape notice in ordinary perception. This is a seeing of the sameness which obtains in things which are nonetheless different. Aristotle judges that "it needs sagacity to grasp the similarity in things that are apart" (III.xi.5).

The classic definition of metaphor is provided by Aristotle in the Poetics: "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else." In place of the usual or ordinary name, by which Aristotle means "that

in general use in a country," metaphor substitutes an "alien name [allogrios]." The transference (metapherien) of name, whether "from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on the grounds of analogy,"<sup>75</sup> implies, as Paul Ricoeur argues in The Rule of Metaphor,<sup>76</sup> the intuitive perception of resemblance. This can be clearly illustrated in the case of proportional metaphors, that is, those based on analogy (to analogon). Such metaphors involve the apprehension of a similarity between the relationships of two sets of terms. Aristotle's example is as follows. The proportional metaphor which describes a cup as the "shield of Dionysus" is based on the cup being to Dionysus, the god of wine, what a shield is to Ares, the god of war. One can also say that the shield is the "cup of Ares" because "the metaphor from proportion should be reciprocal and applicable to either of the two things of the same genus" (III.iv.4). The equivalence or identity of the sets of relations is what makes the metaphorical transference of names possible. This is the case even when "some of the terms thus related have no special name of their own."<sup>77</sup> The nameless term is seen to have the same relation to its object as that exhibited in the relationship between the named terms.

The Greek word analogon is derived from the conjunction of ana, "upon or throughout," and legein which means "to speak" but originally had the meaning of "to bring together"

or "to gather." Heidegger contends that "In the term  
`analogy` we actually find both meanings [of legein] side by  
side: the original meaning of `relation` and that of  
`speech,` `discourse.`"<sup>78</sup> A proportional metaphor gathers  
that which is the same, that which belongs together, in the  
two different relationships and displays that sameness as a  
unique feature (oikeion)<sup>79</sup> that speaks through dissimilar  
elements. Belonging together as the same is a relation of  
kinship. The sameness resides in the unique feature that  
metaphor discloses, the "generic" relationship, as Ricoeur  
calls it,<sup>80</sup> which is made visible. Thus, as the Rhetoric  
tells us, we can "give names to things that have none by  
deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the same  
kind, so that, as soon as it is uttered, it is clearly seen  
to be akin. [hoti sungenes]" (III.ii.11).

The use of metaphors, particularly those based on  
analogy, are appropriate to a psychological epideictic be-  
cause their transfer of meaning on the basis of resemblance  
reflects the very nature of the ingenious insights of medi-  
tative thinking. Both meditative thinking and the Humanist's  
ingenium require seeing things which belong together but are  
not usually understood as being related. A psychological  
epideixis originates in an insight such as that into how the  
boredom of our alienated everydayness resembles the dis-  
closure of Sein in the call of Home. This insight allows us  
to say that our profound boredom is the call of Home. Being

is the unique feature, the genus, which is gathered and revealed in the metaporizing of psychological epideictic.

The importance of metaphor and metaphorizing for a psychological epideictic is reinforced in metaphor's imbuing discourse with a foreign air. "It is metaphor above all," Aristotle tells us "that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air" (III.ii.8). Quintilian echoes this statement in asserting that "metaphor is designed to move the feelings, give special distinction to things, and place them vividly before the eye" (VIII.vi.19). Ricoeur suggests that this special distinction or foreign air issues from the "interplay between distance and close kinship... [involved] in metaphorical transposition." Ricoeur's thesis is not at odds with our analysis of the uncanniness of a psychological epideixis which was seen to arise from an unexpected disclosure of the latency of the familiar. Despite the apparent dissimilarity or distance between the two, the metaphorical vision of meditative thinking reveals that the signs of the "they's" alienation--its boredom and obsession with the new --and the signs of mortals' appropriation by Sain are the same.

Pleasure is intimately connected to the foreign air produced by metaphor. This pleasure comes of the understanding which follows upon metaphor's disclosure of similarities. Aristotle describes it in the Rhetoric as the pleasure of learning and relates it to metaphor's unsurpassed capaci-

ty to disclose new meanings. "It is metaphor...that above all...teaches and informs us through the genus" ( III.x.2). The gladness of authentic being-in-the-world is the pleasure which issues from the metaphors of a psychological epideixis. This is the joy of learning of one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being.

The third thing given by metaphor is perspicuity or clarity which belongs with a foreign air as one of the chief merit of rhetorical language. "This is shown," as Aristotle says, "by the fact that the speech, if it does not make the meaning clear, will not perform its proper function [that is, it will not be persuasive]" (III.ii.1). Clarity comes from the use of ordinary language. Thus while metaphor's deviation from ordinary usage is required to produce a foreign air, clarity remains the necessary counterbalance to unusual predications. The harmony of clear meaning and distinctive expression is attained by adhering to what is appropriate to the subject matter. With respect to both metaphors themselves and style of speaking in which they appear, propriety "will be secured by observing due proportion" (III.ii.7). This is attained with specific metaphors when they are drawn from things which are akin (so that the transfer of signification does not appear unnatural), and in the general stylistic use of metaphors when "neither weighty matters are treated offhand, nor trifling matters with dignity, and no embellishment is attached to an ordinary

word" (III.vii.2). Appropriate style is a major factor in lending credibility to the discourse. Oravec notes that "style records the `truth` about the...[object of discourse] since the essential quality of the object, not necessarily the empirical facts...produces the effect of verisimilitude."<sup>82</sup>

Previous chapters discussed the importance with which the classical tradition regarded the notion of propriety. It was prominent in sophistic rhetoric in terms of the concept of kairos, an awareness of which provided the basis for determining what was appropriate in all matters which require deliberation. Theophrastus identifies propriety as one of the virtues of style. And for Cicero, propriety or decorum provided the standard in both rhetoric and ethics. In a psychological epideixis, observance of propriety or due proportion issues from an appreciation of the various dimensions of contemporary culture as the circumstance in which it speaks (the unworld of technology), the audience that it addresses (the "they") and the topic of its discourse (the presencing of Sain).

Appropriate metaphors are perspicacious in that they provide an acute perception of the intended meaning. Metaphorical language, to borrow a line from Shelley, "marks the before unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their apprehension."<sup>83</sup> Quintilian notes metaphor's capacity to place things before the eyes. A intuitive grasp of same-

ness occurs in metaphor's concrete presentation of dissimilar things. "'To place before the eyes,'" as Ricoeur argues, "...is not an accessory function of metaphor, but the proper function of the figure of speech."<sup>84</sup> The union of sense and senses, meaning and presentation, res and verba lies at the pivotal point in rhetorical persuasion. Metaphor, as a figure of speech, fuses intuitive clarity with sensual display. The result is the impression of liveliness that typifies metaphorical speaking.

"Liveliness," Aristotle tells us

is got by using the proportional type of metaphor and by being graphic [literally: making your hearers see things]....By "making them see things" I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity (III.xi.1-2).<sup>85</sup>

The unique feature disclosed in an intuition of similarity is made visible as an active reality. By activity, Aristotle means life, movement, animation. Homer's mastery of metaphor is testified to in his speaking "of inanimate things as if they were animate" (III.xi.2). The task of an appropriate, well constructed metaphor is to create the appearance of an active presence in the face of apparent dissimilarity.

Imagination, as we have heard from Vico, is the eye of the ingenium. In making something visible, in letting us see the similar, metaphor presents an image. In "...Poetically Man Dwells....," Heidegger writes:

Our current name for the sight and appearance of something is "image." The nature of the image is to let something be seen...the genuine image...[is] a sight or

spectacle.<sup>86</sup>

Here we are not speaking of the image as the residue of perception, or as a weakened impression, or as decaying sense data. Nor again are we referring to the mere reproduction of something that was once present to perception. Rather, image is meant in the productive sense in which it is the emergence of a new presentation of meaningful relationships. An image is the vision of the meanings which are created by the synthesis of sameness and difference, and fusion of sense and senses which occur in metaphorical attribution. Images issue from metaphors as the re-presentation of the similarity which was concealed in the original appearance of difference. In psychological epideictic's practice of release-ment to things, the image which issues from the metaphor of the fourfold is that of Sein as psychological reality.

Heidegger speculates about the relationship between image and metaphorical language when in his own poetry he muses:

Only image formed keeps the vision.  
Yet image formed rests in the poem.<sup>87</sup>

Metaphor's vision of a unique feature, its intuitive perception of similarity, is beheld in imagistic representation. Ingenium is, has its being, in the eye of the imagination which beholds it. The image, in turn, remains beholden to the poem (epideictic) as the occasion or place of its coming into being.



A similar position is taken by Ricoeur who understands the imagistic dimension of metaphor in terms of "seeing as."

"Seeing as" as Ricoeur quotes from Marcus B. Hester,

is an intuitive experience-act by which one selects from the quasi-sensory mass of imagery one has on reading metaphor the relevant aspects of such imagery.<sup>88</sup>

The experience is of "having" the image, that is, of witnessing the concrete configuration generated by metaphor's "leading before the eyes." The act is understanding or constructing the relevant meaning. As an act of understanding, "seeing as" establishes the similarity on which metaphor turns. And, as an experience of seeing something, "seeing-as" is tied to metaphor's graphic display. Ricoeur points out that the intuitive experience/act of "seeing as" is, like metaphor, not something which can be learned. While one can be prompted, in the end one either does or does not recognize the image.

### Observation

"Seeing as" describes the audience's response to the discourse. The Rhetoric, as we know, defines the hearers of an epideictic as observers or spectators. Images are the spectacles which the audience witnesses. In a psychological epideixis, these images are a metaphorical vision of the concrete Situation of being-in-the-world. In Chapter Three

we discussed Oravec's analysis of observation in terms of its aesthetic, judgemental and comprehending dimensions. By returning to that analysis, as well as to the Humanists' interpretation of the reading of an epideixis, we can specify the particular character of the persuasion engendered by psychological epideictic.

The aesthetic aspects of observation have already been elucidated with respect to the effects of the discourse's foreign air. The element of judgement, on the other hand, relates to the success of the orator in accurately portraying the audience's experience of everydayness. In judging the verisimilitude of the speech, the spectators must discriminate their experience in a manner similar to the differentiations made in the composition of the speech itself. The aesthetic aspect of observation is what brings the two together for in gaining their attention through the use of stylistic amplifications, the orator has engaged the audience in the perspective embodied in his speaking. The audience sees its experience through the very words used by the rhetor and thus must discern that experience according to those words if they are to judge the truthfulness of the speech. In the "Centennial Address," for example, Heidegger's neighbors were required to judge the accuracy of his depiction not only of boredom and fascination with the unfamiliar but also their lived experience of the call of Home. Epideictic, like metaphors themselves when they are

weak or outlandish, can fail. The orator's words do not ring true as they are either unclear or inappropriate.

The judgemental component of observation is cast somewhat differently when epideictic is committed to written form. The persuasive presence of the speaker (in the sense of voice and appearance developed in rhetoric's art of delivery) and the specificity of the actual rhetorical situation is withdrawn from the discourse. To the Ancients, the precision of epideictic style in rendering acute perception of its topic compensated for the absence of the orator and thus recommended its presentation in writing. However, despite the particular virtues of epideictic, when oration becomes text there emerges an accompanying need for interpretation (the art of hermeneutics) in respect to its function of engaging discourse and audience.

Recognizing the implications of the shift from hearing to reading, the Quattrocento Humanists were led to the conception of written epideictic presented by Kahn. In the Humanists' view, the reader's experience of an epideictic is that of a process of interpretation which is required to understand what the text says and thus precedes the hearers' judgement of the discourse's verisimilitude. Before they can see, envision their experience in terms of the discourse, readers must bridge the gap between the world of their experience and the realm of the text's significations. Interpretation is the process of discriminating the meaning

which relates text and reader in what Gadamer has called a "fusion of horizons." This is the meaning which is appropriate to the text within the situation in which it is read. As has already been noted, the Humanists, as do contemporary students of hermeneutics such as Gadamer, assert that in deliberating about appropriate meaning, readers are involved in a process of practical knowledge which sees what is appropriate within a situational context. This has two significant implications for psychological epideictic. First, insofar as the judgements of decorum or propriety which inform interpretation of the epideixis are the same as those required in its composition, the audience participates with the author in disclosing the discourse's insights. This is most clear with respect to the observer's construction of meaning in "seeing as." Second, and in line with the Aristotelian concept of observation, in deliberating about the appropriate meaning of the text with respect to the reader's situation, the reader's experience is itself clarified as the basis for judging the discourse's verisimilitude.

Returning now to theoria in the Rhetoric, the element of judgement precedes understanding of the insight conveyed because unless the audience is convinced of the truthfulness of the topic's depiction they will not comprehend the insight which the orator hopes to convey. Again, epideictic is like metaphor. Comprehension of the similarity residing in

reason "figurative" or "imaginative" and thus in the original sense "theoretical" [theorein--i.e., to see].<sup>91</sup>

Aristotle's identification of the chief merit of rhetorical language as residing in giving the discourse a foreign air, while not allowing the art to be detected and keeping the meaning clear, can now be understood as referring to the ability to generate images. With respect to psychological epideictic, "managing well" means constructing surprising yet clear metaphors which reveal the presencing of Sein in our mundane experience, and doing this in such a way as to seem natural. The impression of artificiality is a constant threat to psychological epideictic and comes of Sein appearing as an abstraction, or worse, a contrived ideology forcefully imposed on experience. The art of this type of epideictic, and the feature which gives it its foreign air, is the discovery and display of psychological reality as the mysterious presencing of Sein latent in our average everydayness. The art is successful when, in observing the discourse's representation of familiar things, the audience recognizes such things as a gathering of the fourfold. Precisely in generating its distinctive images, a psychological epideictic "leaps ahead" of the hearer/reader to disclose the Situation of their being-in-the-world and therein free them for their authentic possibilities. The ability to "leap ahead" of its audience in their potentiality for Being is a defining characteristic of psychological

apparently different things is based on an acceptance of the depiction of those things. The hearers of a psychological epideictic must judge it a truthful presentation of the familiar world (thus the important role of the exordium in establishing the rhetor's credibility) or they will never see its images, never comprehend its re-presentations of Sein.

Comprehension, the third component of observation, is the intuitive act aspect of "seeing as" discussed by Ricoeur. It is the re-cognition of the images' re-presentations. The audience gains insight into the topic of an epideictic discourse insofar as they "get" its images, which is to say, recognize the unique feature or distinctive quality metaphorically displayed. The "getting" of an image is the constructing of relevant meaning which follows upon the aesthetic experience and judgemental act of "having" an image. "Seeing as" is the culmination of the process of observation. Witnessing the spectacles of an epideictic is observation as Oravec defines the term in Aristotle:

theoria [observation] is a psychological function composed of an aesthetic part and a cognitive part, the latter made up of judgement and comprehension.<sup>89</sup>

A psychological epideictic can lead its hearers/readers to "heightened appreciation and intellectual insight," which is how Oravec describes the telos of observation,<sup>90</sup> because, to again borrow Grassi's words,

Such speaking is immediately a "showing"--and for that

epideictic.

In the "Centennial" address, Heidegger describes the way in which meditative thinking responds to the call of Home as it comes to us disguised in the alien. "This way: by being ready and disposed to conserve that from which we originate." Several moments later, he evokes "the healing power of yesterday correctly understood and genuinely appropriated."<sup>92</sup> These remarks would seem to be consistent with Perelman's insistence that the values upon which epideictic generates consensus must necessarily be "traditional and accepted." The conservative nature of epideictic is seen, on this interpretation, to be a function of the genre's exclusive concern with uncontroversial topics. Granted, there are definite overtones of cultural conservatism in Heidegger's speech (such as panegyric references to "the rural regions and small country towns")<sup>93</sup>. Still, the disposition to conserve that from which we originate cannot be identified with adherence to traditionally accepted values any more than the healing power of yesterday can be taken in the sense of old time religion.

As is clear from the discussion of humanism in the previous chapter, Heidegger conceives of the openness of Being as that from which human beings originate. Humanism is rejected for having failed to recognize this Origin and our belonging to it, and therefore having "not set the humanitas of man high enough." Although he follows Nietzsche in rejec-

ting the metaphysics of values, we may venture that the value to which Heidegger's discourse solicits consensus is that of our humanity, "correctly understood and genuinely appropriated." The genuinely conservative nature of Heidegger's epideictic, and by extension the nature too of psychological epideictic, is in its cultivation of the essence of our humanity--standing out as mortals into the openness of Being--as a "meditating and caring" response to the alienation of our everydayness.

Unlike legal or political rhetoric, epideictic persuasion does not direct its audience to specific actions; it engenders a disposition. In Perelman's formulation, epideictic fosters adherence to "certain values which one wants to see prevail and which should orient action in the future."<sup>94</sup> These values, then, are those in light of which one interprets situations and contemplates actions. The craft of meditative thinking, in both the Messkirch speeches and psychological epideictic, seeks to strengthen our disposition as mortals. Mortals are those who conserve the presencing of Sein by dwelling on the earth, beneath the sky, and in the presence of the absent divinities. Our disposition as mortals may allow the authentic Situation of our being-in-the-world to prevail in the midst of the unworld of technology. Our disposition as mortals may orient us in the future which already is in its coming toward us today.

In a discourse begun by asking about the Messkirch of



tomorrow, Heidegger concludes by making a turn back into the power of yesterday. This power is distinct from the sentimental lure of romantic nostalgia. The yesterday, to whose power Heidegger appeals, exists today as what-is-as-having-been; it is the still binding claim of that from which we originate. Its power resides in the potentiality-for-Being which Dasein is as having-been delivered over to its there. The power of yesterday comes toward us from out of the future as the re-petition of our humanity that we experience in the call of Home.

In witnessing the imagistic representation of the call which is generated by the metaphors of an epideictic, spectators are readied and disposed to being appropriated by the ringing mirroring of the fourfold. As we have said, psychological epideictic "leaps ahead" of its readers/listeners by way of such images. The audience who is the Other "leaped ahead" of, is the "they-self" into and out of whose everyday dispositions the rhetor speaks in "order to rouse them and guide them aright." In "leaping ahead" of the "they-self," a psychological epideictic gives care back to the listener's authentic self thereby disposing being-in-the-world to its ownmost possibilities as a mortal.

Psychological epideictic is directed to the "they" but it is not engaged in the denial, repression, or elimination of the "they-self." In their average everydayness, mortals will always be the "they." Much of the time we are just like

everybody else. It is the way we are and who would even want change it? Neither does psychological epideictic attempt to create an authentic "they." Beyond promising to be an unbearable existence, the very conception of an authentic "they" is a contradiction in terms. (As the "they," being-in-the-world accepts the relationship to possibilities which characterizes everydayness. Authenticity denotes one's own, unique relationship to these possibilities.)

Rhetoric, by its very nature, is concerned with those things about which one can deliberate, the things which could be other than they are, things which can change. The alienation of familiar being-in-the-world is such a thing. The "they" changes historically with respect to the specific character of its average everydayness. Certainly the way in which everybody does a particular thing, like the way one wears one's hair, changes constantly both over time and across cultures, even within societies. While apparently insignificant variations in everydayness may foreshadow them, alterations of the essential experiential character of the "they" are of a decidedly more profound, even if subtle, nature. These alterations are seen in the manner in which the "they-self" relates to itself, Others and things. As a historical phenomena, the variability of the "they-self's" experience of being-in-the-world rests with the destiny of Being. In its destinying, Being gives itself to be revealed in various modes of world historical presence. The "they,"

which is itself being-in-the-world, has its essence in standing out, albeit in the averageness of its everydayness, into these regions of Being's presence.

In our age, the alienation of the "they" is destined by the concealing of Being's presence in the Enframing. The signs of this destiny are by now quite familiar. Calculative thinking determines our relationship to all that exists. Things are treated with injurious neglect. Homelessness gnaws at the core of our being. The unworld of technology buzzes with frantic activities over which we seem to have little control. The gods have fled. Earth and sky are reduced to exploitable resources.

We may ask, and most certainly we do, if Being will "turn" and disclose another destinying of revealing? If things will be released from the Enframing and granted the power to gather a world in which mortals might dwell in the nearness of the four? If the divinities will again appear from out of the blue depth of the heavens? At best, we can join with Heidegger in uttering a cautious "perhaps."<sup>95</sup> These are questions for which there are no better human answers. There is, however, a better question. There is a question which is far more appropriate than the others.

In asking about the "turning" of Being as if it were an event to occur in the course of history, we remain locked within the causal and temporal prejudices of calculative thinking and fail to recognize history itself as the advent

of destinying. If we are to be granted insight into the destinying of Being, the question to be asked is: How must we think? To this question we have already heard Heidegger's response: meditative thinking alone stands in dialogue with the world destiny (Weltgeschick). Meditative thinking attends to the destinying of Being by soliciting our openness to the mystery at the heart of the Enframing. It preserves an open place for Being's presencing by disposing us toward things as the gathering of world. In his "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger writes: "for man it is ever a question of finding what is fitting in his essence which corresponds to destinying." <sup>96</sup> Meditative thinking cultivates openness to the mystery and releasement toward things as the actions befitting mortals in an age of technology. For Heidegger, the fate of our humanity lies in the success of meditative thinking as a response to the dominance of calculative rationality.

Psychology appropriates the craft of meditative thinking in order to "set aright" the alienation suffered under the reign of technology. The persuasive force of psychological epideictic is directed toward modification of the "they's" alienated everydayness in two interrelated ways. The first of these, the "leaping ahead" of the "they-self" which opens the authentic self to the Situation in which its ownmost possibilities emerge, has already been specified within the context of both rhetorical theory and the

phenomenology of being-in-the-world. We have said that in being called out of the "they," the self is released to its being-there as a mortal. Being-there is disclosed as mortal in the reflection of earth, sky and divinities. Mortals find themselves and their authentic Situation in the mirror of the world. This is a recovery of the world as a psychological reality, that is, as the mirroring whose reflection grants meaning to life. The mutual mirroring of mortals and the world carries within it the potential to generate ways of experiencing things that are viable alternatives to the calculations of technological rationality. We have described these modes of mortal being-in-the-world as dwelling. In dwelling, mortals bring forth a meaningful world of action and concern by erecting and cultivating things which embody the gathering of the fourfold. In dwelling, mortals come to see the Situation of their being-in-the-world as constellated by the gathering of the fourfold in things. By disposing mortals to dwelling, psychological epideictic conserves the essence of psychological reflection--the ringing mirroring of earth, sky, mortals and divinities--as a world.

Psychological epideictic "leaps ahead" to free mortals from the alienation of the "they-self," but with this the unworld of technology does not disappear. Mortals must still live in an age of plastic hearts, space flight and the profit motive. We still reside in the everydayness of life in the late twentieth century. Mortals, as has been said, will

always be the "they." However, when being the "they" in their necessary dealings with technology, mortals are not bound by the "they's" calculative relationship to things. (Mortals, to use Heidegger's term from Being and Time, do not choose "the `they` for their `hero`".) <sup>97</sup> While employing technological devices just like everyone does, mortals are also receptive to how things condition us. Rather than losing themselves in the fascinating machinations of technology, mortals find themselves in the reality of reflection gathered by things. Dwelling in today's world requires both the appropriate use of things as resources and the responsive preservation of things as disclosing the presencing of  Sein.

The "they" is not immune to the alternative possibilities for being-in-the-world which issue from a release-ment toward things. It encounters these possibilities as they are actualized in the dwelling of mortals and is attracted to them as something new and different. The incorporation of alternatives to calculative thinking into the everydayness of the "they" reduces dwelling to a level of averageness and thereby precludes insight into the ground of dwelling in the mutual mirroring of the fourfold. (This is the experiential reason why an "authentic `they`" is an impossibility.) Yet, even at the level of averageness, the introduction of a non-technological disclosure of the world into the everydayness of being-in-the-world signals a change

in the "they".

The alteration of everydayness occasioned by the dwelling of mortals is the indirect, second way in which psychological epideictic addresses the alienation of the "they". This provides a basis for future epideictic which, by metaphorically re-presenting the now familiar alternative modes of being-in-the-world, can illuminate the reality of reflection concealed in average everydayness and therein reveal anew the Situation of mortal dwelling.

The ultimate success of psychological epideictic in responding to the crisis of the psychological by alleviating the alienation of the "they" is dependent upon the course of destiny. In making such an apparently deterministic, even romantic statement we have succumbed to neither stoic resignation nor mystical quietism. Nor again are we engaged in the type of reflection on Being's "turning" which was rejected earlier. The Enframing is not a preordained fate nor is it subject to human control.

All destinyings are of the character of a mutual appropriation of the essence Being and the essence of humanity--the coming to presence of the one and the preservation of that presence by the other. The danger which threatens in the Enframing is that it conceals its essence as a presencing of Being and thus alienates humans from their own essence. The turn of destiny which would reveal the presencing of Sein in the unworld of the Enframing

requires, says Heidegger, the founding of "an essential relationship between technology and man in respect to their essence."<sup>98</sup> Without this relationship, that is, without humanity's openness to the mysterious presencing of Being in technology and its releasement to things as the openness in which this presencing might come into concealment, the turning cannot come to pass. With it, mortals safeguard the essence of Being and, in that, their own essence as well. Meditative thinking, which is in dialogue with the destinying of Being precisely in its fostering of the aforementioned relationship, is thus the action which is most devoted to both changing the world and preserving the special dignity of being human.

The dependence of psychological epideictic's success on destiny can now be seen in light of the interdependency of mortals and the world in their co-constituting of psychological reality. The "they" of alienated everydayness exist in an unworld populated by human resources, filled to the brim with commodities and ordered by the calculations of technological rationality. Unless things have the power to reflect experience as a meaningful context in which mortals can recognize themselves and their concerns, the world has no genuine psychological reality. Conversely, the calculations, obsessions and other preoccupations of the "they" blind it to recognizing things as anything other than means to an end. Without the disposition of mortals to see themselves as



figured by the things of the world, psychological reality cannot be a world of experience.

Psychological epideictic attempts to recover the psychological by first playing upon the "they's" fascination with the new to gain its attention and then using the art of rhetorical persuasion to alleviate its alienation. What remains beyond the powers of even the most skillfully crafted epideixis is, on the one hand, the ability of the "they" to actually see the images displayed and, on the other, the world's capacity to sustain these images. The one cannot be taught and the other cannot be humanly created. Both come, if they come at all, as if as gifts.

### Peroration

In clarifying the relationship between psychological epideictic and the "they," we have unwittingly followed Cicero's advice in De Inventione where he recommends that a digression for the sake of amplification precede the peroration. The peroration or epilogue is itself divided into two parts by Cicero: amplification and recapitulation. The Rhetorica Ad Herennium suggests the addition of an appeal to emotion. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle attributes four functions to the conclusion: the favorable disposition of the audience, amplification of what has already been said, excitation of emotions, and summary of the proofs.

In the case of an epideixis, which offers amplification as its form of proof, summary and further amplification of that proof are best subordinated to ensuring the audience's approval and arousing their passion. Because a psychological epideictic offers a critique of the "they," it is imperative that the audience is assured that speech's laudatory concern with mortals and dwelling includes each and every one of them. This is all the more urgent because with its air of unfamiliarity, psychological epideictic performs on that thin line between anxiety and gladness, and so can be quite threatening to the audience.

One way of reassuring the audience of the speaker's positive intention toward them and also of reinforcing their engagement in the speech is by amplifying its insights in images which are personally relevant to both speaker and listeners. Heidegger does this in his Messkirch addresses by employing metaphors derived from farming such as those of soil, crops, roots and growth. In addition, he is never at a loss to affirm his ties with the audience by repeatedly mentioning "our home" and "our town," and by referring always to "we" as the agent who attempts meditative thinking. As befitting the intimate atmosphere of his hometown's celebrations, Heidegger includes autobiographical reminiscences which testify to his belongingness in the community. Solidarity with the audience is a key factor in allowing Heidegger to traverse a difficult course of reflection

while minimizing the chances of losing his listeners, or worse, provoking their disdain. In fact, he is able to generate enthusiasm for meditative thinking by linking it to his neighbors' provincial mistrust of the technological changes which come from the big cities, and by bolstering confidence in their own natural inclination toward dwelling.

One can only assume that the special circumstances and oral delivery of Heidegger's addresses allowed for a rapport with his audience which is difficult to replicate in written epideictic. Although the essay versions of these orations may not qualify for any literary prizes, they are exemplary in respect of the due proportion in which they blend metaphorical and ordinary language. More often than not, psychological epideictic will take the form of a text and thus require the interpretative reading discussed above. Appropriate style is essential to inviting readers to engage in the hermeneutic process through which they may become involved in the reflections offered.

Earlier on, the defining characteristic of psychological epideictic was said to be its ability to leap ahead of the audience in their potentiality-for-Being. Beale's generic definition of epideictic, as rhetorical performatives which participate in the reality to which they refer, provides an illuminating context in which to reiterate the salient features of psychological epideictic.

Beale identifies rhetorical performatives as discourses

consisting of three elements. First is a nucleus of performative speech acts. These are utterances which do something beyond just conveying information or making assertions. The nucleus of performative speech acts identify what the rhetorical performative "amounts to" in the sense of engagement in an activity such as praising or blaming someone, or commemorating something. Second is the rhetorical situation as the set of arrangements--political, social, cultural, et cetera--which constellate the speech as a unity and provide the context within which it functions. The interplay between speech acts and rhetorical situation directs the audience's attention to the speech's illocution. The latter, the third element of a rhetorical performative, is the speech's significance in saying what it says, that is in the act of its saying. Depending on the rhetorical situation, this may be the communal or social significance of the speech.

Analysis of a psychological epideictic according to the above definition shows it to be consistent with the concept of a rhetorical performative act. Openness to the mystery and releasement toward things, both of which participate in the realities to which they refer, are the nuclei of performative speech acts which inform us about what the epideictic "amounts to." To be even more specific, the metaphorical speaking of a psychological epideictic, in which it figures openness to the mystery and releasement toward things, can be identified as its nucleus of perfor-

mative speech acts. As metaphorical, these speech acts do much more than convey facts or opinion. They disclose the similarity between apparently dissimilar things and thereby generate images. The performative character of metaphorical speaking resides in the act of "seeing as" which it accomplishes in images. What a psychological epideictic does "amount to" can alternately be described as an alleviation of the alienation of the everydayness of human existence, or a recovery of psychological reality. The two are the same.

The rhetorical situation of a psychological epideictic is the unworld of technology: the disarrangement of the world and the psychological. The unworld, in which things are injuriously neglected and everydayness is alienated, occasions the metaphorical speaking of a psychological epideictic. The crisis of the psychological necessitates the union of openness to the mystery and releasement toward things. Under these circumstances, the metaphorical and imagistic speaking of a psychological epideixis is not only comprehensible but also persuasive.

Following Beale's model, the leaping ahead of the audience in their potentiality-for-Being, which was designated the distinguishing characteristic of psychological epideictic, is now seen as the discourse's illocutionary dimension. The metaphorical amplification of the average experience of living in a technological world moves the audience to see their possibilities anew. The act of leaping

ahead of the "they," which frees them to their authentic possibilities, is a psychological experience. The "leap ahead" transforms the event of the discourse into an experience of world disclosure in which the audience participates. The psychological significance of the epideictic resides within itself as an activity which cultivates the meanings latent in everyday behavior.

## CHAPTER SIX

### RHETORIC AS PHILOSOPHY

#### Popular Psychology and the Feature Story

As we have seen, technological culture and a psychological society belong together. Psychology's specialized expertise confers technological status and with that, social authority. When psychology speaks, the "they" listens. The contemporary relationship between psychology's scientific knowledge and the power to influence daily lives has been clearly demonstrated with respect to advertising. While the work of John B. Watson has been discussed in this regard, there is yet another dimension of psychology's social power exemplified in Watson's career and relevant to the present project.

Beyond, or rather, in tandem with his pioneering work in advertising psychology, Watson also qualifies as the original popular psychologist. Kerry W. Buckley, in his article "The Selling of a Psychologist," describes how Watson, after establishing his behaviorist credo in the hearts and minds (we should say, "behaviors") of his colleagues on Madison Avenue, directed his message to the public at large.

Through an enormous output of books, magazine articles,

and radio broadcasts he was able to establish himself as the public spokesman for the profession of psychology and as an expert on subjects ranging from child rearing to economics. In effect, Watson became the first "pop" psychologist to the expanding middle class, assuming the role once held by the minister in a more rurally based society. In this sense, his writings were designed not only to inform, but to persuade.<sup>1</sup>

Watson's mass media ruminations aimed at persuading the man in the street to see, think, feel, and act in a manner consistent with the scientifically enlightened ordinance of corporate economy. His popular psychology was designed to help prepare the individual to take up his or her appropriate role in the brave new world opened by technological progress.

Just as a critical analysis of advertising has been helpful in developing the project of a rhetorical psychology, Watson's activities as a "pop" psychologist provide a starting point for the reflections on psychological rhetoric undertaken in this chapter. The distinction between the two, rhetorical psychology and psychological rhetoric, has been made in terms of the former discerning the speaking of Sein through things while the latter attempts to address things as they present Sein. While the concerns of rhetorical psychology are primarily theoretical in nature (as witnessed in the previous chapter), those bearing on psychological rhetoric are of a more specific, concrete and generally practical character.

Watson's "pop" psychology and its myriad of contempor-



ary descendants from self-help books and magazine articles on depression and stress, to call-in shows on radio and television, demonstrate not only psychology's popular appeal but its adeptness at reaching the general public via the mass media. Watson's child psychology influenced the way a whole generation was raised. Masters and Johnson helped change the way we look at sexuality. "I'm ok, you're ok" has become part of the vocabulary of everyday conversation.

Popular psychology and rhetorical psychology perform in the same arena--the cosmos of beliefs and perceptions which are the communal world of mundane existence. Both modes of psychology reach beyond the excluding gates of the university and the closed door of the consulting room to directly influence the affairs of daily life. The influence they exert is, however, qualitatively different. Psychological rhetoric seeks to cultivate meanings and display latent possibilities of dwelling. In contrast, most varieties of popular psychology provide definitive advice, based upon scientific data (or the illusion of such), on how to successfully manage our individual behaviors. "Pop" psychology, no less than advertising, instructs us on the correct functioning of lifestyles for the worker/consumer. The "how to" of such psychology is that of how to be the technological "they-self." The success of popular psychology indicates the realm of discourse in which psychological rhetoric might be fruitfully engaged. However, models for such engagement must

necessarily issue from another source.

The practical side of psychological rhetoric stands within the tradition of positive sophistry as it has been detailed in the preceding chapters. Rhetors from Gorgias and Isocrates to those of the Second Sophistic, the Byzantine Empire, and the Renaissance directed many of their discourses to a larger public. Their use of epideictic rhetoric to encourage civic involvement, preserve classical culture, renew communal values, and reinforce personal virtues is to be distinguished from the less than laudable activities ususally associated with sophistry--activities comparable not only to the persuasion illicted by advertising but also the dissemination of ready-made "wisdom" by popular psychology. Renaissance Humanists were "maestri di cultura" (to quote Struever) who spoke about things in terms of their qualities, bringing these qualities into recognizable relief before the eyes of a general audience. The things of which the sophists spoke were very often the things of ordinary experience made extraordinary by virtue of their amplification at the hands of a gifted rhetor.

One of the most common modern forms of epideictic, as discussed earlier, is the magazine and newspaper "human interest" story or "feature" article. (Watson's "pop" psychology articles, it is worth noting, appeared in mass circulation magazines such as Harper's, Cosmopolitan, McCall's, and The Nation.) Like its classical forebearer,

the feature story is a somewhat ambiguous genre. Neither purely "hard" news nor merely fiction, but sharing characteristics of both, the feature story is, a "hybrid of the writing world."<sup>2</sup> As with the news story, it is grounded in facts. Its attention to detail and employment of literary devices likens it to the short story. With the essay it shares the presence of a decided, frequently personal, point of view. And like an advertisement, it contains an "angle" that will inject it, first of all, into a specific "market," and ultimately into the hearts and minds of a specific audience."<sup>3</sup> These characteristics of the feature story, and not surprisingly, the step by step instructions for its composition, are of a kind (albeit in modern journalistic rather than classical rhetorical terminology) with the accounts of epideictic offered in the ancient handbooks.

The "classical feature story" is, by textbook definition,

a creative, sometimes subjective, article designed to entertain and to inform readers of an event, a situation or an aspect of life.<sup>4</sup>

Or again, this time in the words of one of its practitioners,

A feature offers a fresh approach: A way of capturing the pathos, drama, laughter of the everyday scene. A feature is sort of like a sandwich, with slabs of frosted cake on each side and meat and potatoes, garnished with plenty of seasoning, in the middle.<sup>5</sup>

While feature articles do--to a greater or lesser degree--inform their audience, engaging the reader is of paramount concern. Indeed the feature writer's goal of rendering the

reader a "vicarious participant" is directly analagous to Aristotle's conception of the role of the hearers of an epideictic. Thus, for the writer of such stories just as the epideictic rhetor, the approach taken to the phenomena is the essential dimension of his or her craft.

Feature articles require both a different eye and touch than do news stories. To pluck the heart strings of the public, the contemporary feature writer, no less than the classical epideictic rhetor, must keep a sensitive finger on the pulse of culture. Perspective feature writers are advised that to be successful they must learn

to sense immediately the unusual, humorous, dramatic, or sad elements in an occurrence....The trick is to recognize the distinctive character of the event.<sup>6</sup>

What the feature writer must possess is imagination, the eye of the ingenium as it is called by Vico. The ingenuity of the feature writer is that of the epideictic rhetor who, in focusing on the qualitative dimension of the phenomena, gains insight into its distinctive character. In order to convey this character, and thereby engage its reader, the language of the feature story must too be imaginative in the classical sense of phantasia as a leading before the eyes. Ornate style typified by the use of metaphors, which is the hallmark of epideictic, is the language appropriate to the feature story. Again, aside from the nomenclature, the following observation from a journalism text could well have been taken a rhetorical tract:

Feature writers also concern themselves more with style--that is "fine" writing--than do other reporters. They are given greater freedom in their use of language. The results aim at color as well as clarity....a moving picture in prose of something real.<sup>7</sup>

The epideictic character of feature articles makes this modern journalistic genre the prototypical medium for a rhetorical psychology. As their name asserts, these stories feature things--artifacts, events, practices, experiences, et cetera--in terms of their human interest. The topos is that of quality. Interest is directed to what kind of a thing it is, not that it is, id est, lived-meaning rather than the factual information as conveyed in "hard" news stories.

The journalist's frame of reference in intuiting and displaying qualities is the audience's common sense of things. This audience, the general public, is the "they" in its alienated everydayness. Their sense of things is one enframed by technology. The rhetorical psychologist, on the other hand, endeavors to disclose the latent presencing of Sein in the things of the "they's" unworld of technology. As a feature writer, the psychologist attempts to revision popular perceptions in stories which re-present things in their "thingness" as they gather worlds of psychological reflection.

The critical theorist Leo Lowenthal wrote that "Mass culture is psychoanalysis in reverse."<sup>8</sup> The understanding of

human desire which enables psychoanalysis to lift repression is used by mass culture to enforce it. In the same vein, one might say that psychological rhetoric is "pop" psychology, or even advertising, in reverse. It is precisely in this sense that psychological feature stories are psychological rhetoric.

Cloaked in the mantle of scientific progress, "pop" psychology goes to press in order to advise the public on health and happiness in light of the latest findings of quantitative research. While they do not always buy it, the "they" do buy into psychology's authority to predict and control behaviors. Psychological feature stories may be able to find their way into print because the public wants to know "What does psychology have to say?" about virtually every aspect of modern life. The writer of such stories recognizes both the authority granted to the psychologist (ethos) and the aforementioned disposition of the audience (pathos) but does not then proceed to present the "answers" (logos) discovered by behavioral science. Instead, the psychological feature writer employs his or her craft to persuade the public to listen to what the things of everyday life are saying about our psychological experience. The dynamics and the difficulties of this undertaking have been the subject of previous chapters. What remains is to provide, if only in rough outline, is an example of a possible topic and its treatment in a psychological feature story. It

must be kept in mind that this outline only "tells" what the actual story would have to "show."

### Walkman to a Different Drummer

The incredible popularity of portable, personal stereos like the Walkman is a prime example of our culture's fascination with the latest technological gadgetry. A psychological feature story would display this phenomena in light of its transformation of ordinary experience.

In writing about personal stereos, or anything else that is as popular, the psychological feature writer takes a lesson from the sophists of the later Empire. Little good is done by a direct assault on the powers that be, especially if dissent is deemed treason, or, as in this case, Ludditism. Irony better serves one's purposes. An ironic panegyric of the Walkman may evoke psychological reflection and yet avoid the annoyance which would be automatically provoked by criticism of a much enjoyed technology.

What immediately strikes one as laudable about personal stereos is that they turn mindless, routine activities into something relatively pleasant. Clip the tuner/cassete player to your belt, slip the headphones on, press a switch and like magic, boredom is replaced by education or entertainment (depending on the channel or tape). This virtually effortless transformation of experience is a modern tech-

nological miracle, a miracle that almost everyone can afford to own.

Few of today's activities are perceived to be as depersonalizing or as boring and as our daily commute. Not surprisingly, the commuter, particularly the rider of public transportation, is probably the most common and highest frequency user of personal stereos. We have all seen the strangely muffled ears, rhythmically swaying torsos, and slightly glazed eyes which crowd city bus and suburban train. And who can blame them for their escape? Although we most often just grin and bear it, how many times have we felt it an affront to be packed into a public vehicle, sandwiched between total strangers. We feel somehow violated by disturbing sights, distracting sounds, disgusting smells, and an occasional direct touch. And then there is the time--all that wasted, empty time that drags by as we wait to reach our destinations.

Listening to a Walkman is a "head trip" and having your "head" in the place you want it makes the unpleasanties and drudgery of commuting a little easier to bear. But, where is this "place?" Where is your "head at" while you are wired up to one of these electronic boxes?

Commuting is the long, cyclical journey between the public and private realms of modern life. For many of us, it is the mundane, monotonous morning trek from where we want to stay--home, to where we have to go--work or school.



Evening rush hour finds us frantically dashing to where we would like to be--anywhere but work or school, which usually means home. Putting on a Walkman is a refusal to give up being (or, alternately, the expression of the desire to be) where we want, at the same time that it is an affirmation of our going where necessity commands us. The compelling power of these compact devices is that they provide momentary shelter from the work a day world by enabling us to port our homes around with us.

The outward appearance of the headphoned commuter suggests that he or she has withdrawn into their own personal "space", oblivious to the world around them. They are listening to something that we cannot hear; they are immersed in KFAT, or Michael Jackson, or the Ten Minute Manager. (You will know for sure which it is if you have misfortune of having to take a bus or even a long elevator ride shoved up next to someone with a "leaky" headset.) The individual commuter accesses the collective consciousness encoded in the audio cassette and does so without even having to compromise the sanctity of their "space" by communicating with the person next to them.

The individual's apparent power to privatize public space is indeed heady stuff. The marvelous technology of the "Walkman" allows you to keep your mind for yourself. The body goes through the motions of required behaviors while the mind retreats to a stereophonic inner sanctum. Absent

mindedness takes on a whole new meaning. What is more, the power to perform this feat, which is always at your finger tips when one of these miniature stereos is strapped to your body, quickly becomes an indispensable part of our average everydayness.

The "Walkman" rescues us from boredom by transporting us into the stimulating audio media worlds in which we feel at home. The personal, portable stereo is our salvation from the depersonalization of daily commutes on mass transportation. The irony is that even while it accomplishes everything that we have come to expect from it, this sophisticated technology assails the integrity of the very thing we are trying so hard to maintain--our own unique subjectivity. Personal "space," as defined by the portable stereo, means private consumption of mass media products. Harried by the assorted pressures of modern life, we all too often confuse private pleasures with the maintenance of personal identity. There is nothing personal about the high fidelity sounds that filter out the undesirable elements of our public commutes. The "Walkman" simply substitutes one reality, (albeit a more entertaining one) the mass media, for another, mass transportation. Far from making us feel at home in the world, the "Walkman" drowns out the people and things, ideas and feelings in which we might find a home. By flooding our personal "space" with the latest sounds, portable stereos do not leave much of a place for us to be

ourselves.

After reading such an article, the audience's behavior will not necessarily change, that is, they will not stop listening to the Walkman. However, the hope is that their experience of such listening will now be informed by a degree of insight into the difference these devices make in their daily routines. Maybe the habitual ease with which they routinely plug into their "personal," portable stereo systems will be edged with an uneasiness about this difference. From the perspective of rhetorical psychology, uneasiness about the ways in which technology re-creates even the little things in our lives is step toward an appropriate (prepon) response to the uncanniness of our world.

## EPILOGUE

Rhetorical psychology offers a sophisticated approach to the "life situation" problems with which we began our reflections. Webster's defines "sophisticated" as: "not simple, artless, naive, etc.; urbane, worldly-wise, etc. or knowledgeable, perceptive, subtle, etc." <sup>1</sup> The sophistication of this psychology is directly attributable to its dual origin in a phenomenological conception of the world and the classical art of rhetoric.

Essential to rhetorical psychology is the recognition of the worldly character of experience. This recognition comes of following the "turn" from Dasein to Sein which occurs in Heidegger's later thought. The "turn" allows us to understand the presencing of Being in terms of psychological rather than metaphysical reality. Sein, the presencing of Being as the world, is the reality of reflection which is the realm of psychological experience. Heidegger's description of Sein as the gathering of the fourfold provides a way of imagining the world as psychological reality. In the configuration of the fourfold--the ringing mirroring of earth, sky, mortals and divinities which is presented in things--psychology discovers an illuminating image of the dynamic complexity of human experience. The image of the fourfold is a subtle discrimination of the relatedness which textures psychological reflection. The historically varying constel-

lations of the four are a key to fathoming the changes in psychological life which mark one era from another.

We have seen the "life-situation" problems which individuals now bring to therapy as a sign of the overall crisis of the psychological which occurs in an age of technology. The general form of the crisis is the alienation of the everydayness of being-in-the-world. Rhetorical psychology is not naive about the essence of technology. To the contrary, there is a profound sense in which it is wise in the ways of the world. The alienation of everydayness is understood in terms of the technological Enframing of the world which, in reducing everything to manipulable resources, obliterates psychological reflection.

The recovery of psychological reality may be possible by way of what Heidegger calls "meditative thinking." Psychological epideictic appropriates meditative thinking's twofold directive of "openness to the mystery" and "releasement toward things" as a response to the crisis of the psychological. This crisis, as we have noted from Romanynshyn, consists of the world being devoid of the psychological and the psychological lacking a world. Openness to the mystery seeks to discover the psychological reality of the technological world by intuiting the presencing of Sein which is concealed in the Enframing. Releasement toward things is a counteractive to technology's injurious neglect of things which attempts to restore the power of things to gather

and reveal a world of psychological experience.

In turning to classical rhetoric--the tradition's sophistic strand in particular--for its knowledge of the craft of meditative thinking, psychological epideictic is sophisticated in both the descriptive and historical senses of the term. The history of sophistic rhetoric is an inspiration for psychology to address the psychological conditions of the polis by way of discourses which actively participate in the life of the culture.

The theoretical and practical art of rhetoric supplies the schooling psychology needs to construct persuasive epideictic. Epideictic rhetoric, the genre of praise and censure, ingeniously displays the inherent qualities of its subject in light of the audience's values and perceptions. Ornate figures of speech, primarily metaphors, are employed to incite the audience's imagination and lead before their eyes (phainesthai) previously unapprehended relations which obtain within the world of their experience. The quality of contemporary life is disclosed in feature stories that show how things matter to us psychologically, that is, how they make a difference in our lives. Meanings are qualitatively amplified, not reductively deduced. In their figurative presentation of psychological meanings, such feature stories "leap ahead" of the "they" in its alienated everydayness to disclose possibilities of mortal dwelling. Far from superficial, their images display an openness to the mystery

latent within technology in the hope that we may intuit a new common sense of things during a time when we feel homeless and the world seems come undone.

The psychology proposed in this dissertation would employ the epideictic performance of meditative thinking to cultivate the meanings of behavior. It would preserve the sophistication of psychological life itself as an appropriate response to the Enframing of technology. In its rhetorical and phenomenological sophistication, rhetorical psychology may play a part in the recovery of psychological reflection and in so doing help us retrieve our humanity.

Evaluation of Sein-analysis' claim to stand outside metaphysics, and what is more, the trial by fire of rhetorical psychology's attempt to cultivate a non-technological sensus communis is ultimately decided with respect to the feature stories it creates. In these stories it will be seen whether Sein-analysis can serve the rhetorical function of myth or if it too becomes literalized as yet another enframing system of representative (and thus calculative) conceptualizations. The audience will have to decide whether or not psychological rhetoric's metaphorical images are persuasive. And it is history itself which will render judgement as to rhetorical psychology's role in releasing us from the Enframing of technology or its acquiescence in binding us to yet another metaphysical humanism.

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sial character of both my reading of Being and Time from the other side of the turn in Heidegger's thought, and Grassi's understanding of Vico and Italian Humanism. My overall intention has been to utilize provocative approaches to philosophical matters in the hope of showing their psychological significance.

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CHAPTER TWO

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"leaping in" provides a basis for describing the rhetoric of  
totalitarian regimes, such as that of the National  
Socialists. The telos of Nazi rhetoric was a "they-self"

given over to the dictates of the Führer. The "they" is disburdened of authentically appropriating its possibilities in that these have been prescribed by the "conscience" of the German people, Adolph Hitler. (Theodor Adorno, in The Authoritarian Personality, uses psychoanalytical constructs to characterize the "they-self" which fell under the spell of such rhetoric as possessing an "externalized superego.") In sharp contrast, the rhetorical psychology developed in this dissertation neither prescribes possibilities nor attempts to control the "they-self."

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